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Abstract 
The goal of the present research was to examine the nature of masked priming with an 
emphasis on the influence of stimulus-response (S-R) associations.  In Chapter 2, both 
the magnitude of the category congruence (priming) effect and the nature of the priming 
distance effect were assessed in two number classification tasks.  Participants made either 
magnitude (i.e., is the target larger or smaller than ‘5’?) or identification judgments (i.e., 
press one button if the target is a ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ or ‘4’ or the other button if the target is a 
‘6’, ‘7’, ‘8’ or ‘9’).  Priming distance effects in both tasks indicated that, regardless of 
task instructions, semantic activation played a key role in producing masked priming 
even when the identification task showed evidence of priming from S-R associations.  In 
Chapter 3, category learning tasks were used involving stimuli having neither the ability 
to activate semantic information nor any a priori response associations.  Participants 
learned, through feedback, artificially-defined category sets.  Each category contained a 
prototype item that served as a masked prime.  In the single-session tasks, responses were 
faster when a stimulus was primed by its own prototype versus the prototype of the other 
category, however, this (priming) effect only increased in size when participants 
performed the task over multiple sessions, indicating that it takes considerable time for 
the S-R associations to develop and impact priming. The research in Chapters 2 and 3 
was based on a prospective view of masked priming.  There is, however, an alternative 
retrospective view supported by numerous demonstrations of prime validity effects (i.e., 
larger priming effects when the proportion of congruent trials is high).  In Chapter 4, an 
arrow classification task with free choice stimuli was used to examine this debate.  The 
prime-target relationship for the arrow targets was either: a) always congruent, b) always 
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incongruent, or c) unpredictive.  Prime validity effects for the free choice trials (i.e., trials 
involving “either way” stimuli, e.g., < >, for which either response was acceptable) 
occurred using both 77 ms and 165 ms prime-target intervals. The results in the 
unpredictive conditions support a prospective view of masked priming since they indicate 
that it was response bias suppression when the proportion of incongruent trials was high 
that produced the prime validity effects. 
 
Keywords:  masked priming, S-R associations, semantic activation, depth of processing, 
number classification, category learning, arrow classification,  task strategies, response 
biases, prospective view of masked priming, retrospective view of masked priming, 
prime validity effects, memory recruitment account, priming distance effects 
                                                                                      
 
v
Co-Authorship Statement 
The contents of Chapter 4 were recently published in Attention Perception and 
Psychophysics.  The contents of Chapters 2 have been submitted to the Canadian Journal 
of Experimental Psychology.  The contents of Chapter 3 have been submitted to Memory 
& Cognition. 
Each of these manuscripts are by Jason R. Perry and Dr. Stephen J. Lupker. They 
were all primarily written by Jason R. Perry. 
 
Citations: 
Perry, J.R. & Lupker, S.J. (2010).  A prospective view of the impact of prime validity on  
response speed and selection in the arrow classification task with free choice 
trials.  Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72, 528-537. 
Perry, J.R. & Lupker, S.J. (submitted).  An investigation of the time course of category  
congruence and semantic distance effects in number classification tasks.  
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology.  44 pp. 
Perry, J.R. & Lupker, S.J. (submitted).  An investigation of the effects of masked primes  
using artificial category sets.  Memory & Cognition.  35 pp. 
                                                                                      
 
vi
Acknowledgments 
 I am extremely grateful and wonderfully blessed to have had Dr. Stephen Lupker 
as my supervisor.  He has been a source of incredible support and encouragement 
throughout my graduate career.   
 I wish to extend my love and gratitude to my girlfriend, Hilary Oatman, for 
believing in me.  Her love, support, and encouragement mean more than words can 
express. 
I also wish to thank my family who cheered me on as I wrote this thesis.  I love 
you all!! 
 I want to thank Tamsen Taylor, Matt Waxer, Tatjana Ilic-Balas, Eric 
Stinchcombe, and James Boylan who have been some of my closest friends and fellow 
graduate students over the course of my graduate career.  Their support and friendship 
has been a wonderful gift from God.  And I also want to thank Jason Tucker who, though 
not a graduate student, nevertheless had nothing but encouragement for my research. 
 Finally, I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments from my examiners.  Their 
input has improved the quality of this research. 
 
For the Glory of God who strengthens and helps us and upholds us with His righteous 
right hand (Isaiah 41:9) 
 
                                                                                      
 
vii
Table of Contents 
 
CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION.…………………………………………………...ii 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...iii 
Co-Authorship Statement………………………………………………………………….v 
Acknowledgments………………………………..………………………………………vi 
 
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………...vii 
 
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………viii 
 
List of Appendices……………………………………………………………………..…ix 
 
Chapter 1: General Introduction…………………………………………………………..1 
 
Chapter 2: Number Classifications…………………………………................................24 
Addendum to Chapter 2………………………………………………………………….61 
Chapter 3: Category Learning Tasks with Masked Primes ……………………………..65 
Addendum to Chapter 3………………………………………………………………….98 
Chapter 4: Target Arrow Classifications with Free Choice Trials…………….……….102 
Chapter 5: Conclusions……..……………………………………………………….….137 
 
Appendices……………………………………………………………………………...160 
 
Vita……………………………………………………………………………………...174 
 
                                                                                      
 
viii
List of Tables 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Table 1.     Category Congruence Effects and the Priming Distance Effect for the 
Magnitude Judgment Task – Experiment 1 …………………………...……37 
 
Table 2.     Category Congruence Effects and the Priming Distance Effect for the Target 
Identification Task – Experiment 2 ………………………………………....40 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Table 1. Results for Category Learning - Experiment 1 ……………………..………76 
 
Table 2. Results for Category Learning - Experiment 2 ………………………..……81 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Table 1.    Results for Either-Way Responses.................................................................116 
 
Appendix D 
 
Table 1. Results for Non-Prototype Targets as a Function of Learning Ability…….167 
 
                                                                                      
 
ix
List of Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Stimuli lists................................................................................................160 
Appendix B: Prime discrimination data for number classifications ...............................161 
Appendix C: Double-digit magnitude judgment task .....................................................162 
Appendix D: Post-hoc analysis for category learning experiments…………………….165 
Appendix E: Prime discrimination data for arrow classifications……………………...170 
Appendix F: Consent form…………………………………………………………...…172 
Appendix G: Ethics approval…………………………………………………………...173 
 
                                                                                      
 
1
Chapter 1 – General Introduction 
 There is a pervasive belief that the presentation of stimuli outside of one’s 
awareness affects behaviour.  Advertisers, for instance, have for many years embedded 
images within their advertisements in order to affect one’s desire for the advertised 
product.  Electronic gaming machines have also been programmed to flash winning 
jackpot symbols in order to influence gamblers’ behaviour.  Although there is 
surprisingly little evidence about whether these techniques actually work, there is, as will 
be discussed, good scientific evidence that the presentation of stimuli outside of one’s 
awareness can  affect behavior.  The questions addressed in this dissertation concern the 
nature of the processes by which that happens.  
It has been known for some time that information which is not directly attended 
can influence behaviour.  For instance, in the Stroop (1935) task subjects respond to the 
ink color of a color word (see MacLeod, 1991, for a review).  The key finding is that 
responses are faster when the identity of the ink color and the word are congruent (e.g., 
the word BLUE written in blue ink) versus when they are incongruent (e.g., the word 
BLUE written in red ink).  The standard explanation for Stroop effects is that the 
presentation of a stimulus automatically activates the response associated with the 
irrelevant dimension (i.e., the word’s name) even though people are purposely not 
attending to the word and that processing is slowed down when that response conflicts 
with the appropriate response. 
The notion that non-attended stimuli can impact processing due to the fact that 
they activate stimulus-response (S-R) associations also plays a crucial role in Klapp and 
Greenberg’s (2009) theory of automaticity as well as Kornblum, Hasbroucq, and 
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Osman’s (1990) dimensional overlap model.  It is also an important assumption in 
research investigating visual selective attention (see Fox, 1995, for a review) and 
cognitive control (e.g., Bugg, Jacoby, & Chanani, 2010; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 
2003).  In the Stroop task, however, the words are not actually presented outside of one’s 
awareness and are, instead, clearly visible. To investigate the impact of stimuli that are 
presented outside of awareness, a more recently developed experimental technique of 
masked priming has typically been employed (e.g., Forster & Davis, 1984; Marcel, 
1983). 
In a masked priming paradigm, a forward mask precedes a briefly presented 
prime (typically 60 ms or less) which is then followed by a target stimulus that requires a 
response.  In this situation, participants are typically unaware not only of the prime’s 
identity but also of its existence.  According to an S-R association account of masked 
priming, when the prime stimuli have an associated response (e.g., press the left response 
key when an arrow points to the left) that response is activated by the prime causing 
responses to be faster when the target is preceded by a prime which requires the same 
response as the target (i.e., a congruent trial) as opposed to a prime which requires a 
different response (i.e., an incongruent trial).   
According to this view, subliminal stimuli are processed to only a fairly low level 
and, therefore, will not likely affect higher-level cognitive processing (e.g., gambling 
behaviour).  Note, however, that there is an alternative view which is that subliminally 
presented stimuli are processed to the point that semantic information is activated with 
that semantic information producing the priming effect.  Therefore, understanding how S-
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R associations and semantic activation interact in order to produce subliminal priming 
effects is a vital area of cognitive research.    
An S-R Association Account of Masked Priming 
According to an S-R association account of masked priming, lower-level (non-
semantic) associations are formed between target stimuli and their responses due to their 
repeated presentations and classifications (see, e.g., Abrams, 2005; Abrams & 
Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Klotz & Neumann, 1999).  
Once formed, presentation of these stimuli as masked primes produces a bias to respond 
with their associated response.  This response bias aids target responding on congruent 
trials and interferes with target responding on incongruent trials. 
One source of support for an S-R association account comes from Eimer and 
Schlaghecken’s (1998) task in which participants responded to arrow targets that required 
a directional (i.e., left (<<) or right (>>)) response.  These targets were preceded by 
masked prime arrows.  When the interval between the prime and target was brief, 
responding was faster when the prime and target arrows pointed in the same direction 
(e.g., Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000, 2002).   
Interestingly, Eimer and Schlaghecken’s (1998; 2002) results with a longer prime-
target interval show exactly the reverse pattern, that is, participants responded 
significantly faster when the prime and target arrows pointed in opposite directions as 
opposed to the same direction (a “negative priming effect”).  Measurements of event-
related potentials (ERPs) helped explain this negative priming effect by demonstrating 
that a masked arrow prime initially activates the motor response which corresponds to the 
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direction of that prime.  However, as time passes this response activation diminishes and 
the opposite motor response becomes activated. 
Further research has shown that, in addition to response latencies, masked arrow 
primes also affect response selection probabilities in tasks where arrow target trials are 
interspersed with trials involving either-way targets (< >), targets for which either 
response is legitimate (see Bodner & Mulji, 2010; Klapp & Haas, 2005; Klapp & 
Hinkley, 2002; Perry & Lupker, 2010; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Schlaghecken, 
Klapp, & Maylor, 2009).  Specifically, responses in these “free choice” trials are more 
frequent and faster when they match the direction of the masked prime at short prime-
target intervals, but at longer prime-target intervals the pattern reverses (see especially 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004).  According to an S-R association account these effects 
occur because the masked prime activates its associated response making that response 
both more likely and more rapidly executed initially with  the opposite response gaining 
strength as time passes. 
Old Versus New Set Priming 
A crucial prediction of any type of S-R association account of masked priming is 
that priming should only occur for primes that have been previously presented and 
responded to as target stimuli (i.e., “old set primes”), whereas primes which have not 
been previously responded to as targets (i.e., “new set primes”) should not produce 
priming since response biases have not been formed for these primes.  Support for this 
prediction comes from Damian’s (2001) physical size (large or small) judgment task in 
which Dutch concrete nouns were presented as targets and preceded by masked primes.  
Specifically, a masked priming effect occurred such that responses were faster when both 
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the prime and target corresponded to either large or small items (i.e., a congruent trial) 
than when the prime and target corresponded to items of opposite sizes (i.e., an 
incongruent trial) when old set primes were used (Experiment 1), but not when new set 
primes were used (Experiment 2). 
An additional prediction of any type of S-R association account, which will be 
examined frequently in this dissertation , is that priming driven by response biases should 
increase in size over trials since response biases are formed and strengthened as a 
function of exposure to the target stimuli.  Damian’s (2001, Experiment 1) results using 
old set primes provide support for this prediction as there was, in fact, an increase in the 
size of the priming effect over trial blocks. 
Evidence for Semantic Activation:  Priming from New Set Primes  
If all masked priming effects were due to the impact of  S-R associations then it is 
likely that the  processing of stimuli appearing outside of awareness only reaches a fairly 
low level and, therefore, such processing will not likely affect higher-level cognitive 
processing (e.g., gambling behavior).  However, in contrast to Damian’s (2001) results, 
another line of masked priming research has produced numerous demonstrations of 
priming from new set primes (e.g., Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Klauer, Eder, 
Greenwald & Abrams, 2007; Kinoshita & Hunt, 2008; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 
2003, 2005; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Reynvoet, Caessens & Brysbaert, 2002; 
Reynvoet, Gevers & Caessens, 2005; Quinn & Kinoshita, 2008; Van den Bussche, 
Notebaert & Reynvoet, 2009; Van den Bussche & Reynvoet, 2007),  results that 
challenge the notion that masked priming is due solely to S-R associations.  That is, if 
masked primes merely activate learned S-R associations, then masked priming effects 
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should never occur for new set primes because there has been no opportunity to form S-R 
associations for those primes.  The fact that priming from new set primes is a common 
finding indicates that masked primes are often processed in a way that involves the 
activation of semantic information and that it is semantic information, as opposed to 
learned S-R associations, that is responsible for producing priming.  The fact that masked 
primes can activate semantic information supports the possibility that stimuli presented 
outside of awareness can have a noticeable effect on higher-level cognitive processing. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, what needs to be kept in mind is that S-R 
association and semantic activation accounts are not mutually exclusive.  That is, 
demonstrations of semantically-based priming (i.e., priming from new set primes) does 
not rule out the possibility that, in some situations (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; 
Damian, 2001), S-R associations may play an important role in producing masked 
priming effects.  That is, even if masked primes inevitably activate semantic information, 
the possibility that S-R associations are also activated by masked primes and influence 
subsequent behavior is certainly not excluded.  In fact, Kinoshita and Hunt (2008) 
recently provided data that suggest a role for S-R associations in masked priming even 
when new set primes are effective primes (i.e., when semantically-based priming arises). 
Kinoshita and Hunt (2008):  A Two-Component Account of Masked Priming 
Kinoshita and Hunt (2008) demonstrated priming in a magnitude judgment task 
using both old and new set masked primes (replicating Naccache & Dehaene, 2001).  
However, in contrast to the previous research, Kinoshita and Hunt provided an analysis 
based on the full latency distributions for each condition.  Their analysis demonstrated 
that, in the longer latency bins (i.e., the right tail of the distribution), the congruent trials 
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in the old set prime condition showed a noticeable slowdown (relative to incongruent trial 
conditions as well as the congruent prime condition for the new set primes).  As a result, 
old set primes did not produce a masked priming effect in these longer latency bins even 
though new set primes did. 
Kinoshita and Hunt (2008) concluded that their results indicate that masked 
priming involves two different automatic components.  One component reflects the 
congruence between the prime and target in terms of task-defined features (e.g., size in a 
size judgment task) and relies upon semantic information activated by the masked prime.  
The other component is assumed to be transitory and relies upon activation of S-R 
associations by the masked primes.  It is the disappearance of this second component 
when latencies get to be long which accounts for the lack of priming from old set primes 
in the longer latency bins. 
Kinoshita and Hunt’s (2008) results are, therefore, consistent with the notion that 
masked primes are processed in a way that causes both semantics and S-R associations to 
be activated and, further, that both play some role in the priming process.  Specifically, 
their results suggest that priming for their new set primes was semantically-based, 
whereas priming for their old set primes was based mainly on S-R associations.  These 
results, therefore, suggest that there may be a rather complex interaction between the 
types of information activated by masked primes and the processes that produce masked 
priming effects. 
The Role of Task-Defined Strategies 
Recent research has also demonstrated that another factor that influences the 
nature of any masked priming effects is the nature of the task’s requirements.  For 
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example, Kunde et al. (2003) demonstrated that priming extended to new set primes 
when participants were required to make magnitude judgments, but not when participants 
were required to identify the target with a button press response.  Further, the size of the 
target set (e.g., Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, & Hoffmann, 2006; Pohl, Kiesel, Kunde, & 
Hoffmann, 2010) and the category (e.g., Abrams, 2008) also appear to affect whether 
new set primes produce priming. 
Additional support for this idea comes from studies that have demonstrated that 
when primes and targets vary along two dimensions (e.g., parity and magnitude) masked 
priming is based solely upon prime-target congruency according to the specific judgment 
task (e.g., parity or magnitude) that the participant was engaged in (e.g., Bodner & 
Dypvik, 2005; Eckstein & Perrig, 2007; Klinger, Burton & Pitts, 2000).  Studies have 
also shown that factors such as the targets’ features (e.g., Pohl et al., 2010) and 
orientation (e.g., Elsner, Kunde & Kiesel, 2008), whether participants perform lexical 
decisions or same-different classifications (e.g., Norris & Kinoshita, 2008), and whether 
double-digit magnitude judgments (i.e., is the two-digit target greater than or less than 
‘55’?) are made based only upon the identity of the first digit or the identity of the second 
digit (e.g., Greenwald, Abrams, Naccache & Dehaene, 2003) also affect the nature of any 
masked priming effects.  Taken together, these results suggest that the source of any 
observed priming effects (i.e., S-R associations or semantic activation) is very much 
dependent on both task instructions and participants’ processing strategies which also 
implies a fairly complex interaction between the types of information activated by 
masked primes and the processes that produce masked priming effects. 
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Masked Prime Processing Mechanisms:  Prime Validity Effects 
 The generally accepted “prospective” view of how the mechanisms of masked 
priming function, regardless of whether masked priming effects are assumed to be due to 
semantic activation or S-R associations (or both), is based on two key assumptions.  The 
first assumption is that the presentation of a masked prime induces a temporary state of 
activation in the cognitive system which, in turn, affects the speed with which a 
subsequently presented target is processed.  The second assumption is that, since 
participants do not report any awareness of these masked primes, any episodic trace left 
by these primes should be so weak that any effect of the prime must have been due solely 
to automatic, rather than strategic, activation processes (see Forster & Davis, 1984; 
Masson & Bodner, 2003).  If this second assumption is correct then it suggests that the 
ability of stimuli presented outside awareness to influence subsequent behavior is 
somewhat limited. 
There is, however, increasing evidence for an alternative “retrospective” view of 
masked priming which denies both of the assumptions of the prospective view and 
instead, adopts two markedly different assumptions.  The first assumption is that the 
primes (even when they are presented briefly and masked) form reasonably strong 
episodic traces.  The second assumption is that, in an effort to aid target processing, the 
cognitive system strategically adjusts the extent to which it relies upon information from 
these episodic traces (even though the viewer is typically unaware of both the presence of 
the prime and its identity). 
The strongest evidence for a retrospective view has come from Bodner and 
colleagues who have demonstrated, in a variety of cognitive tasks, that priming effects 
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are larger when the percentage of trials in which the target is related to the prime is high 
(typically 80%) compared to when it is low (typically 20%) (e.g., Bodner & Dypvik, 
2005; Bodner & Masson, 2001, 2003, 2004; Bodner, Masson & Richard, 2006; Bodner & 
Mulji, 2010; Jaskowski, Skalska & Verleger, 2003; Klapp, 2007).  To account for the 
pervasiveness of these “prime validity” effects, Bodner and Masson (2001; Masson & 
Bodner, 2003) proposed a “memory recruitment account” which is based on a 
retrospective view of masked priming.  Specifically, when the information that can be 
derived from a masked prime is often beneficial for target processing (e.g., a prime arrow 
which often points in the same direction as the target arrow), then the cognitive system 
adopts a target processing strategy which involves placing some reliance upon 
information derived from the prime’s episodic trace.  Because this information (which 
could be based on either semantics or S-R associations) benefits target processing on 
congruent trials, a greater reliance on prime information produces a larger priming effect.  
If this type of view is correct then it implies that people have considerable cognitive 
control not only over the information that is activated by stimuli presented outside of 
awareness but also over how that information can affect subsequent behavior. 
Dissertation  Goals 
 The masked priming paradigm does appear to provide a means for scientifically 
investigating how people process stimuli that are presented outside of awareness.  
Further, as this review of the masked priming literature suggests, the origins of any 
masked priming effects (i.e., S-R associations or the activation of semantics) are due to a 
rather complex interaction between task instructions and participants’ target processing 
strategies.  The primary goal of this dissertation , therefore, is to investigate this 
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interaction with a frequent emphasis on the question of what role S-R associations do 
play in the process. 
 A secondary goal is to provide an additional examination of the prospective 
versus retrospective views of masked priming.  Prime validity effects, effects which 
challenge the more generally accepted prospective view, have now been found in a 
multitude of cognitive paradigms (see Masson & Bodner, 2003, for a review).  The 
question, therefore, is whether one can provide an account for these effects within the 
framework of a prospective view of masked priming or, alternatively, whether the 
retrospective view, with its assumption that people can actually make controlled use of 
information from stimuli presented outside of awareness, might be the more accurate 
view. 
Chapter 2:  Number Classification 
In Chapter 2 the role of task-defined strategies in producing masked priming in 
number classification tasks was investigated to determine how S-R associations and 
semantics interact to produce priming in that task.  Doing so involved evaluating the time 
course (over 1008 trials) of two different data patterns which would serve as markers 
indicating the source of the priming (i.e., S-R associations versus semantic activation).  
The first marker was the magnitude of the masked priming effect itself.  A priming effect 
driven by activated semantic information should emerge in the very first trials and 
maintain itself over the course of the experiment.  In contrast, priming due to S-R 
associations must increase as participants become more familiar with those associations.  
The second marker was the nature of the priming distance effect.  That is, responses in 
number classification tasks are often faster as the numerical distance between the prime 
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and target decreases (e.g., Koechlin, Naccache, Block, & Dehaene, 1999; Naccache & 
Dehaene, 2001; Reynvoet & Brysbaert, 1999, 2004; Reynvoet et al., 2002).  For example, 
if the target is the digit ‘4’ in a task in which the digit must be classified as greater or less 
than ‘5’ then responses will typically be faster if it is primed by the digit ‘3’ compared to 
the digit ‘1’.  These effects must clearly be due to the activation of semantic information. 
 In Experiment 1 participants made magnitude judgments (i.e., indicated whether 
the target is less than or greater than ‘5’) to single-digit targets preceded by masked 
single-digit primes.  The results indicated that there were clear masked priming and 
priming distance effects, both of which remained relatively stable over trials.  In 
Experiment 2, in order to make the use of S-R associations more viable, participants 
made target identifications (i.e., press one button if the target is a ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ or ‘4’ and a 
different button if it is a ‘6’, ‘7’, ‘8’ or ‘9’) to the same single-digit prime-target pairs as 
in Experiment 1.  In this situation, there was an increase in the size of the masked 
priming effect over trials indicating that processing had changed in a way that caused S-R 
associations to have a greater impact in the priming process.  However, as in Experiment 
1, there was a clear priming distance effect which did not vary over trials.  The presence 
of a priming distance effect in both experiments indicates that semantic activation 
continued to play a major role in producing masked priming effects regardless of task 
instructions.  At the same time, the increase in the size of the priming effect in 
Experiment 2 does demonstrate that task instructions can create a situation in which there 
is an impact of S-R associations on the priming process. 
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Chapter 3:  Category Learning Tasks with Masked Primes  
In Chapter 3 the development of S-R associations was traced using a masked 
priming version of a category learning task.  In a typical category learning task (e.g., 
Lamberts, 1995; Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002; Smith & Minda, 1998) participants are 
repeatedly presented with the same set of artificial stimuli (nonword letter strings in these 
experiments) and are required to learn, based upon feedback, which target stimuli belong 
to one category and which target stimuli belong to the other category. 
Previous investigations of masked priming used tasks with clearly defined 
semantic categories (e.g., pleasant/unpleasant, less/greater than 5) which allow for the 
possibility that either semantics or S-R associations (or both) could generate masked 
priming effects, complicating the theoretical analysis.  In contrast, the items in a category 
learning task are novel and, thus, have no ability to activate semantic information.  
Further, as is often the case, at the beginning of the learning process, the stimuli are not 
associated with either possible response (explicitly or implicitly), unlike, for example, 
arrow stimuli.  Thus, the category learning task is an ideal, but unexplored, task for 
investigating the development of S-R associations and their ability to produce masked 
priming. 
In Experiment 1 masked priming effects were obtained for both four- and six-
letter category sets such that responses were faster when targets were preceded by a 
masked prime which was the prototype of its category versus the opposite category’s 
prototype.  However, there was little evidence that these effects were due to S-R 
associations as the effects occurred early and did not increase in size over trial segments.  
In Experiment 2 an increase in the size of the masked priming effects was obtained when 
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participants practiced learning the four-letter category sets over multiple sessions/days.  
This result provides support for the claim that at least part of the observed priming was 
due to the development of S-R associations.  Taken together, the present results suggest 
that although some priming occurs early (Experiment 1) it takes considerable practice in 
order to learn and strengthen the appropriate S-R associations in order for those 
associations to produce the predicted increase in the size of the masked priming effect 
(Experiment 2), raising the possibility that the impact of stimuli presented outside of 
awareness is almost always due to the activation of semantic information. 
Chapter 4:  Target Arrow Classification with Free Choice Trials 
 In Chapter 4, in an effort to evaluate the debate over the prospective versus 
retrospective views of masked priming, the mechanisms that are responsible for 
producing prime validity effects in an arrow classification task with free choice trials 
(i.e., stimuli that allowed a response in either direction, < > or > <) were evaluated.  In 
this experiment, arrow targets were preceded by masked primes which either a) always 
pointed in the same direction of the target arrow (100% congruent condition), b) always 
pointed in the opposite direction (100% incongruent condition), or c) pointed equally 
often in the same and different directions (unpredictive condition) using prime-target 
intervals of either 77 ms or 165 ms (a between-subjects manipulation).  If the priming 
pattern for the response biases on the free choice trials in the unpredictive condition 
mimics the 100% congruent condition then that result would challenge the retrospective 
view (but could be easily accounted for in the prospective view).  However, if the 
priming pattern in the unpredictive condition mimics the 100% incongruent condition 
then that would support a retrospective view (and challenge the prospective view). 
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When the prime-target interval was 77 ms, a prime validity effect occurred for the 
free choice trials such that there was a bias to respond in the direction of the masked 
prime in the 100% congruent condition whereas in the 100% incongruent condition 
response selection was at chance.  When the prime-target interval was 165 ms, a prime 
validity effect occurred such that there was a bias to respond in the direction opposite of 
the masked prime in the 100% incongruent condition whereas in the 100% congruent 
condition response selection was at chance.  Crucially, the results in the unpredictive 
condition mimicked those in the 100% congruent condition at both prime-target intervals.  
The results suggest that these prime validity effects occur as a result of how masked 
primes in the 100% incongruent condition are processed.  These results provide a 
challenge for a retrospective view of masked priming, but can easily be explained within 
a framework of a prospective view of masked priming (such as a response bias 
suppression account).  
Chapter 5:  Conclusions 
 This research makes two important contributions to the masked priming literature.  
First, the results from Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that previous research that has been taken 
as evidence for S-R associations (e.g., Damian, 2001) may have an alternative (possibly, 
semantically-based) explanation.  Second, the results from Chapter 4 pose a formidable 
challenge to anyone attempting to explain them within a retrospective view of masked 
priming.  In Chapter 5 the implications of these results for notions of how stimuli 
presented outside of awareness are processed and for various theories of masked priming 
are addressed.  
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Chapter 2 – Number Classification 
In a masked priming paradigm, stimuli that are briefly presented and masked 
(forward and/or backward) to further decrease their visibility, nonetheless, tend to 
influence responses to subsequently presented targets.  That is, masked prime stimuli tend 
to influence behavior even when people report no awareness of those stimuli and/or 
perform poorly on any task requiring a response to those stimuli.  A key question that 
drives much of this research, therefore, concerns the source of these masked priming 
effects (see Finkbeiner & Forster, 2008; Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007; Kouider & 
Dehaene, 2007; Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009, for recent 
reviews). 
According to one line of research, masked priming is due to stimulus-response (S-
R) associations which have developed as a result of continual responding to particular 
stimuli.  That is, when a stimulus (or part of a stimulus) is repeatedly presented as a 
target, a response bias (i.e., a tendency to respond with the appropriate response) 
develops.  Whenever a stimulus of this sort is then presented as a prime, it creates a bias 
which aids target responding on prime congruent trials (i.e., when the prime and target 
require the same response) and interferes with target responding on prime incongruent 
trials (a position which Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003, called the “evolving 
automaticity hypothesis”). 
A crucial prediction of the evolving automaticity hypothesis is that priming 
should only occur for primes that have been previously presented and responded to as 
target stimuli (i.e., “old set primes”), whereas primes which have not been previously 
responded to as targets (i.e., “new set primes”) should not produce priming since 
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response biases have not been formed for these primes.  Damian’s (2001) physical size 
(small or large) judgment task provides support for this prediction.  Specifically, a 
category congruence effect, that is, faster responses when both the masked prime and the 
target corresponded to either large or small objects (i.e., congruent trials) than when the 
masked prime and the target corresponded to items of opposite size (i.e., incongruent 
trials), was found when old set masked primes were used (Experiment 1), but there was 
no category congruence effect when new set masked primes were used (Experiment 2). 
Further support for the evolving automaticity hypothesis comes from Abrams and 
Greenwald’s (2000) two-phase pleasantness classification task.  In the first phase of their 
experiment, participants classified word targets as either pleasant or unpleasant in 
meaning.  In the second phase, these same word targets were preceded by briefly 
presented masked primes.  The primes were recombined pairs of practiced word targets 
that were either hybrid nonwords (Experiment 1) (e.g., HUMOR + TULIP = hulip) or 
were hybrid words with a valence opposite to that of both members of the pair from 
which they were constructed (Experiment 2) (e.g., SMUT + BILE = smile).  The results 
were that nonword primes (e.g., hulip) composed of letters from previously-practiced 
targets of the same category (e.g., HUMOR and TULIP) (Experiment 1) facilitated 
responses to targets which have the same valence as the practiced targets.  More 
surprisingly, masked word primes having a valence opposite to that of the two words 
used to construct them (e.g., smile from SMUT and BILE) facilitated responses to the 
category of the two partial words rather than the category of the whole word.  Further, 
new set masked primes (i.e., positively and negatively valenced words which were not 
previously seen as targets) had no effect on target responses (Experiment 3). 
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In contrast to Abrams and Greenwald’s (2000) and Damian’s (2001) results (and 
challenging the evolving automaticity hypothesis) there are now numerous 
demonstrations of priming from new set primes.  An early demonstration of such an 
effect was reported by Naccache and Dehaene (2001) who had participants perform 
magnitude judgments in which target numbers were classified as either less than or 
greater than 5.  In their task, the targets 1, 4, 6, and 9 were preceded by both old set 
primes (i.e., 1, 4, 6 and 9) and new set primes (i.e., 2, 3, 7 and 8) in addition to a neutral, 
nonnumeric, stimulus.  Their key result was that priming occurred for both types of 
masked primes (see Kunde et al., 2003; 2005; and Kinoshita & Hunt, 2008, for 
replications of this result). 
Subsequently, a variety of other tasks have also produced category congruence 
effects using new set primes.  For instance, these effects have been reported in both a 
parity judgment task (i.e., is the target an odd or even number? - Reynvoet, Caessens & 
Brysbaert, 2002) and in a single-letter judgment task (i.e., is the letter before or after the 
letter ‘O’ in the alphabet? - Reynvoet, Gevers & Caessens, 2005).  Further, priming from 
new set primes has also been found for target word stimuli in a valence classification task 
(i.e., is the target word pleasant or unpleasant in meaning?) using both word primes (e.g., 
Klauer, Eder, Greenwald & Abrams, 2007) and picture primes (e.g., Dell’Acqua & 
Grainger, 1999) as well as in an animal classification task (i.e., does the target word 
correspond to an animal or not?) using both word primes (e.g., Quinn & Kinoshita, 2008; 
Van den Bussche & Reynvoet, 2007, Experiment 3) and picture primes (e.g., Van den 
Bussche, Notebaert & Reynvoet, 2009). 
                                                                                      
 
27
As this brief summary of the literature indicates, priming from new set masked 
primes is a very common finding which suggests that activated semantic information is 
often responsible for producing priming effects (a position which Kunde et al., 2003, 
called the “elaborate processing hypothesis”).  What needs to be kept in mind, however, 
is that a demonstration that a particular priming effect has a semantic basis does not rule 
out the possibility that S-R associations may have also played some role in producing that 
effect.  Nor does it rule out the possibility that, in other situations, S-R associations may 
be the sole source of the priming effect, a notion that is certainly consistent with 
experiments in which new set masked primes do not produce priming (e.g., Abrams & 
Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001).  In fact, support for a role for S-R associations in 
masked priming even when new set primes are effective primes (i.e., when semantically-
based priming arises) comes from a recent paper by Kinoshita and Hunt (2008). 
Kinoshita and Hunt (2008):  A Two-Component Account of Masked Priming 
 Kinoshita and Hunt (2008) recently replicated Naccache and Dehaene’s (2001) 
results in a magnitude judgment task using both old and new set masked primes.  
However, in contrast to the previous research, they provided an analysis based on the full 
latency distributions for each prime condition.  What their analysis demonstrated was 
that, in the longer latency bins, the congruent trials in the old set prime condition showed 
a noticeable slowdown (relative to both of the incongruent prime conditions as well as the 
congruent prime condition involving new set primes).  As a result, old set primes did not 
produce a category congruence effect in these longer latency bins even though new set 
primes did. 
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Kinoshita and Hunt (2008) concluded that their results demonstrate that masked 
priming involves at least two different automatic components, one based upon semantic 
information and the other based upon S-R associations.  One component reflects the 
congruence between the prime and target in terms of task-defined features (e.g., size in a 
size judgment task) and relies upon semantic information activated by the masked prime.  
The other component is assumed to be transitory and relies upon activation of S-R 
associations by the masked primes.  It is the disappearance of this second component 
when latencies get to be long which accounts for the diminution of priming from old set 
primes in the longer latency bins. 
Kinoshita and Hunt’s (2008) results are, therefore, quite consistent with the notion 
that masked primes are processed to a depth at which both semantics and S-R 
associations are activated and, further, that both play some role in the priming process.  
Specifically, their results suggest that priming for their new set primes was semantically-
based, whereas priming for their old set primes was based mainly on S-R associations.  
Note further that priming for their old set primes disappeared entirely when responding 
was delayed (i.e., in the longer latency bins) even though there was a semantic 
relationship between the prime and target.  Thus, Kinoshita and Hunt’s data suggests that 
there appears to be a rather complex interaction between the types of processes that 
produce priming effects.  The purpose of the present experiments is to gain additional 
knowledge about the nature of these types of interactions by investigating the role of 
task-defined strategies in producing masked priming in number classification tasks. 
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The Role of Task-Defined Strategies  
 Recent research has provided substantial support for the idea that task 
instructions play an important role in determining the nature of any observed priming 
effects.  For example, Kunde et al. (2003) demonstrated that priming extended to new set 
primes when participants were required to make magnitude judgments, but not when 
participants were required to identify the target with a button press response.  Further, the 
size of the target set (e.g., Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, & Hoffmann, 2006; Pohl, Kiesel, Kunde, 
& Hoffmann, 2010) and the category set (e.g., Abrams, 2008) also appear to affect 
whether new set primes produce priming. 
Additional support for this idea comes from studies that have demonstrated that 
when primes and targets vary along two dimensions (e.g., parity and magnitude) masked 
priming is based solely upon prime-target congruency according to the specific judgment 
task (e.g., parity or magnitude) that the participant was engaged in (e.g., Bodner & 
Dypvik, 2005; Eckstein & Perrig, 2007; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000).  Studies have 
also shown that factors such as the targets’ features (e.g., Pohl et al., 2010) and 
orientation (e.g., Elsner, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2008), whether participants perform 
lexical decisions or same-different classifications (e.g., Norris & Kinoshita, 2008), and 
whether double-digit magnitude judgments (i.e., is the two-digit target greater than or less 
than ‘55’?) are made based upon the identity of the first or second digit (e.g., Greenwald, 
Abrams, Naccache, & Dehaene, 2003) also affect the nature of any masked priming 
effects.  Taken together, these results clearly demonstrate that the source of any observed 
priming effects (e.g., semantics or S-R associations) is very much dependent on both task 
instructions and participant strategies. 
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The results cited above could be taken as support for the claim that the type of 
information that is actually activated by the masked primes (i.e., semantics or S-R 
associations) varies as a function of the target task.  Alternatively, it would also support 
the hypothesis that masked primes automatically activate S-R associations and semantics 
with the crucial issue being the extent to which either of these factors is relevant to the 
processing required by the target.  That is, what varies between tasks is not whether 
semantics or S-R associations are activated by the masked primes, but rather how the 
activated information interacts with task demands to produce priming in a given situation. 
The Time Course of the Priming Effects as a Function of Task-Defined Strategies 
The goal of the present research was to provide an examination of how S-R 
associations and semantics interact to produce priming in number classification tasks.  
Doing so involved evaluating the time course of two different data patterns which would 
serve as markers indicating the source of the priming (i.e., S-R associations versus 
semantic activation).  The first marker is the size of the category congruence effect itself.  
Damian (2001) argued that “if the congruity effect depended on automatized mappings 
between stimuli and their corresponding responses, it should clearly build up across the 
experiment” (p. 158) and demonstrated that the magnitude of his category congruence 
effect for old set primes did, in fact, increase across trial blocks.  In contrast, if priming is 
due to semantic activation, then the category congruence effect should appear early in the 
experiment and vary little in magnitude over trials as demonstrated by Naccache and 
Dehaene (2001). 
The second marker is whether the category congruence effect shows any semantic 
basis and, if so, how that effect varies as a function of practice with the task.  For 
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instance, in both the magnitude judgment task (e.g., Koechlin, Naccache, Block, & 
Dehaene, 1999; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Notebaert, Pesenti, & Reynvoet, 2010; Van 
Opstal, Gevers, Moor, & Verguts, 2008) and the parity judgment task (e.g., Reynvoet & 
Brysbaert, 1999, 2004; Reynvoet et al., 2002), tasks in which priming is presumed to be 
predominantly due to semantic activation, a priming distance effect has typically been 
observed.  That is, responses are systematically faster as the numerical distance between 
the prime and target decreases.  For example, if the target is the digit ‘4’ in a task in 
which the digit must be classified as greater or less than ‘5’ then responses will typically 
be faster if it is primed by the digit ‘3’ compared to the digit ‘1’.  Whenever priming is at 
least partly due to semantic activation then a priming distance effect should also be 
present.  However, if priming is ever due solely to S-R associations, then any priming 
effects that have a semantic basis should not be present.  For example, in the present 
situation there may be a change in the priming distance effect over trial blocks as the 
strength of the S-R associations increases indicating a diminishing influence of semantics 
on the nature of target processing. 
Based on this discussion there are, essentially, four possible outcomes in a 
number classification task of the sort used here and previously (e.g., Kinoshita & Hunt, 
2008; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001).  Crucially, each would produce a different time 
course for both the category congruence effect and the priming distance effect.  One is 
that priming will be due solely to semantic activation.  In that case, both the category 
congruence effect and the priming distance effect should be present early and remain 
relatively stable over trials. 
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The second possible outcome would occur if priming is due solely to the 
activation of S-R associations as they strengthen over trials.  In that case, the category 
congruence effect should be small or non-existent early in the experiment, but should 
increase in size over trials.  Further, there should be no evidence of any priming distance 
effect. 
The third possible outcome would occur if both semantic activation and S-R 
associations contribute to the priming effect.  In that case, both a category congruence 
effect and a priming distance effect should be present early due to the activation of 
semantic information.  However, the category congruence effect should increase in size 
over trials as S-R associations strengthen (i.e., the priming due to S-R associations will 
enhance the priming due to semantics).  In addition, the priming distance effect should 
remain relatively stable over trials (i.e., this effect will be unaltered by the emerging 
effect of S-R associations). 
The fourth possible outcome would occur as a result of a more complicated 
interaction among the potential sources of priming.  One could propose that participants 
can strategically alter the basis of their priming effects from semantic activation to S-R 
associations whenever S-R associations may provide a stronger basis for supporting 
priming (such as may have been the case both in Kunde et al., 2003, and, for old set 
primes, in Kinoshita and Hunt, 2008).   In this type of situation, there may be a small 
increase in the size of the category congruence effect across trials (due to reliance being 
shifted to the more useful S-R associations), but more importantly, there should also be a 
decrease in the magnitude of the priming distance effect (due to the diminishing role of 
semantic information in producing priming). 
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The Present Research 
These potential outcomes were examined using single-digit stimuli as masked 
primes and targets in two number classification tasks.  Experiment 1 employed a 
magnitude judgment task in which all single-digits except ‘0’ and ‘5’ were used as targets 
so that priming distance effects could be analyzed.  Based on Naccache and Dehaene’s 
(2001) results, the expectation was that both the category congruence effect and the 
priming distance effect should be present initially and should remain stable over trial 
blocks.  The question of interest was whether S-R associations would also start to play a 
role, leading to an increase in the size of the category congruence effect over trials. 
Experiment 2 involved a change in the task instructions in order to create a 
situation in which there would be a strong bias to shift toward the strategic use of S-R 
information/associations.  The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1 but the task was 
target identification, that is, participants were told to press one button if the target was 
either a ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ or ‘4’ and to press a different button if the target was either a ‘6’, ‘7’, 
‘8’ or ‘9’.  Recall that Kunde et al.’s (2003) results suggest that when task instructions 
require participants to make an identification response to the target then the semantic 
information activated by the masked primes appeared not to play a role in producing 
priming (as indicated by the lack of priming from the new set masked primes). 
If the task instruction manipulation in Experiment 2 is successful in that it does 
bias responding in a way that causes S-R information/associations to play more of a role 
in the process then there should be evidence that the magnitude of the category 
congruence effect increases over trials.  The question of how this process unfolds can 
then be determined by evaluating the nature of the priming distance effect.  As described 
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above, if priming is exclusively due to S-R associations in this type of task, there should 
be no priming early in the experiment as well as no trace of a priming distance effect at 
any point.  Alternatively, the development of S-R associations may merely serve to 
enhance semantically-based priming.  In that case, the priming distance effect should 
arise early and remain constant throughout the experiment.  Finally, if priming in the 
early trials is due to semantic activation, but at a later point, there is a strategic shift such 
that S-R associations assume a dominant role, then the priming distance effect should 
diminish/disappear as the size of the priming effect grows over the course of the 
experiment. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty University of Western Ontario undergraduate students received either $10 
or course credit for their participation, 27 in Experiment 1 and 33 in Experiment 2.  All 
had either normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Materials 
Stimuli.  The primes and targets were single-digit numbers from ‘1’ through ‘9’ 
(excluding ‘5’). 
In both experiments, participants completed 1008 trials.  These trials were divided 
into 21 blocks of 48 trials each.  Within each block, each target was presented six times, 
each time paired with a different prime.  On half of the trials, the target was preceded by 
a congruent prime (i.e., both the prime and target were either less than or greater than ‘5’) 
and on the other half of the trials the target was preceded by an incongruent prime (i.e., 
the prime was less than ‘5’ and the target was greater than ‘5’, or vice versa).  Since 
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identity primes were not used, in order to maintain the same number of congruent and 
incongruent trials not all incongruent prime-target pairs were used.1  Appendix A 
contains the stimulus list. 
Equipment 
Both experiments were run on DMDX experimental software programmed by 
Forster and Forster (2003).  Stimuli were presented on a SyncMaster monitor (Model No. 
753DF).  Presentation was controlled by an IBM-clone Intel Pentium.  Stimuli appeared 
as black characters on a white background.  Responses to stimuli were made by pressing 
one of two <shift> keys on the keyboard. 
Procedure 
Each participant sat approximately 18 inches in front of the computer screen.  In 
Experiment 1 participants were instructed to determine if the target digit was either less 
than or greater than ‘5’ by pressing the right <shift> key if the target was greater than ‘5’ 
or the left <shift> key if the target was less than ‘5’.  In Experiment 2 participants were 
instructed to press the left <shift> key if the target digit was a ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ or ‘4’ and the 
right <shift> key if the target digit was a ‘6’, ‘7’, ‘8’ or ‘9’.  In both experiments 
participants were told to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, but they were not 
told of the existence of the prime.2 
On each trial the participants saw a string of hash marks (e.g., “###”) for 550 ms 
followed by a prime digit which was presented for 44 ms.  The target digit then appeared 
in the same screen location for either two seconds or until the participant responded.  
Participants performed 1008 trials which were divided into 21 blocks of 48 trials each.  
Participants were given an opportunity to take a break after each block of trials. 
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Results 
Trials in which no response was given or the response latency was either less than 
100 ms or greater than 1500 ms were removed from both the latency and error analyses 
(0.24% of the trials in Experiment 1, 1.95% of the trials in Experiment 2).  In addition, 
incorrect responses were also removed from the latency analyses (4.73% of the trials in 
Experiment 1, 7.88% of the trials in Experiment 2). 
The category congruence effects for both reaction time and accuracy were 
analyzed using a 3 (trial segment:  early (blocks 1-7) vs. middle (blocks 8-14) vs. late 
(blocks 15-21)) by 2 (category congruence:  congruent vs. incongruent) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA).  The priming distance effect for both reaction time and accuracy on 
the congruent trials (i.e., those trials for which the priming distance between the prime 
and target is meaningfully defined) was analyzed using a 3 (trial segment: early vs. 
middle vs. late) by 3 (prime-target distance:  one vs. two vs. three) ANOVA. In both 
Experiments the prime-target distance analysis was restricted to the target set ‘1’, ‘4’, ‘6’, 
and ‘9’ since prime-target distance cannot be as strongly manipulated for the targets ‘2’, 
‘3’, ‘7’, and ‘8’, whereas, for the category congruence effect, all targets were included. 
Experiment 1:  Magnitude Judgment Task (see Table 1) 
Category Congruence Effect.  In the latency analysis, there was a marginal effect 
of trial segment, F(2, 52) = 2.75, p < .08, MSE = 457.17, and a significant main effect of 
category congruence, F(1, 26) = 48.74, p < .001, MSE = 564.36.  Response latencies in 
the first (481 ms) trial segment were marginally longer than in the second (475 ms), t(26) 
= 1.92, p <.07, SE = 3.44, and significantly longer than in the third (472 ms), t(26) =  
2.15, p < .05, SE = 4.52, trial segments.  There was no difference between the third and 
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Table 1. 
 Category Congruence Effects and the Priming Distance Effect for the Magnitude 
Judgment Task – Experiment 1 (Reaction Time in ms, Errors in %). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Category Congruence Effect 
     Trial Segments 
Prime Type  Early  Middle  Late   Overall Mean 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Incongruent  493 (5.4) 488 (7.2) 486 (8.0) 489 (6.9)  
Congruent  470 (2.3) 462 (2.3) 457 (3.3) 463 (2.6) 
CE    23 (3.1)     26 (4.9)     29 (4.7)     26 (4.3) 
 
Priming Distance Effect 
       
     Trial Segments     
  
Prime-Target Distance Early  Middle  Late  Overall Mean 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1 Unit    471 (2.2) 460 (3.0) 462 (2.4) 464 (2.6) 
2 Units    470 (2.9) 463 (2.8) 455 (4.0) 463 (3.2) 
3 Units    484 (3.4) 476 (3.0) 469 (4.5) 476 (3.7) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note.  Early = Blocks 1 – 7, Middle = Blocks 8 – 14, Late = Blocks 15 – 21, CE = 
Congruence Effect 
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the second trial segments t(26) = 0.71, n.s.  In addition, congruent trials were responded  
to 26 ms faster than incongruent trials.  The interaction was not significant, F(2, 52) = 
1.91, n.s. 
In the error analysis, there were significant main effects of both trial segment, 
F(2, 52) = 7.09, p < .003, MSE = 0.001, and category congruence, F(1, 26) = 18.73, p < 
.001, MSE = 0.004.  The error rate was significantly greater in the third (5.6%) trial 
segment than in both the first (3.8%), t(26) = 3.07, p < .006, SE = 0.005, and second 
(4.8%), t(26) = 2.26, p < .04, SE = 0.004, trial segments.   The difference in error rates 
between the first and second trial segments was also significant, t(26) = 2.12, p < .05, SE 
= 0.004.  The error rate was also greater for incongruent than congruent trials.  The 
interaction was significant, F(2, 52) = 4.42, p < .02, MSE = 0.001, due to the fact that the 
magnitude of the priming effect in the first trial segment was significantly less than in 
both the second, t(26) = 2.79, p < .02, SE = 0.006, and third, t(26) = 2.45, p < .03, SE 
=0.006, trial segments.  There was no significant difference between the magnitudes of 
the priming effects in the second and third trial segments, t(26) = 0.42, n.s. 
Priming Distance Effect.  In the latency analysis, there were significant effects of 
trial segment, F(2, 52) = 3.39, p < .05, MSE = 1145.30, and prime-target distance, F(2, 
52) = 12.50, p < .001, MSE = 383.24.  Responses were significantly longer in the first 
(475 ms) than in either the second (466 ms), t(26) = 2.25, p < .04, SE = 3.60, or the third 
(462 ms), t(26) = 2.32, p < .03, SE = 4.51, trial segments.  Response latencies did not 
differ between the second and third trial segments, t(26) = 0.51, n.s.  In addition, 
responses were significantly longer when the prime-target distance was three versus one, 
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t(26) = 3.71, p < .002, SE = 3.24, or two, t(26) = 4.59, p < .001, SE = 2.98, units (i.e., a 
priming distance effect).  The difference in response latencies when the prime-target 
distance was one versus two units was not significant, t(26) = 0.65, n.s.  The interaction 
was not significant, F(4, 104) = 0.50, n.s.3 
In the error analysis, neither of the main effects nor the interaction was significant 
(all Fs < 1.59). 
Experiment 2:  Target Identification Task (see Table 2) 
Category Congruence Effect.  In the latency analysis, there was no effect of trial 
segment, F(2, 64) = 0.05, n.s., but there was a significant main effect of category 
congruence, F(1, 32) = 63.40, p < .001, MSE = 295.64.  Congruent trials were responded 
to 20 ms faster than incongruent trials.  The interaction was also significant, F(2, 64) = 
5.38, p < .008, MSE = 131.39, due to the fact that the magnitude of the priming effect in 
the third trial segment was significantly greater than in the first, t(32) = 3.03, p < .006, SE 
= 4.28, and marginally greater than in the second, t(32) = 1.90, p < .07, SE = 4.26, trial 
segments.  The difference in the magnitude of the priming effect between the first and 
second trial segments was not significant, t(32) = 1.44, n.s. 
In the error analysis, there was a marginal effect of trial segment, F(2, 64) = 2.54, 
p < .09, MSE = 0.001, and a significant main effect of category congruence, F(1, 32) = 
16.03, p < .001, MSE = 0.002.  The error rate was marginally smaller in the first (7.7%) 
than in both the second (8.6%), t(32) = 1.73, p < .10, SE = 0.005, and third (8.9%), t(32) 
= 1.90, p < .07, SE = 0.007, trial segments.  There was no significant difference in error 
rates between the second and third trial segments, t(32) = 0.62, n.s.  The error rate was  
greater for incongruent than congruent trials. The interaction was significant, F(2, 64) = 
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Table 2. 
 Category Congruence Effects and the Priming Distance Effect for the Target 
Identification Task – Experiment 2 (Reaction Time in ms, Errors in %). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Category Congruence Effect 
     Trial Segments 
 
Prime Type  Early  Middle  Late   Overall Mean 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Incongruent  502 (9.0) 503 (9.4) 506 (10.6) 504 (9.7)  
Congruent  488 (6.4) 484 (7.8) 480 (7.2) 484 (7.2) 
CE     14 (2.6)   19 (1.6)   26 (3.4)   20 (2.5) 
 
Priming Distance Effect 
 
     Trial Segments 
 
Prime-Target Distance Early  Middle  Late  Overall Mean 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1 Unit    487 (7.2) 490 (8.2) 475 (7.0) 484 (7.5) 
2 Units    488 (7.3) 482 (8.5) 482 (7.8) 484 (7.9) 
3 Units    504 (6.6) 487 (9.4) 494 (9.8) 495 (8.6) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note.  Early = Blocks 1 – 7, Middle = Blocks 8 – 14, Late = Blocks 15 – 21, CE = 
Congruence Effect 
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 3.25, p < .05, MSE = 0.001, due to the fact that the magnitude of the priming effect was 
significantly greater in the third versus the second trial segment, t(32) = 2.82, p < .009, 
SE = 0.007.  There was no significant difference between the magnitude of the priming 
effect for the first trial segment and either the second, t(32) = 1.45, n.s., or third, t(32) = 
1.04, n.s., trial segments. 
Priming Distance Effect.  In the latency analysis, there was no effect of trial 
segment, F(2, 64) = 0.73, n.s., but there was a significant effect of prime-target distance, 
F(2, 64) = 4.04, p < .03, MSE = 945.90.  Responses were significantly longer when the 
prime-target distance was three versus one, t(32) = 2.63, p < .02, SE = 4.24, or two, t(32) 
= 2.32, p < .03, SE = 4.49, units (i.e., a priming distance effect).  The difference in 
response latencies when the prime-target distance was one versus two units was not 
significant, t(32) = 0.18, n.s.  The interaction was not significant, F(4, 128) = 1.18, n.s.4 
In the error analysis there was a significant main effect of trial segment, F(2, 64) 
= 3.42, p < .04, MSE = 0.002.  The error rate in the first (7.0%) trial segment was 
significantly less than in the second (8.7%), t(32) = 2.30, p < .03, SE = 0.006, and 
marginally less than in the third (8.2%), t(32) = 1.86, p < .08, SE = 0.008, trial segments.  
There was no significant difference in error rates between the second and third trial 
segments, t(32) = 0.16, n.s. There was no effect of prime-target distance, F(2, 64) = 1.71, 
n.s., nor was the interaction significant, F(4, 128) = 1.09, n.s. 
Post-Hoc Analysis:  Comparison Distance Effects 
An additional, semantically-based effect often found in number classification 
tasks is the comparison distance effect in which participants are faster to respond to 
more-extreme values (e.g., 1 and 9 in a “less/greater than 5” task) than less-extreme 
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values (e.g., 6 and 4) (see Rouder et al., 2005, for a review; Van Opstal et al., 2008).  
This effect also indicates that semantic information was being used in making target 
decisions and, therefore, if there are priming distance effects in both experiments, 
comparison distance effects should also be evident in both experiments.  A potential 
additional issue for understanding the nature of the impact of semantic information in 
these experiments would be whether this factor might interact with any of the other 
factors, particularly priming distance.  To examine these issues, we performed a 2 
(comparison distance:  more-extreme [1 and 9] vs. less-extreme [4 and 6]) by 3 (trial 
segment: early vs. middle vs. late) by 3 (prime-target distance:  one vs. two vs. three) by 
2 (task instructions: magnitude [Experiment 1] vs. identification [Experiment 2]) 
ANOVA.  Note that since we wished to consider the potential interaction between 
priming distance and comparison distance, we only used congruent trials in this analysis 
(i.e., those trials in which the priming distance between the prime and target is 
meaningfully defined).5 
In the latency analysis, there was a significant comparison distance effect, F(1, 
58) = 98.58, p < .001, MSE = 5568.92, such that responses were slower for less-extreme 
(i.e., 4 and 6) (501 ms) versus more-extreme (i.e., 1 and 9) (456 ms) target values and a 
significant interaction with trial segment, F(2, 116) = 4.81, p < .02, MSE = 1222.99.  The 
nature of that interaction was that the difference in latencies between the less-extreme 
and the more-extreme stimuli was significantly greater in the first segment (512 vs. 458 
ms) compared to either the second (497 ms vs. 457 ms), t(59) = 3.89, p < .001, or third 
segments (494 ms vs. 452 ms), t(59) = 2.36, p < .001.  The difference between the second 
and third trial segments was not significant, t(59) = 0.65, n.s.  This pattern was virtually 
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identical in both experiments.  None of the other interactions, including the interaction 
between comparison distance and prime-target distance, approached significance (All ps 
> .23). 
In the error analysis, there was also a significant comparison distance effect, F(1, 
58) = 72.73, p < .001, MSE = 0.01, such that more error responses were made for less-
extreme (8.3%) versus more-extreme (2.8%) target values, which marginally interacted 
with task instructions, F(1, 58) = 3.43, p < .07, MSE = 0.04.  The comparison distance 
effect was slightly larger (6.6%) in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 (4.3%)  None of 
the other interactions involving comparison distance were significant (All ps > .36).6 
The fact that comparison distance did not vary significantly as a function of the 
prime-target (i.e., semantic) distance suggests that these two semantic factors 
independently impact the priming process.7  The fact that comparison distance did not 
vary significantly as a function of experiment (even though the category congruence 
effect increased in size in Experiment 2) suggests that, although S-R associations played 
a larger role in Experiment 2, the nature of semantic processing in that experiment was 
similar to that in Experiment 1. 
General Discussion 
 The present research is an investigation of the source of masked priming in a 
number classification task with a specific emphasis on understanding how participants’ 
target processing strategies affect the type of information generating the priming effects.  
These issues were investigated by assessing, over trials, both a) the magnitude of the 
category congruence effect and b) the nature of the priming distance effect when using 
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single-digit primes and targets in both magnitude judgment (Experiment 1) and target 
identification (Experiment 2) tasks.  The key assumptions behind this particular approach 
were that priming effects driven by S-R associations must grow in size as those 
associations develop and that priming effects driven by semantic information would 
produce a priming distance effect. 
Summary of Results 
 In Experiment 1 participants made magnitude judgments (i.e., indicated whether 
the target is less than or greater than ‘5’) to single-digit targets preceded by masked 
single-digit primes.  The results indicate that there was a clear category congruence effect 
such that responses were slower on incongruent versus congruent trials.  There was also a 
clear priming distance effect such that response latencies were longer when the prime-
target distance was three versus one or two units.  Both of these effects remained 
relatively stable over trials (see also Koechlin et al., 1999).  In addition, there was a clear 
comparison distance effect.  These results corroborate previous research using the 
magnitude judgment task (see Kinoshita & Hunt, 2008; Kunde et al., 2003; Naccache & 
Dehaene, 2001; Van Opstal et al., 2008) and indicate that priming in this type of task is 
primarily due to semantic activation.8 
 Experiment 2 was an attempt to make the use of S-R associations more viable.  
Recall that Kunde et al. (2003) reported that new set primes did not produce priming 
when participants were required to identify the target (as opposed to making magnitude 
judgments).  Hence, an argument can be made that in a target identification task S-R 
associations play a major role in producing priming effects.  The expectation, therefore, 
was that in the present Experiment 2, in which participants were instructed to identify the 
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targets (i.e., press one button if the target was either a ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ or ‘4’ and a different 
button if it was a ‘6’, ‘7’, ‘8’ or ‘9’) the size of the category congruence effect should 
increase over trials as the S-R associations develop and start to affect the priming 
process.  If the size of the category congruence effect does, indeed, increase over trials, 
the question would then become what happens to the priming distance effect over trials.   
The nature of this effect would allow us to determine the impact of the change in strategy 
(i.e., what it meant for participants to shift from a semantically-based processing to one at 
least partially based on S-R associations). 
The size of the category congruence effect in Experiment 2 did significantly 
increase across trial segments, supporting the notion that S-R associations came to play 
an influential role in generating priming.  However, the pattern of semantic effects was 
essentially identical to that in Experiment 1.  There was a clear priming distance effect 
such that response latencies were longer when the prime-target distance was three as 
opposed to one or two units which was as large in the final trial segment as in the first 
trial segment and there was a clear comparison distance effect.  The fact that the priming 
distance effect did not decrease as the category congruence effect increased indicates that 
participants did not strategically shift the source of the priming effect from semantics to 
S-R associations as the S-R associations strengthened.  Instead the impact of S-R 
associations was merely to enhance the category congruence effect once the associations 
had attained a sufficient level of strength.  Taken together, these results support the idea 
that masked digit primes in a number classification task activated semantic information 
which then produced priming even in Experiment 2 where S-R associations played a role 
as well. 
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Theoretical Implications of the Present Research 
I.  S-R Association Accounts 
The assumption that S-R associations (that are formed and strengthened with 
practice) drive priming effects plays an influential role in research using masked primes 
to study motor activation (see, e.g., Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003; Klotz & 
Neumann, 1999; Neumann & Klotz, 1994).  In addition, this assumption has been used to 
explain the results from both Abrams and Greenwald’s (2000) and Greenwald et al.’s 
(2003) studies and has been used to explain why, in certain circumstances, new set 
primes do not produce priming (e.g., Damian, 2001).  In the present experiments, the 
number of trials (1008 per participant) necessary to produce evidence of the impact of S-
R associations was much larger than in those previous experiments that were considered 
to provide evidence for priming due to S-R associations (e.g., Abrams, 2005; Abrams & 
Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; Greenwald et al., 2003; Neumann & Klotz, 1994).  
That fact at least raises the question of whether the priming observed in those 
experiments was truly due to S-R associations. 
Consider, for example, Damian’s (2001, Experiment 1) results which are taken as 
support for an S-R association account.  In that experiment, involving physical size 
judgments, the size of the category congruence effect increased over trial blocks.  Each 
trial block in the experiment involved 24 target presentations (i.e., two presentations of 
12 targets).  Evidence of priming emerged by the third trial block (i.e., the block in which 
the target was seen and responded to for the fifth and sixth time).  Given the large number 
of trials necessary to get only minimal evidence of priming from S-R associations in the 
present Experiment 2, these results raise the question of whether there might be a more 
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viable explanation for Damian’s findings.  For instance, as will be discussed below, 
perhaps rather than S-R associations being developed over trials it may have been the 
participants’ ability to focus on the specific semantic information required to perform the 
task (in this case, information concerning the size relationship between the target items 
and a pre-specified comparison object) that produced the priming effects. 
Recent research by Perry and Lupker (submitted) provides additional support for 
the idea that, in general, S-R associations take time to reach the level of strength 
necessary to affect priming.  In their experiments, participants were repeatedly presented 
with letter strings (e.g., ‘WARY’ and ‘BARO’) and were required to learn, based upon 
feedback, which items are members of one category and which items are members of the 
other category (see, e.g., Smith & Minda, 1998).  Each target was preceded by a masked 
prime which was the prototype of its category and, therefore, had more letters in common 
with the items in its own category than with items in the other category (e.g., the 
prototype prime ‘wazy’ shares more letters with ‘WEZY’ and ‘WARY’ than with an item 
from the other category, for example, ‘BARO’). 
Because the category sets were artificially defined, they neither had the ability to 
produce category congruence effects on the basis of retrieved semantic information nor 
were they initially associated with either categorical response.  However, these primes 
did produce category congruence effects such that targets were responded to faster when 
primed by the prototype of their category than when primed by the prototype of the other 
category very early in the experiment.  Nevertheless, in none of Perry and Lupker’s 
(submitted) one session experiments, involving up to 44 presentations of each target 
stimulus, was there an increase in the size of the category congruence effect over trials, 
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which should have occurred if the effect was being driven by S-R associations.  In a 
follow-up experiment, Perry and Lupker showed that only when multiple sessions of the 
category learning task were performed over the course of a week was there any evidence 
for an increase in the size of the category congruence effect.  Even though the stimuli and 
task used in these experiments are noticeably different from those typically used in the 
masked priming literature, they do support the notion that it takes some time for S-R 
associations to develop to the point that they can play an influential role in producing 
priming. 
II.  Kunde et al.’s (2003) Action-Trigger Account 
According to Kunde et al.’s (2003) action-trigger hypothesis, participants set up 
action-trigger sets, that is, mappings between possible stimuli and their responses in the 
target task.  Unlike S-R association, these mappings can be instantiated without practice 
and can include any stimuli that participants might wish to include (i.e., they are not 
limited only to those stimuli that appear as targets).  Responses are facilitated when the 
prime and target activate the same action trigger and inhibited when they activate 
different action triggers.  This account can readily explain category congruence effects 
and, because action triggers can be set up for any potential stimuli, it can also easily 
account for priming from new set primes when those effects emerge. 
Unlike an S-R association account, an action-trigger account would certainly be 
able to explain the basic priming effect observed here.  That is, action triggers could be 
set up for all the primes fairly early in the experiments because they also appeared as 
targets, allowing primes associated with one button press response to prime targets 
associated with that response and inhibit targets associated with the other response.  The 
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fact, therefore, that category congruence effects emerged in the initial trial segment poses 
no problem since action triggers do not need practice to develop. 
An action-trigger account runs into a problem, however, in explaining the 
existence of the priming distance effect. According to Kunde et al.’s (2003) action-trigger 
hypothesis, the only role of semantics is to allow the participant to categorize potential 
stimuli as appropriate action triggers.  For instance, in the present single-digit magnitude 
judgment task (Experiment 1) all four digits that are less than ‘5’ would be equally 
associated with (i.e., become action triggers for) one response (e.g., a left button press) 
and all four digits that are greater than ‘5’ would be equally associated with the other 
response (i.e., a right button press).  Since prime processing is assumed to activate the 
action triggers and not semantic (i.e., ordinal) information then, contrary to the present 
results, there is no reason that ‘3’ would be a better prime for the target ‘4’ than ‘1’ is.  
Given the existence of priming distance effects not only in the present experiments but 
also in other research (e.g., Koechlin et al., 1999; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Notebaert 
et al., 2010; Reynvoet & Brysbaert, 1999, 2004; Reynvoet et al., 2002; Van Opstal et al., 
2008), it appears that the action-trigger account could provide, at best, only a partial 
account of these results.  
An additional problem that the present data would pose for Kunde et al.’s (2003) 
action-trigger account concerns the increase in the size of the category congruence effect 
in Experiment 2.  Specifically, in order to explain the larger effect size in latter blocks, 
additional assumptions must be made that would allow the strength of the action triggers 
to increase with practice.  Therefore, although the possibility that participants were 
implementing a strategy that involved something like action triggers in the present 
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experiments cannot be rejected, their role in producing the priming effects observed here 
seems likely to have been a minor one. 
III.  New Set Primes 
The ultimate goal of the present line of research would be to provide a full 
explanation of how changes in participants’ target processing strategies could explain 
why there is priming for new set primes in some circumstances but not in others.  
Experiment 1 was designed to produce priming due to semantic activation, whereas 
Experiments 2 was designed to bias a shift towards priming due to S-R associations.  
Although this manipulation was successful, the existence of a priming distance effect in 
both experiments suggests that the change in target processing requirements did not 
induce a shift in the nature of the information activated by the masked primes (i.e., from 
semantics to S-R associations) which supports the idea that prime processing inevitably 
activates semantics.  Therefore, the question still remains as to why, in some 
circumstances, there has been no evidence of priming from semantically related new set 
primes, that is, primes that should be effective if their semantic information is being 
activated (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; Kunde et al., 2003). 
 One possibility is that prime processing does not always activate semantics (i.e., 
participants may actually have the ability to suppress the automatic activation of semantic 
information from the prime under certain circumstances).  For example, one could argue 
that in Damian’s (2001) experiment involving new set primes, prime processing was 
suppressed in a way that prevented the primes from activating size information, 
producing a null priming effect.  A similar argument could be used to explain Kinoshita 
and Hunt’s (2008) old set prime data.  That is, one could argue that in Kinoshita and 
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Hunt’s experiments the semantic information from their old set primes, but not from their 
new set primes, was in some way suppressed as the S-R associations became stronger.  
Hence, the priming from their old set primes became completely based on S-R 
associations.  As a result, old set primes, but not new set primes, failed to produce 
priming in the longer latency bins because, as Kinoshita and Hunt argue, activation from 
S-R associations has a limited time course. 
The results from the present Experiments 1 and 2 would, of course, be 
inconsistent with this idea since those results indicate that the nature of semantic 
processing did not change as S-R associations started to play a more central role.  
Nonetheless, the present data pattern does not compel the conclusion that it would never 
be possible to create a situation where the impact of semantics could be entirely replaced 
by the impact of S-R associations. 
An alternative reason why new set primes may not consistently produce priming 
is that, in some situations, successful task performance can be achieved very rapidly on 
the basis of lower-level perceptual information.  This sort of explanation fits well with 
the results of Kunde et al.’s (2003, Experiment 3) target identification task.  As described 
above, in their task participants pressed one button if the target was either a 1 or a 4 and a 
different button if the target was either a 6 or a 9.  After the task was finished, many 
participants indicated that they developed a perceptually-based response strategy of 
looking for either a straight line (indicating a 1 or a 4) or a curve (indicating a 6 or a 9).  
A very surface-level strategy of this sort may prohibit any semantic information 
generated by either the prime or the target from playing much of a role in driving 
priming.  Note also that most of their new set primes (‘2’, ‘3’, ‘7’ and ‘8’) were actually 
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more consistent with the other response (i.e., ‘2’ and ‘3’ are curvy, unlike ‘1’ and ‘4’) 
which suggests that even if there was some semantically-based priming, it would most 
likely have conflicted with the inconsistent perceptual information provided by the 
perceptual features of some of the new set primes. 
It seems unlikely, however, that an explanation of this type would account for all 
the reported failures to produce priming from new set primes.  Another possible 
explanation for the lack of priming from new set primes would be based on the nature of 
semantic information activated by the primes and how the usefulness of that information 
might change as a result of seeing those primes as targets.  That is, although primes may 
inevitably activate semantic information, semantic priming can only occur when the 
semantic information that is activated by the primes is useful for performing the task.  
Such a situation may not always exist.  For example, in Damian’s (2001) physical size 
judgment task, there is no guarantee that the size information that was activated by the 
prime was particularly useful with respect to the specific target task (i.e., deciding 
whether the target is larger or smaller than some specified object) because, in general, 
size is more of an absolute rather than a relative concept.  Therefore, there may be no 
reason to expect priming from new set primes.  In contrast, in the experiment where old 
set primes were used, the nature of the semantic information activated by the primes may 
have become useful as a function of participants gaining practice in dealing with that 
information.  Specifically, as a result of seeing these primes repeatedly as targets and, 
therefore, continually making relative size judgments in response to them, participants 
would have gained practice at focusing on the precise information (for those words) that 
would be useful for performing the task.  As a result, old set primes may then have 
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gained the ability to allow participants to rapidly focus on this type of information, 
producing priming, while new set primes would not have. 
This type of explanation could be easily extended to number magnitude judgment 
tasks like those used in Kunde et al. (2003).  Magnitude is an essential semantic 
characteristic of numbers, however, that magnitude information does not necessarily 
translate directly into knowledge that the magnitude of the number being perceived is 
greater than or less than a specific comparison number (e.g., ‘5’).  Thus, it is possible that 
the results of some of Kunde et al.’s experiments, specifically those in which perceptual 
information could not be used, may be explained in terms of the nature of the interaction 
between the semantic information that was activated and the specific task demands. 
Conclusions 
 In the present research we investigated the way in which masked primes produced 
priming by assessing the relationship between the magnitude of both the category 
congruence effect and the priming distance effect across trials in two number 
classification tasks.  The presence of a priming distance effect (and a comparison distance 
effect) in both experiments indicates that semantic activation played a major role in 
producing category congruence effects, regardless of task instructions.  The data do, 
however, support the conclusion that the nature of the task instructions can lead to S-R 
associations also playing an active role once those associations have reached sufficient 
strength. 
                                                                                      
 
54
Footnotes 
1 Repetition priming trials (i.e., trials in which the prime and target are identical) were not 
included in either experiment in order to examine the influence of prime-target 
congruency independent of any impact of prime-target repetition.  It does not appear that 
this practice has always been undertaken in prior published experiments. 
2 Prime discrimination data were collected based on the parameter display settings using 
a separate group of participants (see Appendix B for the details).  Note, however, that 
because the focus of the current research is on how participants’ target processing 
strategies might affect the nature of the information producing the priming effect, the 
visibility of the primes as specifically measured by performance on a prime 
discrimination task would seem to have little relevance in this situation.  What is more 
relevant is that participants had virtually no knowledge of the primes of the sort that 
could be used strategically during prime or target processing. That situation was created 
by using a short prime duration and by the prime being both forward masked and 
backward masked by the target.  Indeed, all participants indicated that they had virtually 
no knowledge of the primes’ existence, much less their identity. 
3  The inclusion of the targets 2, 3, 7, and 8 in the analysis did not alter the results 
concerning the priming distance effect.  That is, there was still a significant effect of 
prime-target distance, F(2, 52) = 24.34, p < .001, MSE = 279.78, and the interaction 
between trial segment and prime-target distance was still not significant, F(4, 104) = 
0.16, n.s. 
4 An analysis including the targets 2, 3, 7, and 8 showed a significant effect of prime-
target distance, F(2, 64) = 11.04, p < .001, MSE = 510.74.  The interaction between trial 
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segment and prime-target distance was marginal, F(4, 128) = 2.35, p < .06, MSE = 
501.66.  
5  We would like to thank Dr. Sachiko Kinoshita for suggesting this particular analysis. 
6  In both the latency and error analyses, the other three main effects, task instructions, 
priming distance and segment were either significant (p < .05) or marginally significant 
(p <.10).  Latencies were shorter and error rates were lower in Experiment 1. 
7  One area of debate in numerical cognition concerns the mechanisms that produce 
comparison distance effects.  Van Opstal et al. (2008) recently proposed the monotonic 
connection view that suggests that comparison distance effects are due to response-
related processes (see also Verguts, Fias, & Stevens, 2005).  Although not the focus of 
the current research it should be noted that the lack of an interaction between priming 
distance and comparison distance in the present experiments does provide indirect 
support for this hypothesis. 
8  An additional experiment which involved double-digit primes and targets, patterned on 
Greenwald et al.’s (2003, Experiment 2) magnitude judgment task when the first digit in 
the target was the informative digit (i.e., the second digit of the target was always an 
uninformative ‘5’) was also performed.   The results paralleled those from Experiment 1 
in that there was a clear category congruence effect and a priming distance effect which 
did not change over trials.  The details of this additional experiment are presented in 
Appendix C. 
 
                                                                                      
 
56
References 
Abrams, R. L. (2005).  Unconscious processing of multiple nonadjacent letters in visually  
masked words.  Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 585-601. 
Abrams, R. L. (2006).  Influence of category size and target set size on unconscious  
priming by novel words.  Experimental Psychology, 55, 189-194. 
Abrams, R. L., & Greenwald, A. G. (2000).  Parts outweigh the whole (word) in  
unconscious analysis of meaning.  Psychological Science, 11, 118-124. 
Bodner, G. E., & Dypvik, A. T. (2005).  Masked priming of number judgments depends  
on prime validity and task.  Memory & Cognition, 44, 29-47. 
Damian, M. F. (2001).  Congruity effects evoked by subliminally presented primes:  
Automaticity rather than semantic processing.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology:  Human Perception & Performance, 27, 154-165. 
Dell’Acqua, R., & Grainger, J. (1999).  Unconscious semantic priming from pictures.   
Cognition, 73, 1-15. 
Eckstein, D., & Perrig, W.J. (2007).  The influence of intention on masked priming:  A  
study with semantic classification of words.  Cognition, 104, 345-376. 
Elsner, K., Kunde, W., & Kiesel, A. (2008).  Limited transfer of subliminal response  
priming to novel stimulus orientations and identities.  Consciousness and 
Cognition, 17, 657-671. 
Finkbeiner, M., & Forster, K. I. (2008).  Attention, intention and domain-specific  
processing.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 59-64. 
Forster, K. I., & Forster, J. C. (2003).  DMDX:  A Windows display program with  
                                                                                      
 
57
millisecond accuracy.  Behavior Research Methods, Instruments and Computers, 
35, 116-124.  
Greenwald, A. G., Abrams, R. L., Naccache, L., & Dehaene, S. (2003).  Long-term  
semantic memory versus contextual memory in unconscious number processing.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 
235-247. 
Klauer, K. C., Eder, A. B., Greenwald, A. G., & Abrams, R. L. (2007).  Priming of  
semantic classifications by novel subliminal prime words.  Consciousness and 
Cognition, 16, 63-83. 
Kiesel, A., Kunde, W., & Hoffmann, J. (2007).  Mechanisms of subliminal response  
priming.  Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 3, 307-315. 
Kiesel, A., Kunde, W., Pohl, C., & Hoffmann, J. (2006).  Priming from novel masked  
stimuli depends on target set size.  Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 2, 37-45. 
Kinoshita, S., & Hunt, L. (2008).  RT distribution analysis of category congruence effects  
with masked primes.  Memory & Cognition, 36, 1324-1334. 
Klinger, M. R., Burton, P. C., & Pitts, G. S. (2000).  Mechanisms of unconscious  
priming: I. Response competition, not spreading activation.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 
Klotz, W., & Neumann, O. (1999).  Motor activation without conscious discrimination in  
metacontrast masking.  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Human Perception 
and Performance, 25, 976-992. 
Koechlin, E., Naccache, L., Block, E., & Dehaene, S. (1999).  Primed numbers:   
                                                                                      
 
58
Exploring the modularity of numerical representations with masked and 
unmasked semantic priming.  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Human 
Perception and Performance, 25, 1882-1905.   
Kouider, S., & Dehaene, S. (2007).  Levels of processing during non-conscious  
perception:  A critical review of visual masking.  Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society B, 362, 857-775. 
Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffman, J. (2003).  Conscious control over the content of  
unconscious cognition.  Cognition, 88, 223-242. 
Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffman, J. (2005).  On the masking and disclosing of  
unconscious elaborate processing:  A reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, and Verguts.  
Cognition, 97, 99-105. 
Naccache, L., & Dehaene, S. (2001).  Unconscious semantic priming extends to novel  
unseen stimuli.  Cognition, 80, 215-229. 
Neumann, O., & Klotz, W. (1994).  Motor responses to nonreportable, masked stimuli:   
Where is the limit of direct parameter specification?  In C. Umilta & M. 
Moscovitch (Eds.), Attention and Performance XV, Conscious and Nonconscious 
Information Processing (pp. 123-150). 
Norris, D., & Kinoshita, S. (2008).  Perception as evidence accumulation and bayesian  
inference:  Insights from masked priming.  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  
General, 137, 434-455. 
Notebaert, K., Pesenti, M., & Reynvoet, B. (2010).  The neural origin of the priming  
distance effect:  Distance-dependent recovery of parietal activation using 
symbolic magnitudes.  Human Brain Mapping, 31, 669-676. 
                                                                                      
 
59
Perry, J. R., & Lupker, S. J. (submitted).  The impact of masked primes when learning  
 artificial category sets.  Memory and Cognition. 
Pohl, C., Kiesel, A., Kunde, W., & Hoffmann, J. (2010).  Early and late selection in  
unconscious information processing.  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  
Human Perception and Performance, 36, 268-285. 
Quinn, W. M., & Kinoshita, S. (2008).  Congruence effect in semantic categorization   
with masked primes with narrow and broad categories.  Journal of Memory and 
Language, 58, 286-306. 
Reynvoet, B., & Brysbaert, M. (1999).  Single-digit and two-digit Arabic numerals  
 address the same semantic number line.  Cognition, 72, 191-201.   
Reynvoet, B., & Brysbaert, M. (2004).  Cross-notation number priming investigated at  
different stimulus onset asynchronies in parity and naming tasks.  Experimental 
Psychology, 51, 1-10. 
Reynvoet, B., Caessens, B., & Brysbaert, M. (2002).  Automatic stimulus-response  
associations may be semantically mediated.  Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 9, 
107-112. 
Reynvoet, B., Gevers, W., & Caessens, B. (2005).  Unconscious primes activate motor  
codes through semantics. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 31, 991-1000. 
Rouder, J.R., Lu, J., Speckman, P., Sun, D., & Jiang, Y. (2005).  A hierarchical model for  
estimating response time distributions.  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 195-
223. 
Smith, J. D., & Minda, J. P. (1998).  Prototypes in the mist:  The early epochs of category  
                                                                                      
 
60
learning.  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 24, 1411-1436. 
Van den Bussche, E., Notebaert, K., & Reynvoet, B. (2009).  Masked primes can be  
genuinely semantically processed:  A picture prime study.  Experimental 
Psychology, 56, 295-300. 
Van den Bussche, E., & Reynvoet, B. (2007).  Masked priming effects in semantic  
categorization are independent of category size.  Experimental Psychology, 54, 
225-235. 
Van den Bussche, E., Van den Noortgate, W., & Reynvoet, B. (2009).  Mechanisms of  
masked priming:  A meta-analysis.  Psychological Bulletin, 135, 452-477. 
Van Opstal, F., Gevers, W., De Moor, W., & Verguts, T. (2008).  Dissecting the  
symbolic distance effect:  Comparison and priming effects in numerical and 
nonnumerical orders.  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 419-425. 
Verguts, T., Fias, W., & Stevens, M. (2005).  A model of exact small-number  
representation.  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 66-80. 
                                                                                      
 
61
Addendum to Chapter 2 
As outlined in Chapter 1, recent masked priming research indicates that masked 
primes have the ability to activate both semantics and S-R associations and further 
suggests that the origins of any masked priming effects are due to an interaction between 
task instructions and participants’ target processing strategies.  In Chapter 2 the nature of 
this interaction was evaluated in two number classification tasks in which participants 
were instructed to make either magnitude judgments (Experiment 1) or target 
identification (Experiment 2) responses.  In both experiments, the magnitude of the 
category congruence (i.e., masked priming) effect and the nature of any priming distance 
effect were evaluated over the course of 1008 trials.  The assumption was that the time 
course of these two different data patterns would serve as markers indicating whether any 
observed priming was due to S-R associations or semantic activation. 
When participants made magnitude judgments (Experiment 1) there were clear 
masked priming and priming distance effects which remained relatively stable over trials.  
These results clearly indicate that priming was primarily due to semantic activation.  
With respect to the role of S-R associations in producing masked priming, the results 
when participants made target identification responses (Experiment 2) are particularly 
informative.  There was a significant increase in the size of the category congruence 
effect indicating that S-R associations did play a role in producing priming when the task 
became an identification task.  However, the presence of a priming distance effect which 
did not decrease as the category congruence effect increased indicates that, despite the 
increased influence of S-R associations, semantic activation continued to play a primary 
role in producing priming. 
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The results from the number classification tasks (Chapter 2), particularly 
Experiment 2, indicate that even when masked priming is primarily due to the activation 
of semantics, S-R associations can still play a role.  The focus in Chapter 3 is on the role 
of S-R associations.  In general, previous investigations of masked priming have all used 
tasks with clearly defined semantic categories (e.g., pleasant/unpleasant, even/odd) which 
allow semantics to play a central role in producing masked priming.  Therefore, in order 
to investigate the development of S-R associations and their role in producing masked 
priming a paradigm is needed that will not allow for an impact of semantic activation.  
One experimental paradigm that should serve this purpose is the category learning task. 
In a typical category learning task (e.g., Lamberts, 1995; Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002; 
Smith & Minda, 1998) participants are repeatedly presented with the same set of artificial 
stimuli (e.g., nonsense letter strings, bug cartoons) and are required to learn through 
feedback which target stimuli belong to one category and which target stimuli belong to 
the other category.  This task would be ideal for investigating an S-R association account 
of masked priming since the items in these category sets are novel and, thus, they have no 
ability to activate semantic information.  Further, at the beginning of the task, the stimuli 
are not associated with either possible response and so the results should provide insights 
into how congruence effects develop as the S-R associations for new categories are 
learned. 
In Chapter 3 a masked priming version of a category learning task was used to 
trace how the development of S-R associations influence the nature of any masked 
priming effects when there should no be influence of semantic activation.  In these tasks 
artificial category sets consisted of either 10 four-dimensional (e.g., ‘WAZY’ – 
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Experiment 1A & Experiment 2) or 14 six-dimensional (e.g., ‘KEPIRO’ – Experiment 
1B) letter strings.  The masked primes were the prototypes of each category, that is, letter 
strings which share most of their letters with the other items in its category and have no 
letters in common with the prototype of the other category.  The results from these 
experiments should allow for a clearer examination of the role of S-R associations in 
producing priming than in previous research. 
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Chapter 3 – Category Learning Tasks with Masked Primes 
In a typical masked priming paradigm a masked prime is briefly presented 
(typically for 60 ms or less) and is then followed by a target stimulus that requires a 
response.  As a result, participants are typically unaware not only of the prime’s identity 
but also of its existence.  Nonetheless, these primes influence target responding.  For 
example, a common finding is a category congruence (i.e., “priming”) effect in that 
responses are faster when the prime and target stimuli require the same response (i.e., a 
congruent trial) than when the prime and target stimuli require different responses (i.e., 
an incongruent trial).  In a recent review, Kiesel, Kunde and Hoffmann (2007) 
emphasized that one key goal of research using the masked priming paradigm involves 
identifying and specifying the mechanisms by which stimuli that people are not 
consciously aware of are able to produce priming effects (i.e., are able to affect a 
conscious action). 
Brief Overview of Previous Masked Priming Research 
According to one line of research, masked primes are assumed to be processed to 
only a “shallow” level and, therefore, any category congruence effect is presumed to be 
due to the prime triggering a response (see, e.g., Abrams, 2005; Abrams & Greenwald, 
2000; Boy & Sumner, 2010; Damian, 2001; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Klotz & Neumann, 
1999).  Specifically, S-R associations are assumed to be formed between target stimuli 
and their responses due to their repeated presentations and classifications.  Once these 
associations have become sufficiently strong, presentation of these stimuli as primes 
produces a bias to respond with their associated responses.  This response bias aids target 
responding on congruent trials and interferes with target responding on incongruent trials. 
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One key prediction of this type of S-R association account is that priming should 
only occur for primes that have been previously presented and responded to as target 
stimuli (i.e., “old set primes”).  Primes which have not been previously responded to as 
targets (i.e., “new set primes”) should not produce priming since response biases have not 
been formed for these primes.  Although there have been some demonstrations that 
priming is restricted to old set primes (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001), 
there are a variety of classification tasks demonstrating that new set primes do produce 
priming (e.g., Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Kinoshita & Hunt, 2008; Klauer, Eder, 
Greenwald & Abrams, 2007; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003, 2005; Naccache & 
Dehaene, 2001; Reynvoet, Caessens & Brysbaert, 2002; Reynvoet, Gevers & Caessens, 
2005; Quinn & Kinoshita, 2008; Van den Bussche, Notebaert & Reynvoet, 2009; Van 
den Bussche & Reynvoet, 2007). 
The fact that new set primes often produce priming indicates that masked priming 
is not due solely to S-R associations and suggests that masked primes activate semantic 
information (although see Kunde et al., 2003, for an alternative account that may be 
viable in certain circumstances).  That is, prior conceptual knowledge that defines the 
relationships between features within a category domain is activated and that information 
aids target processing (see Kaplan & Murphy, 2000; Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; 
Murphy & Medin, 1985).  For example, Naccache and Dehaene (2001) obtained priming 
from new set primes in a magnitude judgment task (i.e., is the target less than or greater 
than “5”?) which they attributed to the masked number prime activating one’s pre-
existing knowledge of magnitude relations. 
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However, even if masked primes do prime through the activation of semantics 
(e.g., the activation of categorical representations of pre-existing knowledge such as 
number magnitude) that does not rule out the possibility that S-R associations play some 
role in masked priming.  In fact, a variety of recent theories of masked priming claim that 
both S-R associations and semantic activation are involved in producing masked priming 
effects, or, as they have often been referred to in those situations, “category congruence 
effects” (e.g., Kinoshita & Hunt, 2008; Klauer, Musch & Eder, 2005; Reynvoet et al., 
2005).  Further, there have been a number of demonstrations suggesting that the source of 
the masked priming effect can change with simple changes in the nature of the task such 
as the size of either the target set (e.g., Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl & Hoffmann, 2006; Pohl, 
Kunde, Kiesel & Hoffman, 2010) or the category involved in the task (e.g., Abrams, 
2008). 
Investigating S-R Association Mechanisms Using a Category Learning Task 
The goal of the present research was to create a paradigm that would document 
the development of masked priming effects due to S-R associations.  To this point, 
virtually all the tasks that have been used to investigate masked priming have used either 
stimuli belonging to clearly defined semantic categories (e.g., pleasant/unpleasant, 
less/greater than 5), or stimuli like arrows which a priori invoke response tendencies 
(e.g., Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Perry & Lupker, 2010).  With respect to the former 
types of tasks, the implication is that either semantics or S-R associations (or both) could 
produce any observed category congruence effects.  With respect to the latter types of 
tasks, the implication is that the relevant S-R associations may have already developed 
before the experiment, making it impossible to investigate the nature of their 
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development and impact on the priming process. Therefore, in order to provide an 
uncontaminated examination of S-R associations, a different type of task and a certain 
type of stimulus set are needed.  The paradigm selected for the present investigation was 
a masked priming version of a category learning task using letter string stimuli. 
In a typical category learning task (e.g., Lamberts, 1995; Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002; 
Smith & Minda, 1998) participants are repeatedly presented with the same set of artificial 
stimuli (e.g., nonsense letter strings, bug cartoons) and are required to learn, based upon 
feedback, which target stimuli belong to one category and which target stimuli belong to 
the other category.  This task has been typically used to investigate the ability and speed 
with which various artificial category sets are learned, that is, the trajectory of category 
learning, which is derived by measuring performance accuracy in various time segments 
over the course of the task. 
A category learning task involving artificial stimuli should be optimal for 
investigating the development of a masked priming effect due to S-R association 
mechanisms.  First of all, the items in these category sets are novel (as noted, in the 
present experiments they were letter strings) and, therefore, have no ability to 
activate/retrieve semantic information.  That is, since both the stimuli and the response 
categories are artificial then these stimuli should be viewed as sets of arbitrary features 
with participants in such a task having no pre-existing knowledge of relations among 
these features which could facilitate the category learning processing (see Kaplan & 
Allopenna, 1994).  Second, at the beginning of the learning process, the stimuli are not 
associated with either possible response (either explicitly or implicitly) and, thus, should 
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allow us to trace the development of the priming effect as the S-R associations for new 
categories are learned. 
The artificial category sets that were used in the present experiments consisted of 
either 10 four-dimensional (e.g., ‘WAZY’) or 14 six-dimensional (e.g., ‘KEPIRO’) letter 
strings.  In both cases, the dimensions corresponded to the letter positions with two 
possible letter identities for each position (for example, in the four-dimensional category 
set, the first dimension corresponds to whether the identity of the letter in the first 
position is either a ‘B’ or a ‘W’).  For both categories in the four- and six-dimensional 
stimulus sets, half the letter strings belonged to one category and half belonged to the 
other category.  Each category set also contained a prototype item.  That is, a letter string 
which shares most of its letters with the other items in its category and has no letters in 
common with the prototype of the other category.  These prototypes were used as masked 
primes in the present experiments (further details about the category sets can be found in 
the Method section). 
The Nature of Masked Priming:  An S-R Association Account 
The key piece of evidence that would be required in order to demonstrate that a 
priming effect is due to S-R associations is the growth in the size of that effect over trials.  
That is, if S-R associations initially have little or no strength then they have no ability to 
prime during the early trials of an experiment.  In order for them to become effective 
primes, their strength needs to be increased as a result of responding to them when they 
are presented as targets.  There are now three demonstrations of priming effects that 
increased in size over trials and, therefore, may be due to S-R associations. 
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Damian (2001) investigated the influence of S-R associations on masked priming 
using a physical size (large or small) judgment task.  When old set primes were used 
(Experiment 1), a category congruence effect occurred in that responses were faster when 
both the prime and the target corresponded to either large or small items (i.e., a congruent 
trial) than when the prime and target corresponded to items of opposite sizes (i.e., an 
incongruent trial).  Damian demonstrated that this effect increased in size across trial 
blocks and claimed that this increase implicates S-R associations because “if the 
congruity effect depended on automatized mappings between stimuli and their 
corresponding responses, it should clearly build up across the experiment” (p. 158).  
Unfortunately, Damian’s task is one in which semantics can play an important role in 
producing priming.  In fact, as will be discussed in the General Discussion, Damian’s 
results do have an alternative explanation in terms of how participants use semantic 
information generated by the masked prime. 
Schlaghecken, Blagrove and Maylor (2007) investigated how the incidental 
learning of S-R associations influences masked priming.  In their experiments 
participants were presented with non-directional arrows (< > or > <) as masked primes 
(in black) and as visible targets (presented in different colours) and asked participants to 
respond to the colour of the target.  When target shape and colour perfectly covaried 
(e.g., < > was always blue and > < was always green) category congruence effects 
emerged in the second half of the experiment.  Interestingly, however, the effect was a 
reverse effect such that responses were slower when the prime and target had the same 
shapes, indicating that something more complicated than the simple association of stimuli 
                                                                                      
 
71
and responses was occurring (e.g., a response suppression mechanism, Eimer & 
Schlaghecken, 2003, was being invoked). 
Boy and Sumner (2010) investigated the relationship between S-R associations 
and the nature of the congruency effect in a variety of arrow classification tasks.  
Crucially, in each experiment, Boy and Sumner observed a gradual negative increase 
across trials in the size the congruency effect which might be considered to be consistent 
with the idea that S-R associations exert a greater influence on the nature of the priming 
effect as they are formed and strengthened.  Again, however, these congruency effects 
were reverse priming effects. 
The Present Research 
As noted, the current research employed a masked priming version of a category 
learning task to investigate the impact of S-R associations on masked priming.  The main 
question of interest was whether a category congruence effect would emerge over trials 
for correct responses such that responses to a target would be faster when preceded by its 
prototype as opposed to the prototype of the other category.  This finding would be of 
particular interest since it would be the first demonstration of a masked priming effect 
with alphanumeric stimuli which would not have a potential explanation in terms of 
semantic activation. 
If, indeed, priming effects in the present experiments are due to S-R associations 
then a second expectation arises.  Whenever an incorrect response is given on an 
incongruent prime trial, at least part of the reason would presumably be that the 
incongruent prime had created a response bias toward the incorrect response.  In contrast, 
incorrect responses on congruent prime trials only occur when participants overcome the 
                                                                                      
 
72
response bias (toward the correct response) created by the congruent prime.  As a result, 
an examination of the response latencies for incorrect trials should reveal a reversed 
category congruence effect.  That is, incorrect responses to a target should be faster when 
preceded by the prototype of the opposite category as opposed to the prototype of its own 
category. 
Method 
Participants.  Seventy-eight University of Western Ontario psychology 
undergraduate students received course credit for their participation in this experiment.  
Thirty-three participated in Experiment 1A (Age Range = 18 to 21, Mean = 18.4) and 45 
participated in Experiment 1B (Age Range = 18 to 21, Mean = 18.6).  All had either 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were proficient in English. 
Materials.  The target set consisted of either 10 four-dimensional items 
(Experiment 1A) or 14 six-dimensional items (Experiment 1B) (see Appendix A).  All 
targets were pronounceable.  The dimensions corresponded to the letter positions with the 
value on each dimension being binary.  For example, for the four-dimensional stimuli, the 
letter in the first position of the item was either a ‘B’ or a ‘W’.  For both category sets, 
half the items belonged to one category (“Category 1”) and the other half belonged to the 
other category (“Category 2”). 
Each category set consisted of a prototype item which shared most of its letters 
with the non-prototype items in its own category and did not share any letters with the 
prototype of the other category (i.e., ‘WAZY’ and ‘BERO’).  The non-prototype items in 
the four-dimensional category sets (Experiment 1A) shared three out of four letters with 
their prototype and only one letter with the prototype from the other category (e.g., 
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‘WEZY’ or ‘WARY’ for the category with the prototype ‘WAZY’).  The non-prototype 
items in the six-dimensional category set (Experiment 1B) shared either four or five out 
of six letters with the prototype of their category. 
In both experiments, the targets were presented in upper-case (e.g., ‘WEZY’ or 
‘BARO’).  The primes were either the prototype for the category to which the target 
belonged (i.e., a congruent prime) or the prototype for the other category (i.e., an 
incongruent prime).1  Primes were always presented in lower-case letters (‘wazy’ or 
‘bero’).  The forward mask consisted of a series of either four (Experiment 1A) or six 
(Experiment 1B) ‘&’ symbols (e.g., ‘&&&&&&’) with the uppercase targets serving as 
the backward mask.  All stimuli were presented in 14 point Courier New font. 
In Experiment 1A, each target was presented 44 times (440 trials in total) in 
blocks of 10 trials such that each block consisted of a random presentation of all ten 
items.  In Experiment 1B each target was presented 28 times (392 trials in total) in blocks 
of 14 trials such that each block consisted of a random presentation of all 14 items.  In 
both experiments, each target was preceded equally often by a congruent versus an 
incongruent prime.  Note also that for both experiments the prototypes appeared as both 
primes and targets. 
Equipment.  All experiments were run using DMDX experimental software 
produced by Forster and Forster (2003).  Stimuli were presented on a SyncMaster 
monitor (Model No. 753DF).  Presentation was controlled by a Windows-based PC.  
Stimuli appeared as black characters on a white background.  Responses to stimuli were 
made by pressing one of two <shift> keys on the keyboard. 
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Procedure.  Participants were run individually.  Each participant sat 
approximately 18 inches in front of the computer screen and was told by the experimenter 
that they would be presented with a series of letter strings and their task was to learn, on 
the basis of feedback, which letter strings belong to Category 1 and which letter strings 
belong to Category 2.  The participants were instructed to respond by pressing the left 
<shift> key if they believed the letter string belonged to Category 1 and the right <shift> 
key if they believed the letter string belonged to Category 2.  In addition, participants 
were instructed to make their responses quickly since the letter string would only be 
visible for a limited period of time. 
Each participant then performed either 440 trials (Experiment 1A) or 392 trials 
(Experiment 1B).  Each trial began with a 440 ms forward mask (e.g., ‘&&&&’) which 
acted as a fixation cue and was followed by a 55 ms prime which was one of the two 
prototypes.  The prime was then followed by a target which was presented in the same 
position on the monitor as the forward mask and the prime for a maximum of 900 ms.  
After each response, participants were given feedback indicating whether their response 
was correct or not along with their reaction time if the response was correct.  If 
participants did not respond before the target disappeared, the message “No Response” 
was displayed before the next trial began. 
Results 
Trials in which either no response was given or the latency was less than 100 ms 
were excluded from all analyses (4.2% of the trials in Experiment 1A, 3.9% of the trials 
in Experiment 1B).  Error rates (trials when the wrong response was given) were 24.1% 
in Experiment 1A and 34.3% in Experiment 1B.  For each experiment, the data were 
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submitted to 2 (trial segment: early (first half of the trials) vs. later (second half of the 
trials)) by 2 (category congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) analyses of variance 
(ANOVA).  Separate ANOVAs for the correct response latencies, incorrect response 
latencies and error rates were run.  The results for both experiments are presented in 
Table 1. 
 Experiment 1A :  Four-Dimensional Category Set 
 Latency analyses for correct responses.2  There was a significant main effect of 
category congruence, F(1, 32) = 10.04, p < .004, MSE = 299.86.  Targets were responded 
to 10 ms faster when the preceding prime was the prototype for their category (514 ms) 
as opposed to the prototype of the other category (524 ms).  There was no effect of trial 
segment, F(1, 32) = 0.52, n.s., nor was the interaction significant, F(1, 32) = 0.01, n.s. 
Error analyses.  There was a significant main effect of trial segment, F(1, 32) = 
24.63, p < .001, MSE = 0.006, and a marginal effect of category congruence, F(1, 32) = 
3.11, p < .09, MSE = 0.003.  The error rate was significantly greater in the early segment 
(28.8%) than in the later segment (21.9%) indicating that participants were learning the 
categories.  The interaction was not significant, F(1, 32) = 2.08, n.s. 
Latency analyses for incorrect responses.  Neither of the main effects nor the interaction 
were significant (all Fs < 0.53).  
Experiment 1B :  Six-Dimension Category Set 
Latency analyses for correct responses.  There was a significant main effect of 
category congruence, F(1, 44) = 27.71, p < .001, MSE = 206.56.  Targets were responded 
to 11 ms faster when the preceding prime was the prototype of their category (511 ms) as  
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Table 1. 
Results for Category Learning - Experiment 1 (Reaction Times in Milliseconds, Errors in 
Percent) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Correct Responses   Incorrect Responses 
    
Trial  Incongruent Congruent  Incongruent Congruent 
Segment Primes  Primes  PE Primes  Primes  PE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Four-Dimensional Category Set (Experiment 1A) 
 
Early  521 (29.1) 511 (28.6) 10 501  502  - 1  
 
Late  527 (23.2) 517 (20.6) 10 506  511  - 5 
 
 
Six-Dimensional Category Set (Experiment 1B) 
 
Early  524 (38.8) 511 (37.7) 13 503  515  - 12  
 
Late  521 (33.7) 511 (33.0) 10 505  513  - 8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note.  Numbers in bracket are the error rates.  PE = Priming Effect 
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opposed to the prototype of the other category (522 ms).  There was no effect of trial 
segment, F(1, 44) = 0.02, n.s., nor was the interaction significant, F(1, 44) = 0.50, n.s. 
Error analyses. There was a significant main effect of trial segment, F(1, 44) = 
19.14, p < .001, MSE = 0.006.  The error rate was greater in the early segment (38.3%) 
than in the later segment (33.4%) indicating that participants were learning the categories.  
There was no effect of category congruence, F(1, 44) = 1.38, n.s., nor was the interaction 
significant, F(1, 44) = 0.07, n.s 
Latency analyses for incorrect responses. There was a significant reversed effect 
of category congruence, F(1, 44) = 11.44, p < .003, MSE =390.78.  Responses were 10 
ms faster when targets were preceded by the prototype of the opposite category (504 ms) 
as opposed to their own prototype (514 ms).  However, there was no effect of trial 
segment, F(1, 44) = 0.01, n.s., nor was the interaction significant, F(1, 44) = 0.31, n.s. 
Post-Hoc Analysis:  Perceptual Overlap 
 A post-hoc analysis was performed to determine whether the observed category 
congruence effects were due to the perceptual overlap between the prime and target.  In 
Experiment 1A the primes were either ‘wazy’ or ‘bero’.  Note that the prime ‘wazy’ 
contains three letters that have the same features in both lower and upper case (i.e., “w’, 
‘z’, and ‘y’) whereas the prime ‘bero’ has only one (i.e., ‘o’).  Therefore, if perceptual 
overlap was the driving force behind the small priming effect then the targets for the 
WAZY category should show a larger priming effect than the targets for the BERO 
category. 
 To examine this issue, the latency data were submitted to a 2 (category type:  
WAZY vs. BERO) by 2 (trial segment) by 2 (category congruence) ANOVA.  There was 
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no main effect of category type, F(1, 32) = 0.03, n.s., and more importantly, there were 
no significant interactions with category type (All Fs < 1.58).  Therefore, it does not 
appear that perceptual overlap was responsible for the observed priming.  
Discussion 
One clear result in Experiment 1 was that for both category sets there was a 
significant category congruence effect for correct response latencies.  That is, responses 
to targets were faster when preceded by their own prototype as opposed to the prototype 
of the other category.  Potential sources of this effect will be discussed further in the 
General Discussion.  However, for now, the most important aspect of these effects is that 
they do not appear to have been due to S-R associations.  If they had been due to S-R 
associations, their size should have increased over trials.  Note also that there was a 
reverse priming effect for the incorrect response trials in Experiment 1B, however, there 
was no indication that this effect increased across trial blocks either.  Thus, although the 
data clearly demonstrate priming without the activation of semantics it is difficult to 
ascribe this effect to the impact of developing S-R associations. 
Experiment 2 
One possibility for why there was virtually no evidence of an impact of S-R 
associations (i.e., that the size of the category congruence effect showed little evidence of 
increasing over trials) may be that the present circumstances did not allow sufficient time 
for S-R associations to develop.  In fact, the high error rates even in the later trial 
segment suggests that participants were still learning the stimulus features that would 
allow them to correctly categorize the stimuli and, thereby, allow the appropriate S-R 
associations to reach a sufficient level of strength to impact priming.3 
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The goal of Experiment 2 was to determine whether the size of the category 
congruence effect would increase over trials if participants were given considerably more 
opportunity to form and strengthen their S-R associations.  Using the four-dimensional 
stimuli from Experiment 1A, nine participants performed the categorization task once per 
day for five consecutive days.  If S-R associations produce priming in this task, the 
expectation is that, with additional practice, we will observe an increase in the size of the 
category congruence effect for correct response over days as well as an increase in the 
size of the reverse category congruence effect for incorrect responses. 
Method 
Participants.  Nine University of Western Ontario psychology graduate students 
received $50.00 each for their participation in this experiment (Age Range = 23 to 33, 
Mean = 27.4).  All had either normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were proficient in 
English. 
Materials.  The target set consisted of the 10 four-dimensional items used in 
Experiment 1A (see the Appendix). 
Procedure.  The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1A except that each 
participant performed the task once a day for five consecutive days.  
Results 
In the present analyses, performance during the first two days of training was 
compared with performance during the final two days of training (i.e., performance on 
day 3 was excluded from the analyses although data from day 3 are included in Table 2).  
For the other four days, trials in which either no response was given or the latency was 
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less than 100 ms were excluded from all analyses (1.6% of the trials).  The overall error 
rate was 19.4%. 
The data were submitted to three 2 (training sessions: early [day 1 & day 2] vs. 
later [day 4 & day 5]) by 2 (category congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVAs 
(latencies for the correct responses, latencies for the incorrect responses and the error 
rates).  The results are presented in Table 2. 
 Latency analyses for correct responses.  There was no effect of training sessions, 
F(1, 8) = 0.25, n.s., but there was a significant main effect of category congruence, F(1, 
8) = 11.23, p < .02, MSE = 254.90.  Targets were responded to 18 ms faster when the 
preceding prime was its own prototype (480 ms) as opposed to the prototype of the other 
category (498 ms).  Crucially, the interaction was significant, F(1, 8) = 7.21, p < .03, 
MSE = 40.11, due to the fact that the 23 ms priming effect in the later training sessions 
was greater than the 12 ms priming effect in the early training sessions. 
Error analyses.  There was a significant effect of training sessions, F(1, 8) = 
12.27, p < .009, MSE = 0.009, but no effect of category congruence, F(1, 8) = 0.08, n.s.  
The error rate was greater in the early training sessions (25.5%) than in the later sessions  
(14.2%), indicating that participants were learning the categories.  The interaction was 
also significant, F(1, 8) = 5.15, p = .05, MSE = 0.001, due to the fact that there was a 
small positive priming effect in the later sessions (13.4% errors following a congruent 
prime, 15.0% errors following an incongruent prime) whereas the small difference in the 
early sessions went in the opposite direction (26.0% errors following a congruent prime, 
25.0% errors following an incongruent prime). 
 
                                                                                      
 
81
Table 2. 
Results for Category Learning - Experiment 2 (Reaction Times in Milliseconds, Errors in 
Percent) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Correct Responses   Incorrect Responses 
    
Trial  Incongruent Congruent  Incongruent Congruent 
Segment Primes  Primes  PE Primes  Primes  PE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Days 1 & 2 501 (25.0) 489 (26.0) 12 503  509  - 6 
       
Day 3  517 (16.9) 499 (14.4) 18 507  528  - 21 
 
Days 4 & 5 495 (15.0) 472 (13.4) 23 467  509  - 42  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note.  Numbers in bracket are the error rates.  PE = Priming Effect 
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 Latency analyses for the incorrect responses.  There was no effect of training 
sessions, F(1, 8) = 0.62, n.s., but there was a marginal reversed effect of category 
congruence, F(1, 8) = 3.72, p < .10, MSE = 1266.90.  More importantly, the interaction 
was significant, F(1, 8) = 22.72, p < .002, MSE = 114.17, due to the fact that the 42 ms  
reversed priming effect in the later training sessions was greater than the 6 ms reversed 
 priming effect in the early training sessions. 
Discussion 
 The results in Experiment 2 support the notion that, with additional practice 
classifying the stimuli, S-R associations become strengthened and, as a result, there is an 
increase in the size of the category congruence effects.  Specifically, both a larger 
category congruence effect for correct responses and a larger reversed category 
congruence effect for incorrect responses (i.e., faster responding when the target was 
preceded by the prototype of the other category as opposed to its own prototype) occurred 
in the later training sessions in comparison to the early training sessions. 
General Discussion 
The goal of the present research was to examine the process by which S-R 
associations begin to produce priming effects in masked priming tasks.  We propose that 
a masked priming version of the category learning task is an ideal task to evaluate S-R 
association mechanisms since the stimuli in this paradigm have no ability to activate 
semantic information and are not associated a priori with any response. 
Participants were repeatedly presented with stimuli from artificial categories 
consisting of either four- (Experiment 1A & 2) or six- (Experiment 1B) dimensional 
letter strings and were required to learn, on the basis of feedback, which target stimuli 
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belonged to one category and which target stimuli belonged to the other category.  In 
every experiment, the target stimuli were preceded by a masked prime which was either 
the prototype of the target’s category or the prototype of the other category. 
Summary of Results 
In both Experiments 1A and 1B, small but significant category congruence effects 
emerged.  Responses were faster when targets were preceded by the prototype of their 
category as opposed to the prototype of the other category.  In addition, in Experiment 1B 
there was a significant reversed category congruence effect (i.e., faster responses when 
the target was preceded by the prototype for the other category as opposed to the 
prototype of its own category).  However, because neither of these priming effects 
increased in size over trials, the data from those experiments do not provide much 
support for the notion that these priming effects are due to the impact of S-R associations. 
 In Experiment 2, participants performed the same (four-dimensional) category 
learning task as in Experiment 1A once a day for five consecutive sessions in order to 
investigate whether the lack of growth in the size of the category congruence effect in 
Experiment 1 may have been due to having insufficient time to fully develop and 
strengthen the appropriate S-R associations.  The results support this idea.  Specifically, 
both the size of the category congruence effect for correct responses and the size of the 
reversed category congruence effect for incorrect responses was significantly greater in 
the later training sessions (i.e., the fourth and fifth sessions) than in the early training 
sessions (i.e., the first and second sessions). 
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Implications of the Current Research 
I.  S-R Association Accounts of Masked Priming 
 In most of the prior studies in which the masked priming effects have been 
assumed to be due to S-R associations (e.g., Abrams, 2005; Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; 
Boy & Sumner, 2010; Damian, 2001; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Klotz & Neumann, 1999) 
priming was evident quite early.  For instance, in Damian’s experiment using old set 
primes, the priming effect was significant by the fifth time participants had seen the 
primes as targets.  In contrast, there was no evidence of an increase in priming over a 
reasonably large number of trials in the present Experiments 1A and 1B and in 
Experiment 2 the priming effect grew quite slowly over several sessions.  The results 
from the masked priming version of the category learning task, therefore, suggest that it 
takes considerable time for S-R associations to develop to the point where they can affect 
priming, at least when using alphanumeric stimuli that are not initially associated with 
any particular response as primes and targets.   
What must be acknowledged, of course, is that the stimuli and the task used in the 
present research are noticeably different from those typically used in the masked priming 
literature.  However, the results from the present experiments at least raise the question of 
whether the prior effects may have an alternative explanation.  Specifically, because 
many of these studies used clearly defined semantic categories it is possible that those 
effects may have actually been due to changes in the nature of the semantic information 
activated by the prime over trials.  Consider, for example, Damian’s (2001) physical size 
judgment task involving old set primes.  In his task, no priming was observed for the old 
set primes in the first two trial blocks, however, significant priming was observed in the 
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third and subsequent blocks even though, at that point, participants had only seen and 
responded to each target four times.  Clearly, something was changing/developing over 
trial blocks and Damian’s suggestion that it was the strength of the S-R associations is a 
reasonable hypothesis if one can successfully argue that S-R associations can be 
sufficiently developed as a result of four responses to a stimulus.   
An alternative possibility, however, is that what may have been developing over 
trials was the participants’ ability to retrieve/focus on the specific semantic information 
which was necessary to perform Damian’s (2001) task.  In this particular situation, that 
would be the more detailed size-based information that allows a participant to determine 
whether the target is larger or smaller than an arbitrarily selected comparison object (e.g., 
a computer monitor).  Perhaps, as participants practiced retrieving this specific size-based 
information for the targets used in the experiment then those targets may have also started 
to activate this particular type of information automatically when they were presented as 
masked primes.  If so, Damian’s old set primes would then have started to produce 
priming.  In contrast, new set primes, which never appear as targets, would not produce 
priming because participants would never have had the opportunity to develop the 
necessary retrieval processes for those stimuli.4  Further research is needed to determine 
whether a semantically-based explanation can provide a better account of Damian’s 
results. 
II. The Category Congruence Effect in Experiment 1 
One question that remains concerns the source of the category congruence effects 
which arose very early in processing in both Experiments 1A and 1B and in the first 
session in Experiment 2.  A semantic activation account of these effects would be 
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inadequate since the category sets were artificial and, hence, had no pre-existing 
semantics for the primes to activate.  As discussed, an examination of the time course of 
these effects effectively also rules out any S-R association account since their size does 
not increase across trials.5  Nor is it likely that the effects were due to perceptual overlap 
between the primes and targets.  In the following discussion, two other accounts of 
masked priming effects, one based on perceptual learning and the other based on Kunde 
et al.’s (2003) action-trigger hypothesis, are considered as potential explanations for these 
effects. 
 Perceptual learning.  The general idea behind perceptual learning accounts (e.g., 
Przekoracka-Krawczyk & Jaskowski, 2007; Schlaghecken et al., 2007, 2008) is that 
participants’ performance is altered over trials as they learn (often implicitly) to better 
attend to various features of the visual display.  Such attention to features could then 
carry over to masked prime processing.  The key difficulty, however, with using a 
perceptual learning account to explain the results in Experiment 1 is that the prior results 
clearly show that any priming due to perceptual learning takes time to develop.  For 
example, Przekoracka-Krawczyk and Jaskowski had participants classify target arrows 
preceded by masked primes in an initial training block followed by a test block.  Across 
all their experiments, priming only occurred in the test blocks.  Therefore, it does not 
appear that a perceptual learning account could provide a framework for explaining why 
priming occurred in the early trials in Experiment 1, although it could provide an 
explanation for the results in Experiment 2.  The same could also be said for other types 
of automatization accounts (e.g., Logan’s, 1988, 1990, instance theory).  That is, although 
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these processes may help to explain the effects observed in Experiment 2, they do not 
appear to hold much promise for explaining the effects observed in Experiment 1. 
Action-trigger hypothesis.  According to Kunde et al.’s (2003) action-trigger 
account of masked priming (see also Kiesel et al., 2007) participants set up action-trigger 
sets, that is, mappings between possible stimuli and their responses in a target 
classification task.  These mappings can involve any stimuli that a participant might 
choose to include and can be formed quickly and without practice.  Responses are 
facilitated when the prime and target activate the same action trigger and are inhibited 
when they activate different action triggers.  The action-trigger hypothesis was originally 
proposed by Kunde et al. as an alternative explanation to a purely semantic account of 
how new set priming occurs in magnitude judgment tasks. 
With respect to Experiment 1, an action-trigger account would go as follows.  
Participants would learn very early that items that belong to the same category have a 
much stronger family resemblance (i.e., they typically have more letters in common) than 
items that belong to the other category.  They would then use that knowledge to establish 
appropriate action-triggers for at least some of the stimuli.  Since there is no explicit 
assumption that, once established, strengthening these action-triggers through further 
practice will produce an increase in the size of the category congruence effect, priming 
could occur early and (potentially) vary little in magnitude over trials, as observed in 
Experiment 1. 
It would be a bit more difficult to explain the increase in the size of the priming 
effect over training sessions in Experiment 2 in terms of the action-trigger account.  To 
do so, one would need to assume that their usage was refined based on some sort of 
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build-up of knowledge with exposure/practice, an assumption that is not part of the action 
trigger account.  For example, perhaps the assignment of action triggers early in the 
experiment (i.e., throughout Experiment 1 and the first day or two in Experiment 2) was 
not always correct because the participants were still learning the categories.  Once the 
categories were learned (i.e., the later days in Experiment 2), participants may have been 
able to associate the action triggers with the appropriate stimuli more confidently and/or 
consistently. 
Alternatively, both action triggers and S-R associations may have both played a 
role in the later sessions in Experiment 2.  That is, priming in the initial blocks may have 
been due to action triggers and their impact may have continued throughout the 
experiment.  The increase in the size of the priming effect in Experiment 2, however, may 
have been due to the development of S-R associations.  The idea that two factors could 
influence priming at the same time is atypical but certainly not novel (e.g., Kinoshita & 
Hunt, 2008; Perry & Lupker, submitted) and there is certainly no a priori reason why any 
observed category congruence effect could not have multiple sources.  Defining the 
boundaries of the action-trigger account and how it relates to S-R association accounts, 
therefore, will be an important issue for future research. 
III. An Alternative Account of the Category Congruence Effects in Experiment 2 
 In the current experiments, semantics was defined as prior conceptual 
knowledge/representation of a category in terms of the relationships between its 
individual stimulus features (see Kaplan & Murphy, 2000; Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; 
Murphy & Medin, 1985).  By this definition, stimuli within our categories were not 
semantically related (as well as being arbitrary).  That is, these stimuli were merely 
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nonword letter strings in which the “features” corresponded to the identity of one of two 
possible letters (e.g., the first letter was either a “W” or a “B”).  Therefore, our 
assumption was that any observed increase in the size of the category congruence effects 
in Experiment 2 could not have been due to the activation of semantics and must, instead, 
have been due to additional practice learning and strengthening the appropriate S-R 
associations. 
In theory, however, one could assume that with continued exposure to these 
stimuli, participants might have begun to develop some sort of conceptual knowledge 
concerning the relationship among the various features within the category set (see 
Murphy & Medin, 1985).  If so, the masked primes may, then, have started to 
automatically activate this particular semantic knowledge leading to the observed 
category congruence effects in Experiment 2.  That is, the increase in priming would have 
been (at least partly) due to the increased activation of semantic information over trials 
(an explanation that would be somewhat similar to the semantically-based explanation 
provided earlier for Damian’s, 2001, results). 
To the extent that this alternative is correct, it would raise the further question of 
whether S-R associations were, in fact, at all responsible for the priming pattern in 
Experiment 2.  That is, it would be unclear whether the source of the observed priming 
was purely “semantic” or whether S-R associations also developed to the point where 
they also impacted priming (e.g., Kinoshita & Hunt, 2008).  This question, of course, also 
has implications for the role of S-R associations in automaticity (e.g., Klapp & 
Greenberg, 2009).  That is, if semantics can be defined to include any relationship 
between a stimulus and the knowledge that the stimulus represents then even knowledge 
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about S-R associations would have to be regarded as semantic knowledge.  Therefore, 
semantic knowledge could be the only possible source of priming effects.  Hopefully, 
further research deriving from Murphy and Allopenna’s (1994; Kaplan & Murphy, 2000) 
investigations concerning the impact of conceptual knowledge on artificial category 
learning (applied to masked priming situations) will allow us to address this issue. 
Conclusions 
 The present research employed a masked priming version of a category learning 
task to investigate the role of S-R associations in producing category congruence effects 
in a situation that, by assumption, legislates against any influences of semantic activation.  
In Experiment 1 priming effects emerged, but did not increase in size over trials.  In 
Experiment 2 priming effects did increase in size, but only after participants performed 
multiple training sessions.  These results, therefore, provide support for the claim that S-
R associations (or something conceptually similar such as action triggers) do play a role 
in masked priming tasks with alphanumeric stimuli (i.e., there is priming in these types of 
tasks that is not due to the activation of semantic information). 
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Footnotes 
1 All the primes in the current experiments were old set primes because the prototype 
items were used as both masked primes and targets.  Note that, in the category learning 
task, category membership is defined by the perceptual features of the stimulus set which, 
in the present experiments, were the letter identities at each of the letter positions in the 
stimulus.  Therefore, even if the prototype items were never seen and classified as targets, 
the prototype primes would probably be best thought of as old set primes since they, by 
necessity, share most of their letters with the other members of their categories (see 
Abrams & Greenwald, 2000). 
2  Removing the prototype targets (i.e., repetition priming) from this and all subsequent 
analyses changed none of the significant main effects nor interactions. 
3 A post-hoc analysis based on correct response latencies for the non-prototype targets 
(i.e., non-repetition priming) was run in order to determine whether the priming effects 
might vary as a function of the participants’ ability to learn the artificial category sets 
(see Appendix D for further details).  For both Experiments 1A and 1B participants were 
divided into three levels of learning achievement based upon overall error rates in the 
task.  In neither experiment was there an interaction between learning achievement and 
category congruence nor a three-way interaction of learning achievement, category 
congruence and trial segment, implying that even the participants who had best learned 
the categories were still not showing evidence of the patterns predicted by an S-R 
association account. 
4 This is not the only possible semantically-based explanation.  Another, similar, way of 
thinking about Damian’s (2001) results is that what was developing over trials was the 
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participants’ ability to categorize targets (i.e., old set primes) into the ad hoc categories 
(e.g., Barsalou, 1982) of “things larger or smaller than a computer screen” (see Quinn & 
Kinoshita, 2008, for a similar proposal).  New set primes, in contrast, would not have 
gained this ability because they never appeared as targets.  The authors would like to 
thank Deanna Friesen for bringing this idea to our attention. 
5 An obvious question is, how early in Experiments 1A and 1B did these effects emerge?  
To address this question we analyzed the category congruence effects for the non-
prototype targets in the first four trial blocks (32 trials in Experiment 1A and 48 trials in 
Experiment 1B).  In both Experiments 1A and 1B there were four presentations of each 
stimulus (two primed by their own category prototype and two primed by the other 
category’s prototype).  In Experiment 1A there was a significant 25 ms effect [497 ms vs. 
522 ms, t(32) = 3.65, p < .002, SE = 6.80] and in Experiment 1B there was a significant 
16 ms effect [515 ms vs. 531 ms, t(44) = 2.04, p < .05, SE = 8.01].  These results suggest 
that there is little reason to believe that the category congruence effects in Experiments 
1A and 1B required practice in order to develop. 
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Addendum to Chapter 3 
The generally accepted “prospective” view of how the mechanisms of masked 
priming work is that a) the presentation of a masked prime induces a temporary state of 
activation in the cognitive system and b) any effect of the prime must be due solely to 
automatic, rather than strategic, activation processes (see Forster & Davis, 1984).  
Probably the most important question for those accepting this view concerns the source 
of the prime’s activation (i.e., S-R associations or semantics). 
As noted previously, in general, masked priming research has used clearly defined 
semantic categories (e.g., categories based on things like shape or magnitude).  Much of 
that research has suggested that the primary source of masked priming in these tasks was 
likely the activation of semantics.  The presence of a priming distance effect in both 
number classification experiments from Chapter 2 provides further support for this 
possibility.  In Chapter 3, the nature of any category congruence (i.e., masked priming) 
effects in a masked priming version of a category learning task was investigated.  Since 
the stimuli in this type of task are artificial they a) have no pre-existing ability to activate 
semantic information and b) are not initially associated with any response.  Therefore, 
this paradigm should be ideal to demonstrate the impact of S-R associations since any 
congruence effects would have to be due to the impact of S-R associations as they 
develop. 
Recall that Damian (2001) noted that an S-R association account predicts that “if 
the congruity effect depended on automatized mappings between stimuli and their 
corresponding responses, it should clearly build up across the experiment” (p. 158).  For 
both the four-letter (Experiment 1A) and six-letter (Experiment 1B) artificial category 
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sets there were category congruence effects such that responses were faster when targets 
were preceded by their own prototype versus the prototype of the other category.  
However, contrary to Damian’s prediction, for neither category set was there an increase 
in the size of the category congruence effect.  In Experiment 2, the size of the category 
congruence effect did increase when participants practiced learning the four-letter 
category set over multiple sessions/days.  The results from Chapter 3, therefore, provide 
support for the claim that S-R associations can impact masked priming, although they 
may need considerable time to develop. 
The stimuli and task used in Chapter 3 are noticeably different from those 
typically used in the masked priming literature.  However, the fact that it took multiple 
sessions until the S-R associations in these experiments developed to the point where 
they affected priming challenges the claims from previous research (e.g., Abrams, 2005; 
Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Klotz & 
Neumann, 1999) that the source of their masked priming effects were due to the impact 
of S-R associations.  Alternatively, these previous results may have been due to changes 
in the nature of semantic information activated by the prime over trials (as discussed in 
the General Discussion sections of both Chapters 2 and 3).  From a “prospective” view of 
masked priming these results (along with the results from Chapter 2) strongly imply that 
the primary source of the prime’s influence comes from activated semantic information. 
There is, however, an alternative “retrospective” view of masked priming which, 
in contrast to the “prospective” view, assumes a) masked primes form reasonably strong 
episodic traces and b) the cognitive system strategically adjusts the extent to which it 
relies upon information from these episodic traces.  If this view is correct, the impact of 
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semantic would have to be interpreted in a somewhat different fashion.  The strongest 
piece of evidence for a “retrospective” view is the existence of prime validity effects.  
That is, larger priming effects when the percentage of trials in which the target is related 
to the prime is high compared to when it is low (see Masson & Bodner, 2003, for a 
review). 
In Chapter 4 an initial attempt to investigate prime validity effects involved an 
arrow classification task with free choice trials.  In this experiment arrow targets were 
preceded by masked primes which either a) always pointed in the same direction of the 
target arrow (100% congruent condition), b) always pointed in the opposite direction 
(100% incongruent condition), or c) pointed equally often in the same and different 
directions (unpredictive condition) using a prime-target interval of either 77 ms or 165 
ms (a between-subjects manipulation).  The inclusion of an unpredictive baseline along 
with a more extreme manipulation of congruent/incongruent prime-target trials allows for 
a closer evaluation of what is producing the prime validity effects and hence, a means of 
contrasting the prospective versus retrospective view of masked priming. 
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Chapter 4 – Target Arrow Classification with Free Choice Trials 
In the masked priming paradigm, a forward mask (typically a character string) 
may or may not be presented prior to a briefly presented (typically 60 ms or less) prime 
stimulus which is then masked by either a backward mask and/or a target stimulus.  The 
goal of this paradigm is to measure the effect of these masked primes on target 
processing in order to better understand the mechanisms underlying the processing of 
subliminal stimuli. 
In general, there are two views concerning how the presentation of the masked 
prime affects target processing (see Masson & Bodner, 2003).  The “prospective view” is 
based upon two assumptions.  One assumption is that the presentation of a masked prime 
induces a temporary state of activation in the cognitive system which, in turn, affects the 
speed with which a subsequently presented target is processed.  The second assumption is 
that, since participants do not report any awareness of these masked primes, any episodic 
trace left by these primes should be so weak that any effect of the prime must have been 
due solely to automatic, rather than strategic, processes (see also Forster & Davis, 1984). 
The alternative, “retrospective view” of masked priming is based on the idea that 
both of the assumptions of the prospective view are incorrect, adopting instead two 
markedly different assumptions.  The first is that the primes (even when they are 
presented briefly and masked) form reasonably strong episodic traces.  The second 
assumption is that, in an effort to aid target processing, the cognitive system strategically 
adjusts the extent to which it relies upon information from these episodic traces (even 
though the viewer is typically unaware of both the presence of the prime and its identity). 
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The strongest piece of evidence that masked primes do activate episodic traces 
that could then be used strategically are “prime validity” effects, that is, larger priming 
effects when the percentage of trials in which the target is related to the prime is high 
(typically 80%) compared to when it is low (typically 20%).  These effects have been 
found in reaction time latencies across a variety of cognitive tasks (e.g., Bodner & 
Dypvik, 2005; Bodner & Masson, 2001, 2003, 2004; Bodner, Masson & Richard, 2006; 
Bodner & Mulji, 2010; Jaskowski, Skalska & Verleger, 2003; Klapp, 2007).  To account 
for these results, Bodner and Masson (2001; Masson & Bodner, 2003) proposed their 
“memory recruitment account”, which is based on the two core assumptions of the 
retrospective view of masked priming, to explain how the proportion of congruent prime-
target trials affects the size of priming effects. 
According to the memory recruitment account, “the processing applied to masked 
primes is encoded in memory and is then recruited to assist with target processing if the 
list context ….. supports its recruitment” (Bodner & Mulji, 2010, p. 361).  That is, when 
the information that can be derived from a masked prime is often beneficial for target 
processing (e.g., a prime arrow often points in the same direction as the target arrow), 
then the cognitive system adopts a target processing strategy which involves placing 
some reliance upon information derived from the prime’s episodic trace.  Because this 
information benefits target processing on related trials, a greater reliance on prime 
information produces a larger priming effect.  In contrast, as Masson and Bodner (2003) 
have argued, a prospective view of masked priming appears to be unable to explain prime 
validity effects.  If priming were merely due to a temporary change in activation within 
                                                                                      
 
104
the cognitive system, that change, and, hence, the size of the priming effect, should not be 
affected by the proportion of congruent prime-target pairs. 
Much of the previous research on the prime validity effect has been done using 
paradigms in which several different stimuli are used as primes and targets so that each 
stimulus is seen and classified only once (e.g., lexical decision, naming).  The present 
research investigates these issues in a slightly different situation, one in which only a 
small set of stimuli is used repeatedly with those same stimuli also acting as masked 
primes.  In these types of situations, the influence of the masked prime on target 
classification is presumed to be due to specific stimulus-response associations which are 
formed as a result of classifying a small set of visible stimuli (see Damian, 2001).  
Specifically, the present experiment was designed to investigate the mechanisms which 
drive the prime validity effect when the task is a target arrow classifications task (see also 
Bodner & Mulji, 2010; Klapp, 2007). 
Arrow Classification Tasks (With and Without Free Choice Trials) 
Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) provided one of the earliest demonstrations of a 
masked priming effect in an arrow classification task in which arrow targets that require a 
directional (i.e., left (<<) or right (>>)) response were preceded by masked prime arrows.  
Their results were counterintuitive in that participants responded significantly faster when 
the prime and target arrows pointed in opposite directions as opposed to the same 
direction (a “negative priming effect”).  Measurements of event-related potentials helped 
explain this negative priming effect by demonstrating that a masked arrow prime initially 
activates the motor response which corresponds to the direction of that prime.  That is, a 
response priming effect emerged due to the fact that repeated classifications of left and 
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right pointing target arrows strengthened the association between these stimuli and the 
left and right key responses, associations that are activated by the masked primes.  
However, as time passes and this response activation diminishes, the opposite motor 
response becomes activated. 
The “facilitation-followed-by-inhibition” pattern from Eimer and Schlaghecken’s 
(1998) event-related potential measurements suggests that, in an arrow classification task, 
responses should be faster when prime and target arrows point in the same as opposed to 
opposite directions (“positive priming”) when the prime-target interval is short, whereas 
negative priming effects should be obtained when the prime-target interval is long.  This 
response priming pattern has, in fact, been demonstrated in subsequent research (e.g., 
Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000, 2002). 
Further research has shown that, in addition to motor response latencies, masked 
arrow primes also affect response selection in tasks where arrow target trials are 
interspersed with a set of either-way targets (< >) for which either response is legitimate 
(see Klapp & Haas, 2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002, Experiment 5; Schlaghecken & 
Eimer, 2004; Schlaghecken, Klapp, & Maylor, 2009, Experiment 2).  Specifically, 
responses in these free choice trials are more frequent and faster when they match the 
direction of the masked prime at short prime-target intervals, but at longer prime-target 
intervals the pattern reverses (see especially Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). 
Prime Validity Effects in the Arrow Classification Task 
Recent research by Klapp (2007) has demonstrated a prime validity effect using 
masked primes in an arrow classification task.  Specifically, Klapp varied the proportion 
of incongruent prime-target pairs between-subjects from 20% to 50% to 80% using both 
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a relatively long 160 ms prime-target interval (Experiment 2) and a short 32 ms prime-
target interval (Experiment 3).  When a long prime-target interval was used, negative 
priming occurred which increased in magnitude as the proportion of incongruent prime-
target pairs increased.  When a short prime-target interval was used, positive priming 
occurred which increased in magnitude as the proportion of congruent prime-target pairs 
increased. 
Focusing solely on the positive priming effect, Bodner and Mulji (2010) recently 
extended Klapp’s (2007) research by showing that the proportion of congruent prime-
target pairs for the arrow targets also affects response selection on the either-way targets.  
Specifically, they interspersed free choice trials with arrow target trials and manipulated 
the proportion of congruent prime-target arrow classification trials between-participants 
such that half the participants received 80% congruent trials (80/20 condition) and the 
other half received 20% congruent trials (20/80 condition).  Using a prime-target interval 
of 105 ms they obtained a larger priming effect for the target arrow classification trials in 
the 80/20 condition (28 ms) than in the 20/80 condition (8 ms) which replicated Klapp’s 
prime validity effect.  Further, the proportion of congruent prime-target pairs in the arrow 
classification trials also influenced response selection on the free choice trials.  
Responses were faster in the 80/20 condition when the response corresponded with the 
direction of the masked prime (a 21 ms priming effect), but not in the 20/80 condition (a 
non-significant 2 ms priming effect) and a response bias emerged such that responses 
corresponded with the direction of the masked prime on 54.1% of the trials in the 80/20 
condition, but response selection was at chance (i.e., 49.1%) in the 20/80 condition. 
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Bodner and Mulji (2010) proposed that prime validity effects on both the arrow 
classification and free choice trials fit particularly well within their memory recruitment 
account.  Specifically, priming effects occurred in the 80/20 condition, but were 
essentially non-existent in the 20/80 condition, because participants in the 80/20 
condition were often relying upon episodic traces obtained from prime processing to aid 
target processing.  In the 20/80 condition, however, the proportion of congruent trials was 
too low to be useful so participants placed virtually no reliance upon the obtained 
episodic traces produced by prime processing. 
The Current Study 
What is important to note about Bodner and Mulji’s (2010) account is the lack of 
a role for automatic response activation processes.  That is, the only source of priming in 
their account is the use of episodic information about the prime in order to aid target 
processing.  When the proportion of congruent prime-target trials is high (e.g., the 80/20 
condition), recruitment of prime information is frequent and a positive priming effect 
emerges.  In contrast, when the proportion is low (e.g., the 20/80 condition), virtually no 
recruitment of prime information takes place and, consistent with Bodner and Mulji’s 
results, no priming emerges.  Where an account of this sort runs into problems, however, 
is in explaining negative priming effects (i.e., the fact that, with longer prime-target 
intervals, incongruent prime-target pairings tend to produce shorter latencies) since the 
recruitment of prime information can only aid processing.  In order to explain inhibition 
effects, it would appear that Bodner and Mulji’s account would have to assume that there 
is some role for response activation/inhibition processes.  If their account were to do so, 
however, the question would then become, why would activation processes not also play 
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a role on positive priming trials (e.g., when the prime-target interval in the arrow 
classification task is short)? 
The current study is an attempt to evaluate the potential role of automatic 
response activation processes in the arrow classification task and the implications for 
Bodner and Mulji’s (2010) account of their arrow classification data.  To do so, the 
strongest possible manipulation of prime-target congruency in that task, combined with 
both a short (i.e., 77 ms) and long (i.e., 165 ms) prime-target interval, was used along 
with a set of either-way targets.  Prime-target congruency for the arrow targets was 
manipulated between-subjects across three different conditions.  In two of these 
conditions, the prime-target relationship for the arrow targets was either 100% congruent 
(i.e., the prime arrow always pointed in the same direction of the target arrow) or 100% 
incongruent (i.e., the prime and target arrows always pointed in opposite directions).  The 
other condition was an unpredictive baseline condition in which arrow targets were 
preceded equally often by congruent and incongruent masked primes. 
The key question concerns how the prime validity manipulation for the arrow 
targets affects the masked prime’s impact (for both the reaction time and response bias) 
on the intermixed either-way targets, specifically focusing on the relationship between 
the pattern in the unpredictive condition versus those in the 100% congruent and 100% 
incongruent conditions.  Since the prime is of no use in terms of predicting the target in 
the unpredictive condition, our working assumption is that participants would have no 
motivation to recruit prime information in this condition.  Thus, any impact of the prime 
in the unpredictive condition would, presumably, be due to automatic processing of the 
sort measured by Klapp and Hinkley (2002) and Schlaghecken and Eimer (2004).  If 
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performance in the unpredictive condition is equivalent to that in the 100% incongruent 
condition (i.e., an essentially null priming effect) then, in support of Bodner and Mulji’s 
(2010) claims, the implication would be that priming in the 100% congruent condition 
was due to the recruitment of prime information to aid target processing with automatic 
activation processes playing little, if any, role.  In contrast, if performance in the 
unpredictive condition is equivalent to that in the 100% congruent condition then the 
implication would be that the priming in the 100% congruent condition is essentially due 
to automatic activation processes rather than recruitment of prime information to aid 
target processing.  Further, it would mean that performance in the 100% incongruent 
condition was affected by some sort of participant action (e.g., an attempt to suppress an 
automatic bias created by the prime).  A final possibility is that the unpredictive condition 
would show priming midway between that in the 100% congruent and 100% incongruent 
conditions.  If so, then the implication would be that the primes may be used in both 
100% congruent and 100% incongruent conditions to either enhance or diminish the 
automatic activation initially created by the primes. 
Method 
Participants.  One-hundred-and-forty-seven University of Western Ontario 
psychology undergraduate students received either course credit or $10 for their 
participation in these experiments (Age Range = 17 – 53, Median = 23.2).  All had either 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were proficient in English. 
Materials.  There were two types of targets in these experiments.  One type was 
double-headed arrows which pointed either towards the left (‘<<’) or the right (‘>>’).  
The other type was an either-way target which consisted of one arrow which pointed right 
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and one arrow which pointed left (‘< >’).  Primes were also double-headed arrow stimuli 
which pointed either left (‘<<’) or right (‘>>’).  Masks consisted of single-headed arrows 
pointing to both the left and the right (‘><><><><’). 1  All stimuli were presented in 14-
point Courier New font. 
There were 360 test stimuli presented in six blocks of 60 trials each.  Within each 
block of trials, there were 20 left-pointing arrow targets, 20 right-pointing arrow targets, 
and 20 either-way targets.  Twenty-four practice trials (eight either-way targets, eight 
right-pointing arrow targets, and eight left-pointing arrow targets) preceded the test trials.  
For the arrow practice trials, half of the prime-target pairs were congruent (i.e., the prime 
and target arrows pointed in the same direction) and the other half were incongruent (i.e., 
prime and target arrows pointed in opposite directions).  For the either-way practice 
targets, half the targets were preceded by a right-pointing arrow prime and half the targets 
were preceded by a left-pointing arrow prime. 
In terms of the experimental trials, in the unpredictive condition, the prime-target 
pairs for half the arrow targets were congruent and the prime-target pairs for the other 
half of the arrow targets were incongruent.  In the 100% congruent condition, the arrow 
targets were always preceded by a prime arrow which pointed in the same direction as the 
target, whereas in the 100% incongruent condition the arrow targets were always 
preceded by a prime arrow which pointed in the direction opposite that of the target.  As 
noted previously, this prime-target congruency manipulation was a between-subjects 
manipulation.  In all three conditions, the either-way targets were preceded equally often 
by either a right-pointing or left-pointing arrow prime. 
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Equipment.  The experiment was run using DMDX experimental software 
produced by Forster and Forster (2003).  Stimuli were presented on a SyncMaster 
monitor (Model No. 753DF).  Presentation was controlled by an IBM-clone Intel 
Pentium.  Stimuli appeared as black characters on a white background.  Responses to 
stimuli were made by pressing one of two <shift> keys on the keyboard. 
Procedure.  Participants were run individually.  Participants sat approximately 18 
inches in front of the computer screen and were told by the experimenter that they would 
have to respond to both arrow targets and either-way targets which would be presented on 
the screen.  For the arrow targets, they were instructed to respond by pressing a key in the 
direction that the target arrow was pointing (either left or right).  For the either-way 
targets they were told to respond by pressing either the left or right key and it was 
emphasized that either response was appropriate.  For the arrow targets, the participants 
were told to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.  For the either-way targets, 
the participants were told to respond as quickly as possible without concerning 
themselves about which response they were making. 
Each participant first performed the 24 practice trials with the experimenter in the 
room.  Following these practice trials and after answering any questions the participants 
may have had, the experimenter left the room and the participants then performed the 
experimental trials which consisted of six blocks of 60 trials (there was an opportunity for 
a break at the end of each block). 
Each trial began with a 550 ms arrow mask (e.g., ‘><><><><’) which acted as a 
fixation cue.  This forward arrow mask was then followed by a 44 ms prime double-
headed arrow (e.g., ‘<<’) which was backward masked by a 33 ms arrow mask.  The 
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backward mask was followed by a 99 ms target which was either a double-headed arrow 
(i.e., ‘>>’ or ‘<<’) or an either-way stimulus (i.e., ‘< >’).  The participants had a 
maximum of 2.5 seconds to respond to the target stimulus before the next trial began.  
The key manipulation was the length of the prime-target interval.  For 51 participants (17 
in each prime condition) the prime-target interval was 77 ms, whereas for 96 participants 
(32 in each prime condition) the prime-target interval was increased to 165 ms by 
inserting an 88 ms blank screen between the backward mask and the target.  Data 
collection in the 77 ms condition was completed prior to beginning data collection in the 
165 ms condition. 
At the end of the experiment, the experimenter asked the participants if they were 
aware of anything that may have appeared before the target stimulus. 
Results 
None of the participants reported that they noticed any of the primes on the screen 
prior to the targets.  Therefore, one can assume that participants possessed little or no 
conscious awareness of the existence of the primes.  Prime discrimination tasks were also 
carried out with separate groups of participants using the display parameters for both 
prime-target intervals.  These data also indicate that participants had little awareness of 
the primes at either prime-target interval (see Appendix E for a description of the prime 
discrimination task). 
For the arrow targets, latency and error data in the unpredictive condition were 
analyzed using a 2 (Prime-Target Congruity:  congruent vs. incongruent) by 2 (Prime-
Target Interval:  short vs. long) mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA), whereas 
latency and error contrasts between the 100% congruent and 100% incongruent 
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conditions were analyzed using a 2 (Prime Condition:  100% congruent vs. 100% 
incongruent) by 2 (Prime-Target Interval:  short vs. long) between-subject ANOVA.  
Latency responses to the either-way targets were analyzed using a 3 (Prime Condition: 
100% congruent vs. unpredictive vs. 100% incongruent) by 2 (Response Congruity: 
congruent vs. incongruent) by 2 (Prime-Target Interval:  short vs. long) mixed-design 
ANOVA.  The response bias to the either-way targets was analyzed using a 3 (Prime 
Condition:  100% congruent vs. unpredictive vs. 100% incongruent) by 2 (Prime-Target 
Interval:  short vs. long) mixed-design ANOVA. 
The interactions for both arrow and either-way target data were further analyzed 
using post-hoc comparisons (using Bonferroni adjustments for multiple comparisons).  In 
addition, incorrect responses to the arrow targets were removed from the latency analyses 
along with either-way and arrow target trials that were shorter than 150 ms or in which no 
response was given (9.8% of the arrow target trials, 4.2% of the either-way target trials).2 
Arrow Targets 
Unpredictive Condition.  In the latency analysis there was a significant main 
effect of prime-target congruity, F(1, 47) = 19.67, p < .001, MSE = 257.21.  Responses 
were 15 ms faster when the prime and target arrow pointed in the same direction (312 
ms) compared to the opposite direction (327 ms).  There was no main effect of prime-
target interval, F(1, 47) = 0.27, n.s.  More importantly, the interaction was significant, 
F(1, 47) = 57.03, p < .001, MSE = 257.21.  When the prime-target interval was 77 ms, 
responses were 41 ms faster when the prime and the target pointed in the same (295 ms) 
as opposed to the opposite direction (336 ms), t(16) = 7.42, p < .001, SE = 5.50 (i.e., 
positive priming).  However, when the prime-target interval was increased to 165 ms, 
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responses were 11 ms faster when the prime and the target pointed in the opposite (318 
ms) compared to the same direction (329 ms), t(31) = 2.65, p < .02, SE = 4.01 (i.e., 
negative priming). 
In the error analysis there were significant main effects of prime-target congruity, 
F(1, 47) = 21.85, p < .001, MSE = 0.005, and prime-target interval, F(1, 47) = 9.30, p < 
.005, MSE = 0.009.  The error rate was greater when the prime and target arrows pointed 
in opposite directions (12.7%) as opposed to the same direction (5.8%) and the error rate 
was greater when the prime-target interval was 77 ms (12.3%) than 165 ms (6.2%).  More 
importantly, the interaction was significant, F(1, 47) = 41.29, p < .001, MSE = 0.005.  
When the prime-target interval was 77 ms, the error rate was significantly greater when 
the prime and target arrows pointed in opposite directions (20.4%) as opposed to the 
same direction (4.1%), t(16) = 6.79, p < 001, SE = 0.024 (i.e., positive priming).  
However, when the prime-target interval was increased to 165 ms, the error rate was non-
significantly greater when the prime and target arrows pointed in the same direction 
(7.4%) as opposed to the opposite direction (4.9%), t(31) = 1.53, n.s. (i.e., negative 
priming). 
100% Congruent Versus 100% Incongruent Comparison.  For the latency analysis 
neither the main effect of prime-target interval, F(1, 94) = 1.47, n.s., nor the main effect 
of prime condition, F(1, 94) = 2.35, n.s., were significant.  The interaction was 
significant, F(1, 94) = 9.81, p < .003, MSE = 3871.40.  When the prime-target interval 
was 77 ms, responses were 62 ms faster when the prime and target arrows pointed in the 
same direction (i.e., the 100% congruent condition) (300 ms) than in the opposite 
direction (i.e., the 100% incongruent condition) (362 ms), t(32) = 2.89, p < .006, SE = 
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21.34 (i.e., positive priming).  However, when the prime-target interval was increased to 
165 ms, responses were a non-significant 21 ms faster when the prime and target arrows 
pointed in opposite directions (304 ms) than in the same direction (325 ms), t(62) = 1.36, 
n.s. (i.e., negative priming). 
For the error analysis, neither the main effect of prime condition, F(1, 94) = 0.16, 
n.s., nor the main effect of prime-target interval, F(1, 94) = 0.01, n.s., were significant.  
The interaction was also not significant, F(1, 94) = 0.46, n.s.  The error rates did not 
differ between the 100% congruent and 100% incongruent prime conditions for either the 
77 ms, t(32) = 0.67, n.s., or 165 ms, t(62) = 0.23, n.s., prime-target intervals (5.4% versus 
6.3% and 5.7% versus 5.1%, respectively). 
Either-Way Targets (see Table 1) 
Response Latencies.  There was a significant main effect of response congruity, 
F(1, 141) = 7.21, p < .009, MSE = 743.87.  Responses were 9 ms faster when participants 
chose a response that corresponded with the direction of the prime (374 ms) than when 
they chose a response that was the opposite direction of the prime (383 ms).  There was 
no main effect of prime-target interval, F(1, 141) = 0.11, n.s., but there was a marginal 
effect of prime condition, F(2, 141) = 2.79, p < .07, MSE = 12440.08.  Although only 
marginally significant, responses were longer in the 100% incongruent condition (401 
ms) than in either the 100% congruent (368 ms), t(96) = 2.02, p < .14, or unpredictive 
conditions (367 ms), t(96) = 2.07, p < .13.  The 1 ms difference between the 100% 
congruent and unpredictive conditions was not significant, t(96) = 0.05, n.s. 
All three two-way interactions were significant.  To begin with, prime-target 
interval significantly interacted with response congruity, F(1, 141) = 27.98, p < .001,  
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Table 1. 
Results for Either-Way Responses (Reaction Times in Milliseconds, Response Biases in 
%) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Response Bias   Response Latency 
   ------------------  ------------------ 
    
Prime-Target  
Relationship    Congruent Incongruent Different Same  PE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
77 ms Prime-Target Interval 
 
Baseline  57.6  42.4   372  334  38 
 
Congruent  60.8  39.2   366  333  33   
 
Incongruent  49.4  50.6   431  423    8 
 
165 ms Prime-Target Interval 
 
Baseline  47.2  52.8  378  384  - 6 
 
Congruent  49.5   50.5  386  386    0 
 
Incongruent  44.8  55.2  365  386  - 21 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note.  Response bias refers to the % of trials in which the response correspond to the 
direction of the prime.  Response latency refers to the speed of the responses based upon 
the direction of the prime arrow.  PE = Priming Effects 
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MSE = 743.87.  When the prime-target interval was 77 ms, participants were 27 ms faster 
when their response corresponded with the direction of the prime (363 ms) than when it 
differed (390 ms), t(50)= 4.93, p < .001, SE = 5.40 (i.e., positive priming).  When the 
prime-target interval was increased to 165 ms, however, responses were 9 ms slower 
when their response was in the same direction of the prime (385 ms) than the opposite 
direction (376 ms), t(95) = 2.21, p < .03, SE = 3.94 (i.e., negative priming). 
Secondly, prime-target interval also interacted with prime condition, F(2, 141) = 
4.18, p < .02, MSE = 12440.08.  When the prime-target interval was 77 ms, responses in 
the 100% incongruent condition were slower than in both the 100% congruent (427 ms 
vs. 349 ms, t(47) = 2.88, p < .006, SE = 27.05) and unpredictive (427 ms vs. 353 ms, 
t(47) = 2.74, p < .008, SE = 27.05) conditions.  There was no difference in response 
latencies between the 100% congruent and unpredictive conditions (349 ms vs. 353 ms, 
t(47) = 0.14, n.s.).  When the prime-target interval was increased to 165 ms, response 
latencies in the 100% incongruent condition did not differ from either the 100% 
congruent (376 ms vs. 386 ms, t(47) = 0.52, n.s.) or unpredictive (376 ms vs. 381 ms, 
t(47) = 0.24, n.s.) condition nor was there a significant difference between the 100% 
congruent and unpredictive conditions (386 ms vs. 381 ms, t(47) = 0.27, n.s.). 
Finally, the interaction between prime condition and response congruity was also 
significant, F(2, 141) = 5.15, p < .008, MSE = 743.87.  Responses were faster when the 
response corresponded to the direction of the prime than when it differed in both the 
100% congruent (359 ms versus 376 ms, t(47) = 2.90, p < .005) and the unpredictive (359 
ms versus 375 ms, t(47) = 2.82, p < .006) conditions.  Responses in the 100% 
incongruent condition, however, were non-significantly slower when the response 
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corresponded to the direction of the prime than when it differed (405 ms versus 398 ms, 
t(47) = 1.07, n.s.).  The three-way interaction was not significant, F(2, 141) = 0.48, n.s. 
Response Biases.  There was a significant main effect of prime-target interval, 
F(1, 141) = 67.09, p < .001, MSE = 0.004.  The bias to choose a response which 
corresponded with the direction of the prime was greater when the prime-target interval 
was 77 ms (55.9%) as opposed to 165 ms (47.2%).  There was also a significant main 
effect of prime condition, F(2, 141) = 19.29, p < .001, MSE = 0.004.  Participants were 
more likely to choose a response which corresponded with the direction of the prime in 
either the unpredictive (52.4%), t(47) = 4.08, p < .001, SE = 0.013, or the 100% 
congruent condition (55.1%), t(47) = 6.15, p < .001, SE = 0.013, than in the 100% 
incongruent condition (47.1%).  The difference in the response bias between the 100% 
congruent and unpredictive conditions was not significant, t(47) = 2.08, n.s. 
In addition, the interaction of prime-target interval and prime condition was also 
significant, F(2, 141) = 3.73, p < .03, MSE = 0.004.  Participants were more likely to 
choose a response which corresponded with the direction of the prime when the prime-
target interval was 77 ms (as opposed to 165 ms) in all conditions - the 100% congruent 
condition (60.8% versus 49.5%, t(47) = 5.95, p < .001, SE = 0.019), the unpredictive 
condition (57.6% versus 47.2%, t(47) = 5.47, p < .001, SE = 0.019) and the 100% 
incongruent condition (49.4% versus 44.8%, t(47) = 2.47, p < .02, SE = 0.019) - with this 
contrast being slightly smaller in the 100% incongruent condition. 
For the 165 ms prime-target interval, the bias to choose a response which 
corresponded with the opposite direction of the prime was significant in the unpredictive 
condition, t(32) = 3.05, p < .006, but not in the 100% congruent condition, t(32) = 0.5, 
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n.s.  This result suggests that response inhibition may not have occurred in the 100% 
congruent condition.  
Discussion 
The current study evaluated the mechanisms driving the prime validity effect in 
an arrow classification task with free choice trials when the arrow targets were preceded 
by masked primes which either a) always pointed in the same direction of the target 
arrow (100% congruent condition), b) always pointed in the opposite direction (100% 
incongruent condition), or c) pointed equally often in the same and opposite directions 
(unpredictive condition) while the prime-target interval was either 77 ms or 165 ms.  
Thus, the current study employed both an unpredictive baseline condition and the 
strongest possible manipulation of prime-target congruency. 
When the prime-target interval was 77 ms, the current study replicated Bodner 
and Mulji’s (2010) pattern of prime validity effects for the either-way targets.  That is, 
responses in the 100% congruent condition were 33 ms faster when the response 
corresponded with the direction of the prime (333 ms) than when it differed (366 ms), 
but, in the 100% incongruent condition, responses were only a non-significant 8 ms faster 
when the response corresponded with the direction of the prime (423 ms) than when it 
differed (431 ms).  Similarly, participants were more likely to choose a response which 
corresponded with the direction of the prime in the 100% congruent condition (60.8%) 
but were at chance performance in the 100% incongruent condition (49.5%). 
Critically for current purposes, however, performance on the either-way targets in 
the unpredictive condition mimicked that in the 100% congruent condition.  Specifically, 
responses to either-way targets in the unpredictive condition were 38 ms faster when the 
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response corresponded with the direction of the prime (334 ms) than when it differed 
(372 ms) (essentially equivalent to the 33 ms effect in the 100% congruent condition) and 
there was a strong bias (57.6%) to respond in the direction of the arrow (essentially 
equivalent to the 60.8% bias in the 100% congruent condition).  Because the arrow 
targets in the baseline condition were preceded equally often by left and right pointing 
arrows and, hence, there would be no overall benefit to recruiting prime information, 
these results strongly suggest that the pattern in the 100% congruent condition is not the 
result of participants relying more heavily upon information from the prime’s episodic 
trace when the proportion of congruent trials is high (a key assumption of the memory 
recruitment account), but is rather due to automatic response activation. 
A similar relationship among the three prime conditions emerged with the 165 ms 
prime-target interval.  Note, first of all, that the prime-target interval manipulation 
worked as predicted, that is, it turned positive priming effects into negative priming 
effects.  For the arrow targets, when the prime-target interval was 77 ms, responses to the 
arrow targets were 62 ms faster when the prime and target arrows pointed in the same 
direction (i.e., the 100% congruent condition) than in the opposite direction (i.e., the 
100% incongruent condition) and, in the unpredictive condition, responses were 41 ms 
faster when the prime and the target pointed in the same as opposed to the opposite 
direction.  With a 165 ms prime-target interval, responses were 21 ms faster in the 100% 
incongruent condition than in the 100% congruent condition and responses in the 
unpredictive condition were 11 ms faster when the prime and the target pointed in the 
opposite compared to the same direction. 
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A similar pattern emerged with the either-way targets.  In the 100% incongruent 
condition, the null bias shown in the 77 ms condition turned into a response bias in the 
direction opposite to that of the prime (55.2%) in the 165 ms condition whereas the 
strong evidence for a bias in the direction of the prime disappeared in both the 100% 
congruent (49.5%) and unpredictive (47.2%) conditions.  Further, in the 100% 
incongruent condition, the null priming effect with a 77 ms prime-target interval turned 
into a 21 ms negative priming effect with a 165 ms prime-target interval.  At the same 
time, the significant priming effects in both the 100% congruent and unpredictive 
conditions when the prime-target interval was 77 ms disappeared.  What these results 
indicate is that the prime-target interval manipulation altered the direction of the 
automatic bias created by the prime as expected based on Eimer and colleagues’ results 
(e.g., Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000, 2002). 
Nonetheless, in spite of the complete reversal of the basic priming effect, the 
pattern among the three prime conditions did not change.  Just as with the 77 ms prime-
target interval, the results obtained in the unpredictive condition using a 165 ms prime-
target interval mimicked those in the 100% congruent condition.  Therefore, it would 
appear that, regardless of what prime-target interval was used, it was the processing 
operations taking place in the 100% incongruent condition that produced the observed 
prime validity effects. 
The Proposed Response Bias Suppression Account 
The explanation we propose for how the 100% incongruent condition is 
responsible for producing a prime validity effect is that participants in that condition are 
actively working to suppress the response bias which is rapidly and automatically 
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activated by the prime.  That is, in the 100% incongruent condition the response which is 
automatically activated by the masked prime for the arrow target trials is always 
incorrect.  Therefore, participants will act to suppress this response bias by decreasing the 
activation of the primed response which, in turn, allows the competing response to 
become more active.  The result is a null positive priming effect and no response bias 
with a short prime-target interval and a negative priming effect and clear bias against the 
prime’s direction with a longer prime-target interval.  In contrast, the results in the 100% 
congruent and unpredictive conditions are being driven by the automatic activation 
produced by the prime.  Hence, following on Eimer and colleagues’ results (e.g., Eimer, 
1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000, 2002) there is 
positive priming with the short prime-target interval and evidence of negative priming at 
the longer interval. 
Note that this account is quite consistent with the fact that, with the 77 ms 
interval, responses were somewhat slower in the 100% incongruent (427 ms) condition, 
than in either the 100% congruent (349 ms) or unpredictive (353 ms) conditions, 
conditions which, once again, mimicked one another.  When the prime-target interval 
was increased to 165 ms, however, there was no longer any difference among the three 
conditions:  incongruent condition (376 ms), congruent condition (386 ms), baseline 
condition (381 ms).  These results, therefore, suggest that participants had considerable 
difficulty responding in the incongruent condition when the prime-target interval was 77 
ms, as would be expected if they were actively working to suppress an automatically 
activated bias.  However, since a longer prime-target interval not only allows more time 
to suppress that bias but also typically automatically produces an activation pattern that 
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reverses the direction of the initial bias (as documented by Eimer and Schlaghecken, 
1998), the overall latency differences between the conditions disappeared. 
There are a number of ways that this suppression process might work (see, for 
example, Tipper’s, 2001, review of various mechanism of inhibition of response 
tendencies and see also Houghton & Tipper, 1994).  The present data, however, do not 
allow a specification of which mechanisms might have been active here. Note also that, 
in many of the mechanisms discussed by Tipper, the suppression process is not a fully 
unconscious process (i.e., some conscious activity is being applied to aid the inhibition 
process).  With respect to the present analysis, however, the argument is not being made 
that the inhibition process necessarily involves conscious activity nor that the process 
requires conscious knowledge of the relationship between the automatic bias created by 
the prime and the subsequent direction of the arrow target.  Rather, the argument is that, 
in an effort to facilitate responding, the suppression process may develop unconsciously 
in much the same way that the process of recruiting episodic trace information is 
presumed to develop in the memory recruitment account (i.e., without the participants 
necessarily becoming aware of what they are doing or why). 
The Fate of the Memory Recruitment Account 
 One obvious question is how would the memory recruitment account need to be 
altered in order to allow it to explain the present data?  One possibility is that one could 
assume that the relationship between use of the prime to aid processing and the 
proportion of congruent trials is not straightforward.  For example, one could argue that if 
the proportion of congruent trials is at least 50% then participants may always use 
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information from the prime to aid target processing.  As a result, performance in the 
unpredictive and 100% congruent conditions would be expected to be equivalent.3 
 An assumption of this sort would allow the account to explain the results in the 77 
ms prime-target interval condition, but it would not allow the account to explain the 
negative priming in the 165 ms prime-target interval condition.  For the memory 
recruitment account to be able to explain negative priming, some sort of activation 
process would need to be added to the account.  If that process allowed for activation of 
the response in the direction opposite that of the prime at longer prime-target intervals, 
then the amended account could explain the change in the either-way target data from 
positive to zero priming in the 100% congruent and unpredictive conditions and the 
change from zero to negative priming in the 100% incongruent condition.  However, as 
previously noted, adding this assumption to Bodner and Mulji’s (2010) account would 
raise the question of why the assumption is being made that there is no automatic 
(positive) activation process when the prime-target interval is short. 
Alternative Accounts of Masked Priming in the Arrow Classification Task 
I.  Variations in Associative Strength Between the Prime and its Response 
As previously described, Klapp (2007) reported that the magnitude of priming for 
arrow targets increased as the proportion of incongruent prime-target pairs varied 
between-subjects from 20% to 50% to 80% in an arrow classification task using masked 
arrow primes.  According to Klapp, a masked prime becomes associated with a particular 
response if both the masked prime and the target signal the same response.  Prime 
validity effects, therefore, arise due to the fact that this association becomes stronger 
                                                                                      
 
125
(which results in a more effective masked prime) when the proportion of compatible 
prime-target trials is high. 
The key difficulty Klapp’s (2007) account would have in explaining the present 
data is that his account would appear to predict that there should be a difference in the 
size of the priming effects for either-way targets between the 100% congruent and 
unpredictive conditions at both prime-target intervals.  The nonsignificant differences 
between these conditions at both prime-target intervals suggest that it is not variations in 
associative strength between the prime stimulus and its response that is driving the prime 
validity effects in the current study. 
Note, however, that, although the magnitude of priming for either-way targets did 
not differ between the unpredictive and 100% congruent conditions at either prime-target 
interval in the current study, the magnitude of priming for the arrow targets did differ 
between Klapp’s (2007) 50% and 80% congruent conditions.  Thus, Klapp’s account is 
consistent with his own data.  Further, it is unclear what may have produced a 
discrepancy between Klapp’s data and the present data.  One could argue that the 
cognitive system reacts differently to primes when their associated responses are always 
either consistent or inconsistent with the target compared to when their response 
consistency varies across trials.4  In essence, the argument would be that the 100% 
conditions do not represent the most extreme manipulation of relatedness proportion, but 
rather represent a qualitative change from relatedness proportions less than 100%.  
Whether this is the reason for the discrepancy or not remains a question for future 
research. 
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II.  A Two-Component Account of Masked Priming 
Kinoshita and Hunt (2008) recently proposed a two-component account of 
masked priming/congruence effects in a categorization task.  According to their account, 
there is an unconditional component which reflects priming driven by stimulus-response 
associations (with “used” primes that had been responded to as targets) and a conditional 
component which reflects the congruence between the prime and target in terms of task-
defined features.  Both of these components operate automatically.  However, the 
unconditional component is assumed to be transitory since it either decays rapidly or is 
actively suppressed, whereas the conditional component is assumed to be independent of 
response latency since it is time-locked to the target. 
Kinoshita and Hunt’s (2008) account was derived by applying a latency 
distribution analysis to a magnitude classification task (i.e., is a target number 
larger/smaller than 5?) and has yet to be applied to the arrow classification task.  
However, one can assume that their account would predict that the observed priming 
effects in that task would be primarily driven by the unconditional component, because 
the arrow primes had been used as targets.  According to their account, priming from this 
component either decays rapidly in time or is actively suppressed.  Response decay alone 
could not explain the reversal to negative priming at the 165 ms prime-target interval. 
 However, an active suppression mechanism which operates along the lines of what we 
propose here could.  That is, it would have to be a suppression mechanism that is 
sensitive to the nature of the prime-target relationship (allowing it to play a major role in 
the 100% incongruent condition) as well as being one that could produce an overall level 
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of activation in the initially primed response that is lower than the resulting level of 
activation of the opposing response. 
III.  Adaptation to the Statistics of the Environment Model 
In the arrow classification task (with and without free choice trials) there are only 
two possible responses (i.e., left or right) and a small number of targets (i.e., left arrows, 
right arrows, and, potentially, two-sided arrows) that are repeated multiple times over the 
course of the experiment.  The mechanism that is posited here to explain prime validity 
effects, a mechanism that is somewhat different from those proposed by the memory 
recruitment account, may also explain prime validity effects in other tasks in which 
stimulus-response mappings can be formed through multiple repetitions of a small set of 
targets over the course of the experiment.  One task in which prime validity effects have 
occurred which fits this criterion is Bodner and Dypvik’s (2005) masked parity judgment 
task.  Whether the mechanism proposed here does, in fact, extend to the masked parity 
judgment task is currently being investigated. 
On the other hand, it is unlikely that the mechanism proposed here can explain 
prime validity effects in tasks that have a large target set and rarely repeat the targets 
(e.g., lexical decision, naming).  Tasks like these do not allow the development of 
response biases based on specific stimulus-response mappings which would then become 
stronger through practice.  Thus, those types of tasks would appear to provide better 
support for the memory recruitment account.  Interestingly, however, recent research by 
Kinoshita, Forster, and Mozer (2008) has challenged the memory recruitment account of 
prime validity effects in Bodner and Masson’s (2004) masked prime naming task, albeit 
on a different basis than that discussed here.  Essentially, Kinoshita et al. argued that the 
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mechanisms that produce prime validity effects in that paradigm are the same 
mechanisms which produce blocking effects in a naming task (see Lupker, Brown, & 
Colombo, 1997; Taylor & Lupker, 2001).  That is, these prime validity effects are due to 
the fact that the difficulty of items within a block of trials strongly influences naming 
latencies. 
More specifically, in a masked prime naming task, targets preceded by a masked 
repetition prime would be easier to process than targets preceded by an unrelated prime.  
Therefore, when a block of trials contains a large proportion of masked repetition trials 
there should be a noticeable reduction in response latency for those trials in comparison 
to when those trials appear in a block with mainly unrelated trials.  Such is not 
necessarily the case for the unrelated trials because participants have somewhat less 
ability to speed up responding on those (more difficult) trials (i.e., latencies on those 
trials may be essentially similar in the high and low proportion blocks).  Thus, according 
to Kinoshita et al. (2008), prime validity effects could emerge in this task as a result of 
the difficulty of the other trials within the block rather than as a result of participants 
placing more reliance on the prime when there is a large proportion of masked repetition 
trials (as argued by Bodner and Masson, 2004).  The question of whether Kinoshita et 
al.’s analysis is actually a better explanation of the data from these types of tasks than the 
memory recruitment account, nonetheless, remains a question for future research. 
Conclusions 
In the current research, the mechanisms which drive the prime validity effect in an 
arrow classification task with free choice trials was investigated.  The results indicate that 
varying the validity of the masked arrow primes for the arrow targets produced prime 
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validity effects for both the response speed and bias for the intermixed either-way trials. 
The use of an unpredictive baseline condition demonstrated that these prime validity 
effects appear to be mainly driven by the processing in the 100% incongruent condition.  
That is, the prime validity effects arise as a result of participants automatically 
suppressing response biases created by the initial automatic activation of the prime when 
those biases are inconsistent with the majority of the target stimuli.  Although this 
conclusion does not contradict the memory recruitment account in general, it does 
suggest that at least some of the data taken as support for the memory recruitment 
account might be explained just as readily by mechanisms more consistent with the 
prospective view of masked priming (see also Klapp, 2007). 
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Footnotes 
 1  There has been an active debate in recent years concerning the importance of the 
features of the mask in producing negative priming effects at longer prime-target 
intervals (see Jaskowski & Przekoracka-Krawczyk, 2005; Kiesel, Berner, & Kunde, 
2008; Klapp, 2005; Lleras & Enns, 2004, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2006; Sumner, 
2008; Verleger, Jaskowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, & Groen, 2004).  The goal of the 
current study was not to enter into that debate, but rather it was to create a situation in 
which the direction of the priming effect would change from positive to negative as the 
prime-target interval increases while ensuring that the masked primes are subliminal (i.e., 
prime visibility is minimized).  As demonstrated by Klapp (2005), Schlaghecken and 
Eimer (2006), and Sumner (2008) it is clearly possible to obtain negative priming effects 
using masks which do not share features with the primes and targets, indicating that 
negative priming effects are not due to using masks with features.  As demonstrated by 
Lleras and Enns (2004), however, these types of masks both maximize the chances of 
observing negative priming and more effectively decrease prime visibility.  Therefore, we 
chose to use a mask which shares features with the primes and targets. 
2  To determine whether the congruity effects in the latency data on the arrow target and 
either-way target trials share a common origin, the correlation between congruity effect 
sizes was calculated for participants in the unpredictive conditions.  A marginally 
significant correlation, r(17) = 0.45, p < .07, when the prime-target interval was 77 ms, 
and a significant correlation, r(32) = 0.52, p < .003, when the prime-target interval was 
165 ms, suggests that these priming effects do, in fact, share a common origin. 
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3  We would like to thank Glen Bodner for offering this suggestion. 
4  We would like to thank Glen Bodner for offering this suggestion. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Theoretical Implications 
In a typical masked priming paradigm a forward mask precedes a briefly 
presented prime which is then followed by a target stimulus that requires a response.  The 
key finding of interest is that responses are faster when the target is preceded by a prime 
which requires the same response as the target (i.e., a congruent trial) as opposed to a 
prime which requires a different response (i.e., an incongruent trial).  This paradigm has 
been used extensively in cognitive psychology to investigate a) how one processes 
subliminally presented information and b) the extent to which that information can 
influence one’s subsequent behaviour. 
The generally accepted “prospective” view of how the mechanisms responsible 
for masked priming work is based on two key assumptions (see Forster & Davis, 1984; 
Masson & Bodner, 2003).  The first assumption is that the presentation of a masked 
prime induces a temporary state of activation in the cognitive system which affects the 
speed with which a subsequently presented target is processed.  The second assumption is 
that any effect of the prime must be due solely to automatic, rather than strategic, 
activation processes.  A key issue of debate for proponents of a prospective view 
concerns whether masked primes activate semantic information or whether their impact is 
due solely to the activation of stimulus-response (S-R) associations (see Finkbeiner & 
Forster, 2008; Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007; Kouider & Dehaene, 2009; Van den 
Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009, for recent reviews). 
A key assumption of any S-R association account is that lower-level (non-
semantic) associations are formed between target stimuli and their responses due to their 
repeated presentations and classifications (see, e.g., Abrams, 2005; Abrams & 
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Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Klotz & Neumann, 1999).  
Once formed, presentation of these stimuli as masked primes produces a bias to respond 
with their associated response.  This response bias aids target responding on congruent 
trials and interferes with target responding on incongruent trials. 
Any S-R association account makes two predictions concerning the nature of any 
priming effects that are due to these response biases.  The first is that any priming driven 
by these biases should increase in size over trials since response biases are formed and 
strengthened as a function of exposure to the target stimuli (see Damian, 2001).  The 
second, and more often examined, prediction is that primes that have been previously 
presented and responded to as target stimuli (i.e., “old set primes”) should produce 
priming and primes that have not been previously responded to as targets (i.e., “new set 
primes”) should not produce priming.  There have been some demonstrations of this data 
pattern (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001), however, the more common 
result is that priming occurs for both old and new set masked primes (e.g., Dell’Acqua & 
Grainger, 1999; Klauer, Eder, Geenwald & Abrams, 2007; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; 
Reynvoet, Caessens & Brysbaert, 2002; Reynvoet, Gevers & Caessens, 2005; Quinn & 
Kinoshita, 2008; Van den Bussche, Notebaert & Reynvoet, 2009; Van den Bussche & 
Reynvoet, 2007). 
The fact that priming from new set primes is a common finding challenges the 
notion that masked priming is due solely to S-R associations.  Rather, those data indicate 
that masked priming involves the activation of semantic information and that it is 
semantic information, as opposed to S-R associations, that is responsible for producing 
priming in many situations.  However, demonstrations of priming from new set primes 
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does not rule out the possibility that S-R associations may still play an important role in 
producing masked priming effects.  That is, even if masked primes inevitably activate 
semantic information, the possibility that a) S-R associations are also activated by 
masked primes and b) that they contribute to priming is not excluded. 
Recent research has, in fact, provided data that suggests S-R associations do play 
a role in generating masked priming.  For example, Kinoshita and Hunt (2008) provided 
data based on a latency distribution analysis of a number classification task using both 
old and new set primes.  They argue that their results indicate that masked priming 
involves two different automatic components, one based on S-R associations and another 
based upon semantic activation. 
Another factor that influences the extent to which S-R associations play a role in 
generating masked priming is the nature of the task’s requirements.  That is, factors such 
as task instruction (Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Norris & Kinoshita, 2008), the 
size of the target (e.g., Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, & Hoffmann, 2006; Pohl, Kiesel, Kunde, & 
Hoffmann, 2010) and category (e.g., Abrams, 2008) set, the specific judgment task the 
participant was engaged in (e.g., Bodner & Dypvik, 2005; Eckstein & Perrig, 2007; 
Klinger, Burton & Pitts, 2000), and the targets’ features (e.g., Pohl et al., 2010) and 
orientation (e.g., Elsner, Kunde & Hoffmann, 2008) all appear to affect the nature of any 
masked priming effects. 
This research suggests that the origins of any masked priming effects (i.e., 
semantic activation or S-R associations) are due to a rather complex interaction between 
task instructions and participants’ target processing strategies.  The primary focus of this 
thesis, therefore, was to further investigate this interaction.  Of particular interest was the 
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role that S-R associations would play in the masked priming process.  This was done 
using both number classification tasks (Chapter 2) and masked priming versions of 
category learning tasks (Chapter 3). 
The perspective adopted throughout the present research was based on the 
assumptions of the (generally accepted) prospective view of masked priming.  There is, 
however, an alternative “retrospective” view which denies both assumptions of the 
prospective view and, instead, adopts two markedly different assumptions (see Masson & 
Bodner, 2003).  The first assumption is that masked primes (even when they are briefly 
presented and masked) form reasonably strong episodic traces.  The second assumption is 
that, in order to aid target processing, the cognitive system strategically adjusts the extent 
to which it relies upon information from these episodic traces.  The strongest piece of 
evidence for a retrospective view is the existence of prime validity effects in a variety of 
cognitive tasks, that is, larger priming effects when the percentage of trials in which the 
target is related to the prime is high compared to when it is low (see Masson & Bodner, 
2003, for a review). 
If a retrospective view of masked priming is correct then explanations of how 
masked primes affect priming would have to be somewhat different than if the 
prospective view is correct.  Therefore, a secondary goal of this thesis was to provide a 
closer examination of the prospective versus retrospective views of masked priming.  
This was done using an arrow classification task with free choice trials to investigate the 
origins of prime validity effects in that particular paradigm (Chapter 4). 
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Summary of Results:  Chapter 2 – Number Classification 
In Chapter 2 both the magnitude of the category congruence (i.e., masked 
priming) effect and the nature of the priming distance effect were assessed across 1008 
trials in two number classification tasks using single-digit primes and targets.  The 
distinction between tasks was whether the task instructions required magnitude 
judgments (i.e., is the presented number larger or smaller than ‘5’ – Experiment 1) or 
identification judgments (i.e., press the left button if the target is a ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ or ‘4’ and 
the right button if it is a ‘6’, ‘7’, ‘8’ or ‘9’ – Experiment 2).  When magnitude judgments 
were required (Experiment 1) then there were clear category congruence and priming 
distance effects which remained relatively stable over trials.  These results corroborate 
previous research using the magnitude judgment task (see Kinoshita & Hunt, 2008; 
Kunde et al., 2003; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001) and indicate that priming in this type of 
task is primarily due to semantic activation. 
 In terms of evaluating the influence of S-R associations in producing masked 
priming, the results when target identification judgments were required (Experiment 2) 
are particularly informative.  In that situation, the results suggest that when the task 
instructions encourage attention to the S-R mappings then S-R associations do contribute 
to the priming effect.  Specifically, there was a significant increase in the size of the 
category congruence effect across trials.  However, as in Experiment 1, there was also a 
clear priming distance effect which did not vary over trials. 
The key finding from Chapter 2, therefore, was the presence of a priming distance 
effect in both number classification tasks.  This particular finding indicates that semantic 
activation continued to play a major role in producing masked priming effects, regardless 
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of task instructions, even when the increase in the size of the category congruence effect 
in Experiment 2 indicated that S-R associations also impacted priming. 
Summary of Results:  Chapter 3 – Category Learning Tasks with Masked Primes 
 Much of the masked priming research which has produced priming from new set 
primes (indicating that masked primes activate semantics) has used clearly defined 
semantic categories.  Such was also the case in Chapter 2 in which there was a semantic 
distance effect in both number classification experiments, that is, an effect indicating that 
semantic activation contributed to the priming effects in both experiments.  The question 
arises, therefore, as to whether there exists a paradigm which would produce masked 
priming effects which do not make use of clearly defined semantic categories and, 
therefore, must be due to S-R associations. 
 In Chapter 3 a masked priming version of a category learning task was used to 
trace how the development of S-R associations may influence the nature of any masked 
priming effects.  In a typical category learning task (e.g., Lamberts, 1995; Nosofsky & 
Zaki, 2002; Smith & Minda, 1998) participants are repeatedly presented with the same 
set of artificial stimuli (e.g., nonsense letter strings, bug cartoons) and are required to 
learn, based upon feedback, which target stimuli belong to one category and which target 
stimuli belong to the other category.  The artificial stimuli in this paradigm a) have no 
pre-existing ability to activate semantic information and b) are not initially associated 
with any response.  Therefore, this paradigm should be ideal for investigating masked 
priming effects which cannot be due to semantic activation and, presumably, must be due 
to S-R associations. 
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The artificial category sets that were used consisted of either 10 four-letter (e.g., 
‘WAZY’ – Experiments 1A & 2) or 14 six-letter (e.g., ‘KEPIRO’ – Experiment 1B) 
stimuli.  For both category sets, half the stimuli belonged to one category and half 
belonged to the other category.  Each category set also contained a prototype item, that is, 
a letter string which shares most of its letters with the other items in its category and has 
no letters in common with the prototype of the other category.  These prototypes were 
used as the masked primes. 
In the first experiment, category congruence effects were obtained for both 
category sets.  Specifically, responses to targets were faster when preceded by their own 
prototype versus the prototype of the other category.  However, there was little evidence 
that these effects were due to S-R associations since the effects occurred early and did not 
increase in size over trials.  In the second experiment, there were significant increases in 
the size of the category congruence effects when participants practiced learning the four-
letter category set over multiple sessions/days.  Specifically, both a larger category 
congruence effect for correct responses and a larger reversed category congruence effect 
for incorrect responses (i.e., faster responding when the target was preceded by the 
prototype for the other category versus its own prototype) occurred in the later training 
sessions (i.e., the fourth and fifth sessions) in comparison to the early training sessions 
(i.e., the first and second sessions). 
The key finding from Chapter 3, therefore, was the demonstration that although 
some priming occurs early (Experiment 1) it takes considerable practice in order to learn 
and strengthen the appropriate S-R associations to the extent necessary to increase the 
size of the category congruence effect (Experiment 2).  Even though the stimuli and task 
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are noticeably different from those typically used in the masked priming literature, the 
fact that it took so long for the S-R associations to develop to the point where they 
affected priming (along with the fact that in Chapter 2 many trials were necessary to 
show an increase in priming) challenges the notion that S-R associations play a dominant 
role in producing priming in many situations. 
 The Role of S-R Associations in the Priming Process 
In this thesis, a specific emphasis was placed on the role of S-R associations in the 
priming process.  The results, as noted, indicate that the nature of the task’s instructions 
influence the role of S-R associations (Chapter 2) and that S-R associations will impact 
priming, but only after considerable practice (Chapter 3).  Before discussing the results 
of Chapter 4 the implications of these results for various accounts of masked priming will 
be discussed. 
A key assumption of any S-R association account is that associations that are 
formed between target stimuli and their responses produce a response bias when they are 
presented as masked primes.  This assumption plays an influential role in research using 
masked primes to study motor activation (e.g., Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Klotz & 
Neumann, 1999; Neumann & Klotz, 1994) and has been used to explain why, in certain 
circumstances, new set primes do not produce priming (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; 
Damian, 2001).  The combined results from Chapters 2 and 3, however, raise the 
possibility that at least some of the priming effects that were previously attributed to the 
impact of S-R associations may have instead been due to a semantically-based source. 
Consider, for example, the results from Damian’s (2001, Experiment 1) physical 
size judgment task using old set primes which has been taken as support for an S-R 
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association account.  Damian demonstrated that the size of his category congruence effect 
increased over trial blocks.  Further, since each trial block involved 24 target 
presentations (i.e., two presentations of 12 targets) the fact that priming emerged by the 
third trial block (i.e., the block in which the target was seen and responded to for the fifth 
and sixth time) has been taken as support for the notion that these S-R associations 
rapidly develop and impact priming. 
In both the number classification task (Chapter 2 – Experiment 2) and the masked 
priming version of the category learning task (Chapter 3 – Experiment 2) a large number 
of trials was necessary before there was any noticeable evidence that S-R associations 
had an impact on priming.  Therefore, these results raise the question of whether there 
might be an alternative explanation for Damian’s results.  For instance, rather than S-R 
associations, what may have been developing over trials was the participants’ ability to 
retrieve/focus on the specific semantic information which was necessary to perform the 
task. 
According to this semantically-based retrieval/focus account, the participants in 
Damian’s (2001) experiments would have adopted a target processing strategy that would 
allow them to focus on and retrieve more detailed size-based information.  This 
information would then help them determine whether the target is larger or smaller than 
an arbitrarily selected comparison object.  According to this account, as participants 
practiced retrieving this specific size-based information those targets would start to 
activate this information automatically when presented as masked primes.  Thus, this 
semantically-based account would predict that old set primes would start to produce 
priming.  In contrast, this account would not predict priming from new set primes since, 
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because those primes never appeared as targets, participants would never have had the 
opportunity to develop the necessary retrieval processes for those stimuli. 
Kinoshita & Hunt’s (2008) Two-Component Account of Masked Priming:  More 
Evidence for the Impact of S-R Associations 
 Kinoshita and Hunt (2008) extended previous research using old and new set 
masked primes in magnitude judgment tasks (e.g., Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; 
Naccache & Dehaene, 2001) by providing an analysis based on the full latency 
distributions for each prime condition.  Their analysis demonstrated that, in the longer 
latency bins, the congruent trials in the old set prime condition showed a noticeable 
slowdown (relative to both incongruent prime conditions as well as the congruent 
condition for the new set primes).  As a result, old set primes did not produce a category 
congruence effect in these longer latency bins.  On the basis of these results, Kinoshita 
and Hunt concluded that masked priming consists of both a semantic and an S-R 
association component. 
According to Kinoshita and Hunt’s (2008) two-component account of masked 
priming, both semantics and S-R associations play crucial roles in the priming process.  If 
that is correct then old set primes should benefit from both the semantic and S-R 
association components, whereas new set primes should only benefit from the semantic 
component.  However, the fact that at no point in any of their latency distributions did the 
old set primes produce more priming than the new set primes suggests that did not occur. 
There is a second issue that can also be raised concerning Kinoshita and Hunt’s 
(2008) data that decreases the level of support those data offers for their two-component 
account of masked priming.  In their latency distributions the new set primes always 
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showed an advantage over their corresponding incongruent primes (i.e., there was always 
a priming effect for the new set primes).  This result suggests that the semantic 
component does not disappear even when latencies are long.  However, if semantics 
continued to play an active role in the priming process then there should have been an 
advantage for old set primes over their corresponding incongruent primes (i.e., a priming 
effect for the old set primes) at all points in the latency distribution since these primes 
should have benefited just as much as the new set primes did from the semantic 
component.  This result, however, did not occur which could only be explained by 
assuming that priming from the old set primes was entirely due to the S-R association 
component (i.e., the semantics those primes generated were, for some reason, 
inoperative). 
Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann’s (2003) Action Trigger Account:  An Alternative to an S-R 
Association Account 
According to Kunde et al.’s (2003) action-trigger account (see also Kiesel et al., 
2007) participants establish action-trigger sets, that is, mappings between possible stimuli 
and their responses in a target classification task.  These mappings can involve any 
stimuli that a participant might choose to include and can be formed quickly and without 
practice.  Responses are facilitated when the prime and target activate the same action 
trigger and are inhibited when they activate different action triggers. 
Kunde et al. (2003) originally proposed an action trigger account as an alternative 
explanation to a purely semantic account of how new set priming occurs in magnitude 
judgment tasks.  However, the present research raises some issues for this account.  One 
issue is that an action-trigger account has difficulty providing an adequate explanation for 
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the existence of semantic distance effects in the present experiments in Chapter 2 as well 
as in other research (e.g., Koechlin et al., 1999; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Reynvoet & 
Brysbaert, 1999, 2004; Reynvoet et al., 2002).  According to Kunde et al.’s action-trigger 
account, the only role of semantics is to allow participants to categorize potential stimuli 
as appropriate action triggers.  For instance, in the present single-digit magnitude 
judgment task (Chapter 2 - Experiment 1) all four digits that are less than ‘5’ would be 
equally associated with (i.e., become action triggers for) a left button response and all 
four digits that are greater than ‘5’ would be equally associated with a right button press 
response.  However, since prime processing is assumed to activate the action triggers and 
not semantic (i.e., ordinal) information then there is no reason that ‘3’ should be a better 
prime for the target ‘4’ than ‘1’ is. 
An additional issue for Kunde et al.’s (2003) action-trigger account concerns the 
observed increase in the size of the category congruence effect in both the latter trial 
segments for the target identification task (Chapter 2 - Experiment 2) and the latter 
training sessions in the category learning task (Chapter 3 – Experiment 2).  An action 
trigger account would only be able to explain this increase by making an additional 
assumption that action triggers are not used in an all or none fashion, but that the 
likelihood of their use increases with practice.  Thus, according to this assumption, the 
assignment of action triggers early in the category learning task (i.e., throughout 
Experiment 1 and the first two days in Experiment 2) was incomplete because the 
participants were still learning the categories.  However, when the categories were 
learned (i.e., the latter days in Experiment 2) participants would then be able to associate 
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the action triggers with the appropriate stimuli more consistently resulting in an increase 
in the size of the category congruence effect. 
Summary of Results:  Chapter 4 – Arrow Classification Task with Free Choice Trials 
 The framework used in designing the research in Chapters 2 and 3 was based on a 
prospective view of masked priming.  As noted, there is an alternative, retrospective view 
which receives crucial support from numerous demonstrations of prime validity effects 
(i.e., larger priming effects when the proportion of congruent trials is high versus low) in 
a variety of cognitive tasks (see Masson & Bodner, 2003, for a review).  Given the 
importance of this theoretical debate, a secondary goal of this thesis was to provide an 
examination of these issues. 
In Chapter 4 an arrow classification task with free choice trials was used to 
evaluate the potential role of automatic response activation.  In this experiment, arrow 
targets were preceded by masked primes which either a) always pointed in the same 
direction of the target arrow (100% congruent condition), b) always pointed in the 
opposite direction (100% incongruent condition), or c) pointed equally often in the same 
and different directions (unpredictive condition) using prime-target intervals of either 77 
ms or 165 ms (a between-subjects manipulation).  The focus was on how this prime 
validity manipulation for the arrow targets would affect the masked prime’s impact (in 
terms of both the reaction time and response bias) on the intermixed free choice trials 
(see also Bodner & Mulji, 2010). 
When the prime-target interval was 77 ms, participants in the 100% congruent 
condition responded faster on free choice trials when the response corresponded with the 
direction of the prime than when it differed (i.e., a positive priming effect).  In contrast, 
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in the 100% incongruent condition, there was no difference in response latencies for a left 
or right response on the free choice trials (i.e., a null priming effect).  Similarly, 
participants in the 100% congruent condition were more likely to choose a response 
which corresponded with the direction of the prime (i.e., a positive response bias), 
whereas in the 100% incongruent condition response selection performance was at 
chance (i.e., a null response bias). 
When the prime-target interval was increased to 165 ms, for the free choice trials, 
the null bias in the 100% incongruent condition with a 77 ms prime-target interval turned 
into a response bias in the direction opposite to that of the prime (i.e., a negative response 
bias).  In contrast, in the 100% congruent condition the positive response bias turned into 
a null bias.  Similarly, in the 100% incongruent condition, the null priming effect with a 
77 ms prime-target interval turned into a negative priming effect with a 165 ms prime-
target interval (i.e., responses were faster when the response corresponded with the 
opposite direction of the prime).  Further, in the 100% congruent condition, the 
significant priming effect with a 77 ms prime-target interval turned into a null priming 
effect. 
The key finding from Chapter 4, however, comes from the contrast between 
performance for the free choice trials in the 100% congruent and the unpredictive 
conditions.  Specifically, at both prime-target intervals, the results in the unpredictive 
condition mimicked the results in the 100% congruent condition.  That is, when the 
prime-target interval was 77 ms, then there was a positive priming effect for the response 
latencies and a positive response bias.  When the prime-target interval was increased to 
165 ms then both the significant priming effect for the response latencies and the 
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significant response bias disappeared (i.e., became null effects).  These findings suggest 
that, regardless of what prime-target interval was used, it was the processing operations 
taking place in the 100% incongruent condition that produced the observed prime validity 
effects for the free choice trials. 
Implications for a Retrospective View:  A Response Bias Suppression Account 
According to a retrospective view of masked priming, the sole source of priming 
is the recruitment of episodic information from the prime to aid target processing.  Thus, 
when the proportion of congruent prime-target trials is high then recruitment of prime 
information produces priming.  On the other hand, when the proportion of congruent 
prime-target trials is low then minimal recruitment of prime information occurs and no 
priming emerges.  The results from Chapter 4, however, challenge this view in at least 
two different ways. 
The first challenge for a retrospective view comes from the contrast between the 
results using an unpredictive baseline and the 100% congruent prime validity conditions.  
A retrospective view predicts that prime information would be recruited when the prime 
was highly informative (i.e., the 100% congruent condition) but not when it was 
uninformative (i.e., the unpredictive condition).  Thus, prime validity effects would be 
due to a difference in the magnitude of the priming effects between these two conditions.  
This pattern, however, was not observed. 
A second challenge is that a retrospective view cannot easily explain the negative 
priming effects which occurred using a 165 ms prime-target interval.  A retrospective 
view would predict only positive priming since the recruitment of prime information is 
assumed to only be done to aid target processing.  Additional, and somewhat 
                                                                                      
 
152
incompatible, assumptions would have to be made concerning the impact of recruited 
information in order to explain the obtained negative priming. 
In contrast, a prospective view can easily explain the results from Chapter 4.  
Specifically, the proposed reason for why the 100% incongruent condition produced the 
observed prime validity effects is that participants in that condition were actively working 
to suppress the response bias which was rapidly and automatically activated by the prime.  
In the 100% incongruent condition, the response which is automatically activated by the 
masked prime for the arrow target trials is always incorrect and target processing would 
benefit from suppressing it.  Participants, therefore, attempt to suppress that bias by 
decreasing the activation of the primed response which allows the competing (correct) 
response to become more active. 
This type of response bias suppression account (which is based upon the 
assumptions of a prospective view of masked priming) is quite consistent with the 
observation that there was a null priming effect and no response bias for the 100% 
incongruent condition with a short prime-target interval.  A longer prime-target interval, 
in contrast, not only allows more time to suppress that bias it also typically produces an 
activation pattern that reverses the direction of the initial bias (as documented by Eimer 
& Schlaghecken, 1998).  Therefore, there should be a negative priming effect and a clear 
bias against the prime’s direction with a longer prime-target interval in the 100% 
incongruent condition.  In contrast, in the 100% congruent and unpredictive conditions, 
there is no need to suppress the response activated by the prime since it does not activate 
an incorrect response on the majority of the trials.  Therefore, responses in both of these 
conditions should be similar at both prime-target intervals since, in both cases, the 
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responses would be generated by the automatic activation from the masked primes.  
Specifically, there should be positive priming and positive response biases with a short 
prime-target interval which would be diminished (potentially turning negative) at longer 
prime-target intervals. 
Concluding Statements 
 The primary goal of this thesis was to investigate how task instructions and 
participants’ target processing strategies interact to influence the nature of masked 
priming.  A specific emphasis was placed on the role of S-R associations in the priming 
process (Chapters 2 and 3).  The framework used in designing this research was based on 
a prospective view of masked priming.  Therefore, a secondary goal was to provide an 
additional examination of the prospective versus retrospective views of masked priming.  
The key question of interest was whether one can account for prime validity effects 
within the framework of a prospective view (Chapter 4). 
 Concerning the origins of masked priming, the results from this thesis indicate 
that semantic activation plays the dominant role in the priming process.  The nature of the 
task instructions can cause S-R associations to play a more active role once those 
associations have been sufficiently strengthened (Chapter 2), however, S-R associations 
take a substantial amount of time to develop (Chapter 3).  These results challenge the 
notion that S-R associations form rapidly (see Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 
2001). 
 Concerning the debate between the prospective versus retrospective views of 
masked priming, the results of this thesis provide two challenges for a retrospective view 
(Chapter 4).  First, the results indicate that the present prime validity effects were due to 
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how the prime was processed when the proportion of incongruent (as opposed to 
congruent) trials was high.  Second, a retrospective view has difficulties explaining the 
observed negative priming effects.  In contrast, a prospective view of masked priming 
can easily explain the obtained priming effects by assuming that participants invoke a 
response bias suppression mechanism when the proportion of incongruent trials is high. 
 In summary, this research contributes to the masked priming literature in two 
important ways.  First, the results from Chapters 2 and 3 challenge commonly held 
assumptions concerning the role of S-R associations in masked priming.  Specifically, the 
results suggest that previous research that has been taken as evidence for S-R associations 
(e.g., Damian, 2001) may have an alternative (possibly, semantically-based) explanation 
(such as the proposed retrieval/focus account).  Second, the results from Chapter 4 pose a 
formidable challenge to anyone attempting to explain them within a retrospective view, 
but could easily be explained within a prospective view of masked priming (such as the 
proposed response bias suppression mechanism). 
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Appendix A : Stimuli Lists 
Chapter 2 – Prime and Target Stimuli used in Experiments 1 2. 
2 – 1, 3 – 1, 4 – 1, 7 – 1, 8 – 1, 9 – 1, 1 – 2, 3 – 2, 4 – 2, 6 – 2, 8 – 2, 9 – 2, 1 – 3,  2 – 3,   
4 – 3, 6 - 3, 7 - 3, 9 – 3, 3 – 4, 2 – 4, 1 – 4, 8 – 4, 7 – 4, 6 – 4, 7 – 6, 8 – 6, 9 – 6, 2 – 6, 3 – 
6, 4 – 6, 6 – 7, 8 – 7, 9 – 7, 1 – 7, 3 – 7, 4 – 7, 6 – 8, 7 – 8, 9 – 8, 1 – 8, 2 – 8, 4 – 8, 8 – 9, 
7 – 9, 6 – 9, 3 – 9, 2 – 9, 1 – 9. 
Chapter 3 – Binary Categorical Structure and Corresponding Target Stimuli. 
Four Dimensional Category Set 
Category 1    Category 2 
0 0 0 0  WAZY  1 1 1 1  BERO 
1 0 0 0  BAZY   0 1 1 1  WERO 
0 1 0 0  WEZY   1 0 1 1  BARO 
0 0 1 0  WARY  1 1 0 1  BEZO 
0 0 0 1  WAZO  1 1 1 0  BERY 
Six Dimensional Category Set 
Category 1    Category 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 BANULY  1 1 1 1 1 1 KEPIRO 
0 1 0 0 0 0 BENULY  1 1 1 1 0 1 KEPILO 
1 0 0 0 0 0 KANULY  1 1 0 1 1 1 KENIRO 
0 0 0 1 0 1 BANILO  1 0 1 1 1 0 KAPIRY 
1 0 0 0 0 1 KANULO  0 1 1 1 1 0 BEPIRY 
0 0 1 0 1 0 BAPURY  1 0 1 0 1 1 KAPURO 
0 1 1 0 0 0 BEPULY  0 1 0 1 1 1 BENIRO   
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Appendix B : Prime Discrimination Data For Number Classifications 
 Prime discrimination tasks were administered to separate groups of participants to 
assess prime visibility.  Twenty-six participants (age range: 18 - 23, M = 21.35) 
performed the task using single-digit primes and targets. 
Each participant performed 24 practice trials followed by 144 experimental trials 
(three blocks of 48 trials each).  Each trial, both practice and experimental, began with a 
550 ms pattern mask (i.e.., ‘###’) followed by a prime digit.  The target digit ‘5’ (or ‘55’) 
directly followed the prime.  The target ‘5’ was preceded equally often by the prime 
digits 1 to 9 (excluding 5) and participants had a maximum of two seconds to indicate 
whether the prime digit was less or greater than 5 before the next trial began. 
 During the practice trials, the duration of the prime presentation decreased from 
165 ms (trials 1 thru 8) to 110 ms (trials 9 thru 16) to 55 ms (trials 17 thru 24).  During 
the experimental trials, the prime digit was always presented for 44 ms.  Participants were 
instructed to make a response even if they were not sure of the identity of the prime or 
even if there was a prime. 
 To assess prime discriminability, a sensitivity measure (d') was calculated.  A hit 
was defined as correctly indicating that a prime digit was less than 5 and a false-alarm 
was defined as incorrectly indicating that a prime digit was less than 5.  The hit rate was 
55.7% and the false alarm rate was 21.7%.  The resulting d' score of 1.01 deviated from 
zero, t(25) = 7.14,p < .001. 
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Appendix C : Double-Digit Magnitude Judgment Task 
Participants.  Thirty-six University of Western Ontario undergraduate students 
received either $10 or course credit for their participation.  All had either normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. 
Materials.  Primes were the double-digit numbers ‘11’, ‘22’, ‘33’, ‘44’, ‘66’, ‘77’, 
‘88’, and ‘99’.  The targets were the digits ‘15’, ‘25’, ‘35’, ‘45’, ‘65’, ‘75’, ‘85’, and ‘95’. 
Similar to Experiments 1 and 2 participants completed 1008 trials which were 
divided into 21 blocks of 48 trials each.  Within each block, each target was presented six 
times, each time paired with a different prime.  On half of the trials, the target was 
preceded by a congruent prime (i.e., both the prime and target were either less or greater 
than ‘55’) and on the other half of the trials the target was preceded by an incongruent 
prime (i.e., the prime was less than ‘55’ and the target was greater than ‘55’, or vice-
versa). 
Procedure.  The experiment was identical to Experiments 1 and 2 except that 
participants were instructed to determine if the target digit was either less than or greater 
than ‘55’.  Participants pressed the right <shift> key if the target was greater than ‘55’ or 
the left <shift> key if the target was less than ‘55’. 
Results.  Trials in which no response was given or the response latency was either 
less than 100 ms or greater than 1500 ms were removed from both the latency and error 
analyses (1.86% of the trials).  In addition, incorrect responses were also removed from 
the latency analyses (7.25% of the trials). 
The category congruence effects for both reaction time and accuracy were 
analyzed using a 3 (trial segment:  early vs. middle vs. late) by 2 (category congruence:  
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congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA.  The priming distance effect for both reaction time 
and accuracy was analyzed using a 3 (trial segment: early vs. middle vs. late) by 3 
(prime-target distance:  one vs. two vs. three) ANOVA.  Note that the prime-target 
distance corresponded to the distance between the digit in the target that was not a ‘5’ and 
the digit which shared its corresponding position in the prime. 
Category Congruence Effect. In the latency analysis, there was no effect of trial 
segment, F(2, 70) = 0.51, n.s., but there was a significant main effect of category 
congruence, F(1, 35) = 48.32, p < .001, MSE = 254.30. Congruent trials were responded 
to 15 ms faster than incongruent trials. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 70) = 
0.77, n.s. 
In the error analysis, there were significant main effects of trial segment, F(2, 70) 
= 11.71, p < .001, MSE = 0.002, and category congruence, F(1, 35) = 16.14, p < .001, 
MSE = 0.002. The error rate was greater for incongruent than congruent trials. The error 
rate was also significantly greater in the third (9.3%) than in both the first (5.9%), t(35) = 
2.59, p < .02, SE = 0.009, and second (7.4%), t(35) = 2.02, p = .05, SE = 0.008, trial 
segments. The difference in error rates between the first and second trial segments was 
not significant, t(35) = 0.99, n.s. The interaction was also significant, F(2, 70) = 4.27, p 
< .02, MSE = 0.001, due to the fact that the magnitude of the priming effect in the third 
trial segment was significantly greater than in both the second, t(26) = 2.79, p < .02, SE = 
0.006, and first, t(26) = 2.45, p < .03, SE =0.006, trial segments. There was no significant 
difference between the magnitudes of the priming effects in the first and second trial 
segments, t(26) = 0.42, n.s. 
Priming Distance Effect. In the latency analysis, there was no effect of trial 
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segment, F(2, 70) = 1.36, n.s., but there was a significant main effect of prime-target 
distance, F(2, 70) = 10.48, p < .001, MSE = 631.04. Responses were significantly longer 
when the prime-target distance was three versus one, t(35) = 4.40, p < .001, SE = 3.13, or 
two, t(35) = 3.58, p < .005, SE = 3.61, units. The difference in response latencies 
between when the prime-target distance was one versus two units was not significant, 
t(35) = 0.24, n.s. The interaction was not significant, F(4, 140) = 1.97, n.s. 
In the error analysis, there was a significant main effect of trial segment, F(2, 70) 
= 5.70, p < .01, MSE = 0.004, and a marginal effect of prime-target distance, F(2, 70) = 
2.48, p < .10, MSE = 0.003. The error rate was significantly greater in the third (8.6%) 
than in the first (6.2%), t(35) = 2.67, p < .01, SE = 0.009, or second (6.5%), t(35) = 2.63, 
p < .01, SE = 0.008, trial segments. The difference in error rates between the first and 
second trial segments was not significant, t(35) = 0.50, n.s. The error rate was also 
significantly larger when the prime-target distance was three units versus one unit, t(35) = 
2.50, p < .01, SE = 0.006. There was no difference in error rates between when the 
prime-target distance was two versus one, t(35) = 1.57, n.s., or three, t(35) = 0.57, n.s., 
units. The interaction was not significant, F(4, 140) = 1.56, n.s. 
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Appendix D : Post-Hoc Analysis for Category Learning Experiments 
To further investigate the mechanisms underlying the obtained priming effect 
pattern an additional analysis was performed in order to determine whether the priming 
effects vary as a function of the participants’ ability to learn the artificial category sets.  
For each experiment, participants were first divided into three levels of learning 
achievement based upon overall error rate in the task.  The third of the participants with 
the lowest overall error rates were classified as the “Good” Learners, whereas the third of 
the participants who had the highest overall error rates were classified as the “Poor” 
Learners.  The middle third were classified as “Fair” Learners.  The priming effects for 
each type of Learner were then calculated both early and late in learning. 
 The working assumption was that either the “Good” or “Poor” Learners may 
show an increase in the size of the response priming effect for correct responses across 
trials.  The reason why the “Good” Learners may show this priming effect pattern is that 
since these Learners more often correctly classified the target stimuli, the response bias 
for these Learners should have clearly developed by the late trial blocks.  Alternatively, 
the “Poor” Learners may show this priming effect pattern since they may have abandoned 
the task of learning the category sets in favour of responding on the basis of any response 
bias. 
For both Experiment 1A and 1B the reaction time latencies for correct responses 
and the errors for the non-prototype targets were submitted to a 3 (learning ability: poor 
vs. fair vs. good) by 2 (trial segment: early (first half of the trials) vs. late (second half of 
the trials)) by 2 (prime congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA.  The results are 
shown in Table 2.  Only the main effect of learning ability and any interactions involving 
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learning ability are reported since the other effects in these analyses are identical to those 
reported above. 
Experiment 1A :  Four-Dimension Category Set 
 Latency analysis.  There was the expected significant main effect of learning 
ability, F(2, 30) = 9.08, p < .002, MSE = 20541.19.  “Poor” Learners (448 ms) responded 
significantly faster than either “Good” (569 ms), t(20) = 3.96, p < .002, SE = 30.56, or 
“Fair” Learners (550 ms), t(20) = 3.34, p < .008, SE = 30.56.  There was no difference in 
response times between “Good” and “Fair” Learners, t(20) = 0.62, n.s.  None of the 
interactions involving learning ability were significant (all Fs < 0.52). 
 Error analysis.  There was the expected significant main effect of learning ability, 
F(2, 30) = 36.63, p < .001, MSE = 0.011.  “Poor” Learners (37.8%) made significantly 
more errors than either “Good” (19.3%), t(20) = 8.41, p < .001, SE = 0.022, or “Fair” 
Learners (26.3%), t(20) = 5.23, p < .001, SE = 0.022.  The difference in error rates 
between “Good” and “Fair” Learners was also significant, t(20) = 3.18, p < .01, SE = 
0.022. 
There was also a marginal interaction between learning ability and trial segment, 
F(2, 30) = 2.59, p < .10, MSE = 0.006.  The magnitude of the decrease in error rates 
between the first and second trial segment for the “Good” Learners (11.2%) was 
marginally greater than for the “Fair” Learners (6.3%) [t(20) = 1.80, p < .09, SE = 0.03] 
and significantly greater than for the “Poor” Learners (3.7%) [t(20) = 2.23, p < .04, SE = 
0.03].  The magnitude of the decrease in error rates between trial segments did not differ 
between the “Fair” and “Poor” Learners [t(20) = 0.66, n.s.].  More importantly, learning 
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Table 1. 
Results for Non-Prototype Targets as a Function of Learning Ability (Reaction Times in 
Milliseconds, Errors in Percent) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Incongruent  Congruent 
Learning Ability  Primes   Primes  PE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Four-Dimensional Category Set (Experiment 1A) 
“Good” Learners 
 Early Trials  565 (23.9)  562 (25.9)   3   
 Late Trials  580 (14.5)  570 (12.8) 10 
 
“Fair” Learners 
 Early Trials  549 (29.5)  536 (29.3) 13 
 Late Trials  562 (25.5)  554 (20.8)   8 
 
“Poor” Learners 
 Early Trials  459 (40.4)  443 (39.0) 16 
 Late Trials  451 (37.4)  440 (34.5) 11 
 
Six-Dimensional Category Set (Experiment 1B) 
“Good” Learners 
 Early Trials  566 (33.0)  558 (33.5)   8 
 Late Trials  572 (24.0)  562 (22.3) 10 
 
“Fair” Learners 
 Early Trials  544 (41.4)  527 (40.5) 17 
 Late Trials  537 (34.7)  530 (36.1)   7 
 
“Poor” Learners 
 Early Trials  461 (48.3)  445 (45.6) 16 
Late Trials  452 (49.7)  443 (45.9)   9 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Note.  Numbers in bracket are the error rates.  PE = Priming Effect 
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ability did not interact with prime congruity, F(2, 30) = 0.56, n.s., nor was the 3-way 
interaction significant, F(2, 30) = 0.27, n.s. 
Experiment 1B : Six-Dimension Category Set 
 Latency analysis.  There was the expected significant main effect of learning 
ability, F(2, 42) = 15.46, p < .001, MSE = 13611.55.  “Poor” Learners (450 ms) 
responded significantly faster than either “Good” (564 ms), t(28) = 5.36, p < .001, SE = 
21.30, or “Fair” Learners (534 ms), t(28) = 3.95, p < .002, SE = 21.30.  There was no 
difference in response times between “Good” and “Fair” Learners, t(28) = 1.41, n.s.  
None of the interactions involving learning ability were significant (All Fs < 0.42). 
 Error analysis.  There was the expected significant main effect of learning ability, 
F(2, 42) = 110.04, p < .001, MSE = 0.005.  “Poor” Learners (47.4%) made significantly 
more errors than either “Good” (28.2%), t(28) = 14.77, p < .001, SE = 0.013, or “Fair” 
Learners (38.2%), t(28) = 7.08, p < .001, SE = 0.013.  “Fair” Learners also made 
significantly more errors than “Good” Learners, t(28) = 7.69, p < .001, SE = 0.013. 
 Learning ability also significantly interacted with trial segment, F(2, 42) = 12.15, 
p < .001, MSE = 0.004.  The magnitude of the decrease in error rates between the first 
and second trial segment was greater for both “Good” (10.2%) [t(28) = 5.48, p < .001, SE 
= 0.02] and “Fair” (5.6%) Learners [t(28) = 2.86, p < .009, SE = 0.02] than for “Poor” 
Learners (-0.01%).  The magnitude of the decrease in error rate was also marginally 
greater for “Good” Learners than for “Fair” Learners [t(28)= 1.89, p < .08, SE = 0.02].  
More importantly, learning ability did not interact with prime congruency, F(2, 42) = 
1.58, n.s., nor was the 3-way interaction significant, F(2, 42) = 0.57, n.s. 
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Summary Statement 
A post-hoc analysis based on correct performance for the non-prototype targets 
was run to determine whether the participants’ ability to learn the category sets may have 
obscured any potential support for the S-R association account.  The question of interest 
was whether the S-R association account may receive support when either examining 
performance for the “Good” Learners since they would have better developed response 
biases or the “Poor” Learners since they may have abandoned any attempt to learn the 
category sets in favour of responding on the basis of any formed response bias.  The 
results indicate that neither the “Good” nor “Poor” Learners produced the predicted 
priming effect pattern. 
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Appendix E : Prime Discrimination Data For Arrow Classifications 
 Although no participants in the present experiments reported noticing the primes, 
a prime discrimination task was administered to a separate group of participants to 
provide a further investigation of the question of prime visibility.  Twenty-two 
participants (age range: 17 – 35, M = 19.45) performed the task using a 77 ms prime-
target interval and 22 participants (age range: 17 – 20, M = 18.36) performed the task 
using a 165 ms prime-target interval. 
Each participant performed 18 practice trials followed by 120 experimental trials 
(four blocks of 30 trials each).  Each trial, both practice and experimental, began with a 
550 ms arrow mask (e.g., ‘><><><><’) followed by a double-headed arrow prime (e.g., 
‘<<’ or ‘>>’) which was backward masked by a 33 ms arrow mask.  A 99 ms stimulus 
(i.e., ‘> <’) either directly followed the backward mask (Experiment 1 – Prime 
Discrimination) or followed the backward mask after an 88 ms blank interval 
(Experiment 2 – Prime Discrimination).  For half the trials the prime pointed to the left 
and for the other half of the trials the prime pointed to the right.  The participants had a 
maximum of 2.5 seconds to respond to indicate the direction of the masked prime before 
the next trial began. 
 During the practice trials, the duration of the prime presentation decreased from 
165 ms (trials 1 thru 6) to 110 ms (trials 7 thru 12) to 55 ms (trials 13 thru 18).  During 
the experimental trials, the prime was always presented for 44 ms.  Participants were 
instructed to make a response even if they were not sure which direction the prime 
pointed or even if there was a prime. 
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 To assess prime discriminability, a sensitivity measure (d’) was calculated.  A hit 
was defined as correctly indicating that a left-pointing arrow prime pointed to the left and 
a false-alarm was defined as incorrectly indicating that a right-pointing arrow prime 
pointed to the left.  In Experiment 1 – Prime Discrimination, the hit rate was 47.4% and 
the false alarm rate was 47.6%.  The resulting d’ score of -0.001 did not deviate from 
zero, t(21) = 0.02, n.s.   In Experiment 2 – Prime Discrimination, the hit rate was 52.9% 
and the false alarm rate was 51.5%.  The resulting d’ score of 0.072 also did not deviate 
from zero, t(21) = 0.26, n.s. 
 In summary, the prime discrimination results using the parameter settings for both 
prime-target intervals provide further evidence that, under the experimental display 
settings used here, participants experienced little, if any, awareness of the prime. 
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Appendix F: Consent Form 
Letter of Information  – An Investigation of Masked Priming Mechanisms 
 
 In this study you will be presented with stimuli on a computer screen.  Depending 
on the experimental condition which you are in you will be required to either make 
word/nonword discriminations, number judgments, learn an artificial category set, or 
determine if an item is a member of a specific category.  In the event that these results are 
published your identity will be kept confidential.   
 
 You should also be aware of the following: 
 
1) There are no known risks involved in participation in this study. 
 
2) There are no hidden or deceptive procedures in this study.  All instructions 
should be taken literally as they are described by the experimenter. 
 
3) The experimenter will provide a general written explanation of the studies 
performed in this lab at the end of the experimental session.  If you wish to 
receive a specific explanation of any study, just let the experimenter know. 
 
4) You will receive one research credit for your participation.  Your participation 
is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from this study at any time during 
the session without loss of credit. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Consent Form – An Investigation of Masked Priming Mechanisms 
 
 I have read the Letter of Information and have had the nature of the study 
explained to me and I agree to participate.  All of my questions have been answered to 
my satisfaction. 
 
_________________________  _____________________________ 
Signature of Participant   Signature of Experimenter 
 
_____________________________        _____________________________ 
Printed Name     Printed Name 
 
_____________________________  _____________________________ 
Date      Date 
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